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The traditional adversarial relationship of labor and 
management in the United States has not precluded ventures 
in cooperation over the years. Recognition of the mutual in 
terests of both groups in economic goals and objectives has 
produced a wide variety of efforts at cooperation beyond the 
normal bargaining-table interactions.
Siegel and Weinberg predict that, due to a number of factors 
in the economy and in the labor force, the American style of 
industrial relations will become increasingly hospitable to 
collaboration. Their examination of the varieties of labor- 
management cooperation should provide both substance and 
encouragement to the dialogue of business, labor, govern 
ment, and civic leaders in exploring the potential contribu 
tion to the economic viability of enterprises, industries, com 
munities, and the nation.
Facts and observations presented in this monograph are the 
sole responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research.
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Preface
Although labor-management cooperation in the United 
States is not a novel phenomenon, it has come to wide public 
attention only in the past decade of persistent economic 
adversity and increasing political conservatism. A great 
many joint committees and similar entities were formed in 
companies, government agencies, and industries and some 
also at the community and national levels to promote the 
mutual interests of employees and employers.
Such collaborative activity will continue to expand and 
flourish in the 1980s. Even while this book was being pro 
cessed for publication, the frontiers of company-level 
cooperation were being pushed forward into new terrain in 
accords reached by the United Autoworkers with Ford 
(February 1982) and General Motors (March 1982). True, 
these accords were negotiated in a season of economic 
distress; but the experience of collaboration in bad times 
may establish and reinforce patterns of behavior that will 
continue as business conditions improve.
The motivation for this book was supplied not only by a 
recognition of the timeliness of the subject, but also by cer 
tain convictions developed by the authors during their long 
and varied professional careers. Early, they acquired a 
respect for the adversarial temper of industrial relations and 
the role of collective bargaining in a pluralistic and evolu 
tionary society largely guided by law. They also soon 
recognized, however, that the natural competition and the 
occasional open hostilities of labor and management do not
Vll
foreclose the earnest pursuit of cooperation for mutual 
benefit, and that the formation of joint committees and the 
like for special purposes need not be inimical to, and could 
actually bolster, the normal bargaining process. In addition, 
they came to the view that communities and the various 
layers of government are probably making insufficient use of 
committees as mechanisms for bringing the broader public 
interest to bear on labor-management decisionmaking.
The authors have had a common core of experience in the 
manpower field, but also differing degrees of concentration 
in the area of labor-management cooperation. Siegel's work 
has ranged widely, but has focued frequently on issues and 
problems involving or requiring collaboration of the two 
parties. For example, in the 1940s, he assisted in the stimula 
tion and diffusion of low-cost technological improvements 
in defense plants; in the promotion of timely planning by 
communities for jobs and counseling services for returning 
veterans and displaced war workers; and in the reconciliation 
of reemployment rights of war veterans and the seniority 
rights of other workers. In the 1950s, he headed a task force 
that drafted legislation for upgrading distressed com 
munities, and he began consultation in the design and im 
plementation of programs for measuring and raising produc 
tivity, an activity that he continued under auspices of the 
Department of Commerce in the 1970s.
Weinberg has had more than three decades of continuous 
service in federal organizations concerned with industrial 
relations, the economic status of workers, the mitigation of 
individual hardship incident to the revision of technology 
and work methods, and the furtherance of labor- 
management cooperation for enhancing productivity and the 
quality of working life. Throughout the 1970s, his respon 
sibilities kept him in personal contact with labor and 
management members of national, industry, community,
Vlll
company, and public agency committees; with officials of 
university centers set up for aid in the formation and conduct 
of committees in their geographic areas; and with researchers 
making studies under contract. These contacts and his duties 
relating to the development of national seminars and 
publications on productivity and worklife quality con 
tributed to a wide familiarity with the literature and informa 
tion sources pertinent to the present study.
The aim of this book is to convey to a broad audience an ap 
preciation of the wide range of opportunities for labor- 
management cooperations, the attendant problems, and the 
derivable benefits. Cooperative arrangements are examined 
at different economic levels, and 65 cases are discussed.
The book has 10 chapters. The first sets up a conceptual 
framework for the review of American experience in 
cooperation and for some brief remarks on the outlook. 
Chapter 2 deals with national committees and commissions 
set up during and since World War I, with labor, business, 
and public representatives, to advise the president and the 
Congress on major policy issues. Chapter 3 relates to joint 
labor-management committees for five industries steel, 
construction, retail food, railroads, and men's clothing. 
Chapter 4 describes six of the 28 communitywide labor- 
management committees that were functioning while this 
study was in progress. The next four chapters concern 
cooperation in the company. The first of these, Chapter 5, 
offers an historical perspective. Chapter 6 concentrates on 
joint programs that aim primarily at improvement of com 
pany performance consultation arrangements, productivi 
ty committees, and quality circles. Chapter 7 covers pro 
grams oriented primarily toward employee welfare health 
and safety, alcoholism, quality of working life, flexible 
schedules, job assistance, and employee ownership. Chapter 
8 considers various incentive programs Scanlon plans, pro 
fit sharing, stock ownership, and pensions.
IX
Chapter 9 acknowledges that government all levels is an 
employer, in addition to serving its other well-known func 
tions, with which labor and management in the private sector 
must reckon. This chapter examines labor-management 
cooperation in public agencies.
The tenth chapter looks to the future. It is followed by three 
appendices, the first of which should be of particular value 
to specialists in labor relations, students of public policy, 
and union and company officials. This appendix includes 28 
documents relating to labor-management cooperation ex 
cerpts from labor contracts, public laws, executive orders, 
policy statements, memoranda of agreement, and model 
provisions and bylaws. Among the highlights are details of 
the new UAW-Ford agreement and of other documents 
relating to General Motors, the Bell System, and the steel in 
dustry.
Appendices B and C will be helpful to readers who wish to 
examine more closely the current status of collaboration. 
Appendix B lists 14 joint committees that were awarded 
grants for fiscal year 1981 under the Labor-Management 
Cooperation Act of 1978. Appendix C provides names, ad 
dresses, and telephone numbers of 26 major nonprofit 
organizations offering assistance in the design of cooperative 
programs.
The authors are grateful to Dr. E. Earl Wright for his en 
couragement at all stages of the preparation of this book. 
They also appreciate the deep interest and helpfulness of 
William L. Batt, Jr., Quality of Work Advisor to the U.S. 
Department of Labor's Labor-Management Services Ad 
ministration.
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Beyond Open Hostilities 
and Collective Bargaining
Prologue
The experience reported in this book reflects favorably on 
the creativity, versatility, and flexibility of American in 
dustrial relations. The deep differences that underlie the 
traditional adversarial postures of labor and management 
have not precluded search for, and invention of, oppor 
tunities for cooperation to mutual advantage. The interest of 
both sides in accommodation has intensified in recent years 
of unrelenting national economic stress, and it promises to 
persist in a world setting of continuing ferment.
Preoccupation in this book with collaborative schemes 
should not be misconstrued, of course, as disparagement of 
other plausible avenues toward needed improvement in our 
nation's productivity and in the quality and salability of its 
products. Effective labor-management cooperation can only 
complement, rather than substitute for, appropriate private 
decisions concerning, say, the mix and design of products, 
techniques of production and distribution, the amount and 
character of physical capital used, wages, and prices. It can 
only complement, rather than substitute for, appropriate 
policies and actions regarding, say, the money supply and in 
terest rates, the size and allocation of public expenditures,
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taxation, regulation, incentives for individual saving and 
business investment, and support for education and 
research. Government's manifold involvements, moreover, 
influence the disposition of labor and management to ex 
plore and pursue cooperative undertakings in addition to 
affecting the national economic performance in other in 
dicated ways.
Due attention must be paid to intercultural differences and 
to our own indigenous strengths when the applicability of 
foreign collaborative arrangements is appraised. At a 
distance, it is easy to overstate the successes achieved 
abroad, to misidentify the critical factors, and to misjudge 
their durability. In any case, literal transplantability is out of 
the question; and selective adaptation entails costs that have 
to seem justified by expected benefits.
To concede the obstacles to naturalization of foreign 
models is not to imply, on the other hand, that domestic im 
itation or diffusion is easy. A cooperative arrangement that 
works in one company, industry, or community is not 
routinely transferable to another. The situation is com 
parable to that experienced in the propagation of 
technology: "best practices" are identifiable more readily 
than they can be copied. Leadership, commitment at the top, 
acceptance below, good will, knowledge, skill, patience, and 
proper followup are as essential to domestic diffusion as they 
are to importation; and labor and management must expect 
benefits to exceed costs.
These remarks should be kept in mind throughout a 
reading of this book. They are offered in awareness that 
news accounts, popular literature, and even the writings of 
scholarly advocates often exaggerate prospects and mute the 
caveats. The important large truth that ought to be proclaim 
ed is less exciting: the adversary style of American industrial 
relations has permitted, rather than forestalled, ventures in 
cooperation, both home-grown and adapted, and it remains
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sufficiently plastic to adjust to new parameters. l The con 
tents of this book should provide encouragement, ideas, and 
guidance to business, labor, government, and civic leaders 
wishing to realize more fully the potential contribution of 
cooperation to the quality of the nation's output and 
worklife, its productivity, and its competitiveness in world 
trade.
Scope
As the chapter title suggests, this book is concerned with 
varieties of cooperation that complement or supplement the 
normal arrangements of labor and management for adver 
sarial interaction in pursuit of predominantly economic ob 
jectives. It features American experience, concentrating, in 
turn, on each of the principal theaters in which significant 
cooperation has occurred or is expected to occur. It pays 
special attention to, but does not focus exclusively on, the 
workplace, the most obvious site of cooperation and the one 
that is typically emphasized in the literature. Furthermore, it 
acknowledges that government has become not only a major 
employer of labor but also a major presence with which 
labor and management must, or should, reckon.
More specifically, this book examines cooperative ar 
rangements in five theaters: 2
1. The national scene, where the federal government 
usually participates as a third, but indispensable, party  
serving, for example, as a catalyst, goad, arbiter, sponsor, 
intermediary, standard-setter, monitor, guarantor, or co- 
financier (chapter 2).
2. The industry level, where the perception of a national 
interest may again accord a key third-party role to the 
federal government (chapter 3).
3. The subnational community, area, or regional level, 
where state and local governments may have explicit roles 
and the federal hand may still be visible (chapter 4).
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4. The private firm or plant, where labor and management 
have to take cognizance of parameters set by government 
policies but generally arrive at agreements without appeal to, 
or intrusion by, a third party (chapters 5-8).
5. The public agency or a component thereof, where the 
federal, state, or local government is itself the 
employer i.e., "management" (chapter 9).
In addition to looking beyond the workplace and giving 
explicit and due recognition to the pervasive government 
presence, this book has a second distinctive feature: It in 
cludes a documentary appendix. This appendix, which 
should be of practical value as well as have scholarly interest, 
presents sample agreements between labor and management 
respecting cooperation and also exhibits pertinent provisions 
of various legislative proposals, laws, avuncular guides, and 
policy statements. Two other appendices offer additional in 
formation that should appeal to practitioners and students 
of industrial relations.
Although this book ranges widely, it cannot, and does not, 
purport to cover the whole eligible domain. The relevant un 
published information is much vaster than the accessible 
portion reviewed by the authors; and, unsurprisingly, the 
published information has its gaps and its favorites. 3 No at 
tempt, furthermore, has been made to exploit the available 
literature exhaustively or to survey certain kinds of coopera 
tion that some readers or other writers might deem pertinent 
or worthy of treatment in depth.
Among the possible additional subtopics of interest, one 
does receive some attention in a later chapter and also in this 
one but is not treated in depth: cooperation at the company 
level in extremis, which involves the sharing of economic 
burdens or losses to avoid shutdowns or severe reductions of 
the workforce and which may inspire subsequent coopera 
tion of the kind that this book emphasizes. 4 No detailed con 
sideration is given to employee representation plans, com-
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pany unions, cooperative associations, or other configura 
tions established (particularly before 1930) by employers 
eager to maintain an "open shop." 5 Also omitted from this 
book is the discussion of "sweetheart" bargains between 
labor and management and other deplored or possibly illegal 
forms of "racketeering." Only passing reference is made to 
the supply of technical and related consulting services by 
union leaders and their designees to management (as 
distinguished from the active participation of the rank and 
file of workers) in the interest of reducing unit costs and in 
creasing price competitiveness. 6 Another matter left for 
other investigators is the engagement of labor and manage 
ment in joint or parallel activities to protect or advance par 
ticular firms, industries, or communities through advertis 
ing, political lobbying, possibly illegal collusion against com 
petitors, or litigation. 7 Finally, we do not treat informal, 
spontaneous collaboration that is so natural to very small 
enterprises in which workers and employers have frequent 
personal contact.
Some Definitions9
A few of the terms already used have multiple meanings or 
may, for other reasons, require commentary. Discussion of 
them extends our remarks on the scope of this book. It may 
be gratuitous to dwell on the different connotations of words 
like "labor," "management," "government," and "state," 
but it should help the reader to know that "cooperation" 
and "collaboration" are used interchangeably.
It is difficult, but also unnecessary, to draw a precise 
boundary between "normal arrangements" for adversarial 
interaction and the extra-normal modes of collaboration that 
are of primary interest to this book. In a country like ours, 
the field of industrial relations as a whole is still open, grow 
ing, and evolutionary. What may be considered extra- 
normal at one time or in one place could well appear normal 
later or elsewhere.
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"Open hostilities," a term used in the chapter title, refers 
to the most dramatic, but fortunately not the most prevalent, 
of the interactions between labor and management. It in 
cludes strikes, strikebreaking, "job actions," "sit-ins," 
"sick-outs," mass picketing, boycotts, injunctions, 
lockouts, etc. Such hostilities have sometimes involved 
serious property damage, armed confrontations, and violent 
"massacres." 9
A much more common mode of adversarial interaction is 
negotiation, best exemplified nowadays by "collective 
bargaining" to which the chapter title also refers. Such 
bargaining has been politely described as "a process of 
reasoning and persuasion," 10 and, even more loftily, as the 
foundation for a system of "industrial jurisprudence." 11 It 
does not, however, exclude threats of resort to open 
hostilities and is sometimes reinforced by demonstrations 
and token work stoppages. Yet, despite its histrionics, 
bluster, tensions, crises, and frustrations, the bargaining 
ritual eventuates, as a rule, in temporarily acceptable or 
tolerable contracts relating to base pay, escalator ad 
justments, overtime, fringe benefits, hours and conditions of 
work, criteria for promotion and layoff, pensions and sup 
plementary unemployment benefits, retirement, rights and 
obligations of employees, and the prerogatives of manage 
ment. As the Secretary-Treasurer of AFL-CIO remarked at a 
conference of 1980 on productivity and the quality of 
worklife, collective bargaining is, indeed, "difficult and un 
tidy at times," but it has also "proven workable and fair 
on ... major issues"; and it could, furthermore, serve as 
"the logical mechanism for increasing the involvement of 
workers" in cooperative endeavors. 12
Negotiation also includes requested third-party interven 
tion for arbitration or mediation to settle contract disputes. 
Collective bargaining agreements often make provision for 
such intervention in addition to provision for the establish-
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ment and administration of in-house machinery to deal with 
worker complaints, grievances, and discipline problems. All 
such arrangements are interpretable as forms of coopera 
tion, but they are also "normal" enough to be regarded as 
outside the scope of this book. Certain other contractual 
provisions for cooperation along specific lines do, however, 
qualify for attention here; they may either concern matters 
sufficiently different from the ordinary bargaining issues or 
represent the culmination of experimental ventures that 
began outside the bargaining process. Some such ventures 
start as initiatives of management; others originate with dual 
blessing of labor and management, sanctioned by letters or 
memoranda of understanding.
The degree of extra-normal cooperation sought by the two 
(or three) parties varies according to the problem and the cir 
cumstances. Cooperation may be limited to discussion or 
consultation on specific matters of mutual interest (e.g., pro 
ductivity, product quality, or industrial peace); or it could 
also involve the adoption of agreeable procedures and action 
in accord therewith (as in the cases of safety, health, and 
alcoholism). At first, a need may be perceived for opening 
and maintaining two-way channels of communication to 
assure the effective implementation of contracts or ar 
rangements already in force; but, having achieved functional 
rapport and looking to the future, labor and management 
may wish to make joint exploration of additional complex or 
technical issues (e.g., adjustment to technological change) in 
an atmosphere of calm without the pressure of tight 
deadlines. The aim of such an endeavor may be the formula 
tion of a timely acceptable program; or it may also envisage 
installation and administration (as in the cases of pensions 
and Scanlon plans).
The disposition to collaborate and the choice of ap 
propriate joint undertakings depend not only on the spec 
trum of visible mutual concerns but also on less evident con-
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siderations. These considerations may be "philosophical," 
strategic, economic, or political. Labor and management 
both have traditional reservations regarding a semblance of 
open courtship. They could also have sharply different 
evaluations of the costs and benefits of particular 
cooperative programs. They may, furthermore, be subject to 
unequal influence by such external factors as the business cy 
cle, legislated standards and regulations, and earlier judicial 
rulings.
Among the vehicles of extra-normal collaboration are 
boards, commissions, councils, committees, and less formal 
study groups, work teams, and task forces. As has already 
been implied, ad hoc entities may first be set up experimen 
tally; if they prove constructive and viable, they may acquire 
permanence and recognition as "normal." Where the nature 
of the cooperation does not require active rank-and-file par 
ticipation, no explicit and identifiable joint structure may 
need to be set up.
Cooperation in the Adversarial Context
Familiar connotations of the adjective "adversarial" tend 
to obscure the place of cooperation in human affairs in 
general and in American industrial relations in particular. 
Since the opening sentence of a preceding section says that 
"this book is concerned with varieties of cooperation that 
complement or supplement the normal arrangements of 
labor and management for adversarial interaction in pursuit 
of predominantly economic objectives," some discussion of 
cooperation in an adversarial context is appropriate.
We start with a universal truism that, once stated, appears 
self-evident: Any protracted relationship among people is 
bound to exhibit elements of conflict, competition, and 
cooperation.^ The mix of elements varies, of course, from 
case to case; and, for each case, the mix varies through time 
also. When we call behavior "adversarial," we really mean
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that conflict and competition are conspicuously present or 
even are dominant, rather than that cooperation is complete 
ly absent. Thus, whatever opinions labor and management 
may hold of each other, they agree more often than not to 
function as "factors of production" to cooperate suffi 
ciently for the generation of the output and income that both 
want. When they bargain or otherwise negotiate over income 
shares and other matters, they tacitly or explicitly agree to 
follow various rules prescribed by custom, law, or common 
sense for arrival at mutually (if only temporarily) tolerable 
results. Even during strikes and other open hostilities, ag 
gression and violence usually are controlled, directed, or 
sublimated to avoid irreversible harm to the "production 
function" to avoid either extreme damage to plant and 
equipment or the "annihilation" of either party.
Another truism requires statement here, even though it too 
may seem gratuitous once it has been expressed: The in 
evitability of some degree of cooperation in any human 
enterprise does not assure either a full constructive realiza 
tion of the potential benefits of cooperation or a fair sharing 
of them. In the absence of complete mutual trust (the usual 
situation), even a genuine offer of extra-normal cooperation 
by a stronger adversary may be perceived by the weaker par 
ty as coercive, patronizing, or debilitating; and a similar 
gambit by a weaker adversary could in turn be perceived by 
the stronger one as a bid for change in the power balance. 
Again, in the absence of trust, the two parties may resign 
themselves to a life of barren circumstantial tangency instead 
of seeking more positive mutual fulfillment. This familiar 
dismal equilibrium itself inspires many observers to preach 
the remedy of cooperation.
Historians, political leaders, and elder statesmen of the 
business world and the labor movement often think of "pro 
gress" as a succession of social states dominated by single 
behavioral elements. Thus, they often see the arrow of
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human evolution or "civilization" pointing away from a 
"primitive" stage of conflict toward a more "advanced" 
stage of competition, and thence toward a "mature," and 
possibly "ideal," order of cooperation. In the realm of in 
dustrial relations, some such motion has actually occurred. 
The exigencies of two World Wars and the "laboristic" 14 
legislation of the New Deal (especially the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act of 1932, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 
and the Wagner Act of 1935) helped to replace an era 
characterized by labor-management conflict by an era 
featuring competition. These developments helped to shrink 
and to bound the vast original domain of "management 
prerogatives" that had been as sacrosanct as the overlapping 
domain of property rights; to confer legitimacy and respec 
tability on unionization; to establish collective bargaining as 
a national norm; and to diminish the violent potential of 
labor-management disputes. 15
The "progress" toward competition, however, is hardly 
complete. The strike weapon, for example, does not yet hang 
on a wall to rust. It is used with discomfiting frequency by 
street cleaners, transport workers, teachers, police officers, 
firefighters, and other local public servants. It is still used oc 
casionally in major industries, such as coal mining, that 
follow the rule of "no contract, no work"; and "wildcat" 
walkouts may occur almost anywhere. Especially remarkable 
was the illegal strike of air traffic controllers, a group of 
federal employees, as recently as August 1981. "Progress" 
toward competition, furthermore, has not meant 
economywide establishment of unionization on a firm foun 
dation of collective bargaining. Witness, for example, the 
enactment of "right-to-work" laws in many states under the 
umbrella of Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947; the 
declining proportion of the workforce enrolled in unions; 
and the frequency with which government has acted as 
"first" party, rather than third, to promulgate work-related 
standards and guidelines.
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The time appears right for a more determined exploration 
than ever of the benefits derivable from labor-management 
cooperation, even if the 1980 elections portend a contraction 
of the federal role as third party. Visions of entry into a new 
era of collaboration, however, should be discounted in view 
of the preceding paragraph; the potentials of our own era of 
competition have been only partly realized, and vestiges of 
the era of conflict have not been exorcised. While welcoming 
new opportunities for joint action to mutual advantage, 
labor and management have good reason to cling to the 
adversary system and to continue circling each other in wary 
competition. The authenticity of the agreements emerging 
from their future interaction depends on the preservation of 
their individualities, which have been shaped by function, 
history, and memory. Their identities should not now be 
casually shed; cooperation should not become a synonym of 
co-option, nor should it become a euphemism for ir 
revocable transfer of economic decisionmaking power from 
the two parties to government in an unequal triple "partner 
ship."
The remarks just made probably still represent the major 
ity sentiment in business and labor ranks. Even if elder 
statesmen fail to mention reservations, limits, and cautions 
in their calls for attenuation of the adversarial spirit, the 
silent qualifications need to be kept in mind. After all, this 
spirit has served us well over the years if the payoff is 
reckoned in terms of material well-being, leisure, the 
amenities and the "democracy" of the workplace, 16 and the 
vigor, diversity, and openness of our society. Under 
"capitalism" with a human face, American workers have 
been able to strive successfully for the "more" that Gompers 
envisaged; they did not have to organize into a permanent 
"class" party and resign themselves to grim collective strug 
gle for problematic personal economic improvement under 
the banner of Marxism, socialism, or syndicalism. 17 Further 
more, workers remain free to seek union representation
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where it does not exist (e.g., in various "sunbelt" areas and 
in new Japanese-owned plants); and they also are free to 
petition and vote for decertification of unions already 
established. Management, too, is active in its own behalf, 
legally discouraging unionization and filing complaints, as 
required, against secondary boycotts and unfair picketing. 18
Cooperation in Industrial Relations Literature
Students of industrial relations have, of course, recogniz 
ed the element of cooperation in both the statics and 
dynamics of the adversarial interaction of labor and manage 
ment. In one well-regarded book, this interaction is called an 
"armed truce." 19 Another prominent author has called it 
"antagonistic cooperation," borrowing a phrase from W. 
G. Sumner, the pioneer American sociologist; and he spoke 
of the goal of "mutual survival," rather than victory by an 
nihilation. 20 A leading economist and systems theorist has 
observed that labor and management are bound together in a 
workable, though untranquil, marriage of convenience and 
necessity:
Industrial conflict is ... a curiously ambivalent 
affair, closer to the domestic battle of the sexes 
than to the clash of armies. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to build on the positive-sum or cooperative 
aspects of the game and to develop institutions that 
express this aspect. This is perhaps why the union, 
which may have been originally devised to pros 
ecute conflict in many instances becomes an instru 
ment to resolve it in a way . . . that an army never 
does. 21
The "positive sum" mentioned in the preceding quotation 
is a desideratum commended by many thoughtful commen 
tators on industrial relations. In other terminological guises, 
it is esteemed in the classical writings of such fields as scien 
tific management, industrial psychology, personnel ad-
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ministration, organization theory, and group dynamics. 22 A 
designer of quality of worklife committees, writing in 1980, 
was surely thinking of the the difference between a positive- 
sum game and a zero-sum game when he observed that labor 
and management must be taught the existence of cooperative 
modes of interaction having "win-win options" as alter 
natives to more familiar modes having " win-lose 
outcomes." 23 A major textbook of the 1960s concluded with 
the proposal that the two parties should progress from mere 
"conjunctive bargaining" to "cooperative bargaining," 
which is "at least a stage higher in the industrial relations 
evolutionary hierarchy." In the first of these two varieties of 
bargaining, excessive emphasis is said to be placed on "com 
petition," with possibly adverse spillovers for the general 
public; the second seeks "fuller exploitation of the special 
contribution which each party can make to an improved per 
formance," and without collusion at the expense of others. 24 
Another book of the same decade contrasted "distributive" 
bargaining, which focuses on relative shares of the common 
output, with "integrative" bargaining, which features (as in 
the Scanlon plan, discussed in chapter 8) cooperative prob 
lem solving in the interest of enlarging the common output. 25
Experience gained on the production front during World 
War I increased awareness of the potentials of cooperation 
in the workplace. In 1918, the year in which he was elevated 
to the Supreme Court, Brandeis lent his legal prestige to the 
proposition that the participation and "consent" of 
employees in the formulation of work rules and policies were 
more conducive to "efficiency" than was the usual manage 
ment practice of dictation. 26 Elton Mayo was saying similar 
things at the same time. 27 Mary Parker Follett, an influential 
business philosopher and consultant of the 1920s a period 
in which advanced management adroitly fought the inroads 
of unionism by more imaginatively addressing the wants of 
labor noted that disputes could be settled by three means: 
domination, compromise, and "integration."She advocated
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cultivation of the third approach, which requires no fun 
damental concession by either party yet yields ponderable 
benefits to both. 28 A business professor seconded the mo 
tion, referring to this constructive win-win outcome as the 
"double plus." 29
Seasoned labor leaders have also looked forward to 
peaceable times in which workers, management, and the 
public could realize the fruits of cooperation. In 1925, 
William Green, head of AFL, proposed that "the an 
tagonistic and hostile attitude, so characteristic of the old 
order in industry, must be supplanted by a friendly relation 
ship and a sense of obligation and responsibility." Indeed, 
through good faith on both sides, he ventured, "the com 
mon problems of industry can be solved, efficiency in service 
promoted, and economies in production introduced." 30 He 
was surely mindful of the contrast between labor's positive 
acceptance during World War I and the anti-union reaction 
of the aftermath. In 1940, when World War II had already 
engulfed Europe, Philip Murray, the head of CIO, envisaged 
that true acceptance of collective bargaining would lead to 
greater cooperation, with the union instrumental "in achiev 
ing efficient plant operation." Clinton Golden, an associate 
of Murray's in organizing the steelworkers, expressed a 
similar sentiment more strongly in a book published in 1942: 
"union-management cooperation tends to make manage 
ment more efficient and unions more cost-conscious, thereby 
improving the competitive position of a business enterprise 
and increasing the earnings of both workers and owners." 31 
In 1973, I. W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers, 
recalled Murray's view of 1940 that labor and management 
could cooperate to meet threats to their common interests; 
he was writing in favor of the Experimental Negotiating 
Agreement (of which more will be said later), a "revolu 
tionary new bargaining procedure" eliminating the possibili 
ty of a nationwide strike or lockout and providing for volun 
tary arbitration of unresolved issues. This new approach was
Beyond Open Hostilities 15
motivated by recognition of the ravages of the 1959 strike 
and of the encouragement given to stockpiling and to im 
ports by uncertainties as to the outcome of subsequent 
rounds of contract talks. 32
In the 1979 address of the president-elect of the Industrial 
Relations Research Association (IRRA), the "adversary" 
and "voluntary" principles were hailed as the twin pillars of 
the "American Ideology." According to this assessment, the 
two principles have served well historically, the tension be 
tween them keeping the tension between labor and manage 
ment generally within bounds. As a rule, the two parties have 
proved "practical" and "pragmatic," disposed to seek and 
accept compromise and incremental change. They have tacit 
ly agreed to "institutionalization" of the "bargaining 
game," with increasing reliance on "professional" players 
for attainment of "some equitable combination" of wages 
and profits. Furthermore, they have probed opportunities 
for "more direct collaboration," for establishment of 
"more constructive, integrative, cooperative, problem- 
solving, and trusting relationships to use the terms that 
have been variously applied to the 'higher' stage of industrial 
relations development.''
But, according to the same IRRA observer, something has 
been happening along the way to "voluntarism" the prin 
ciple that requires private parties to try to adjust their oppos 
ing interests with "maximum freedom" from outside in 
terference. He sees this principle "subjected to attrition by 
increased doses of state intervention" as the complementary 
adversary principle proves unable, or too slow, to meet cer 
tain new and important challenges. Among the egregious 
failures are: the peaceful and fair resolution of wage and 
other issues in the public sector, the acknowledgment and 
just disposition of the claims of women and minorities in 
company agreements, a proper recognition of the social con 
cern to halt inflation, and the satisfaction of many non- 
monetary needs or wants of workers (such as improvement
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of worklife quality and of measures for occupational health 
and safety). Consequently, the IRRA observer sees private 
decisionmaking, particularly at the level of the firm, being 
outflanked; the state, as third party, is "moving in to 
regulate the results as well as the procedure of bargaining." 
He is discreetly silent on the encouragement of state incur 
sion offered by the private parties themselves not only 
through their neglect of changing labor market and socio- 
demographic realities but also through their active courtship 
of political power.
The Governmental Presence
The preceding section and the description of the five 
theaters at the outset attest to the pervasiveness of govern 
ment's involvement in contemporary economic affairs. The 
scale and diversity of federal participation have increased 
enormously under a wide assortment of influences, especial 
ly in the past two generations or so influences, incidentally, 
that will largely persist even if the 1980 elections are validly 
interpretable as a "mandate" to halt the proliferation and to 
reduce the variety and cost of federal programs. Some of the 
inspired cutbacks will have to be compensated, however 
tardily and reluctantly, by state and local (as well as new 
private) expenditures. Besides, some of the reductions will be 
replaced, or more than replaced by enlarged federal outlays 
for other purposes (e.g., defense). Accordingly, the share of 
all government jurisdictions in the gross national product 
will not decline significantly or at all. The economy, in short, 
will remain clearly "mixed," rather than become evidently 
private; and the long term trend toward governmental 
"monitoring" or regulation of the private sector's interac 
tions is more likely to be redirected and to become more dif 
fuse than to be arrested for long or clearly reversed.
The proliferating federal economic role has been shaped 
by many social, physical, technological, and psychological 
factors, and, of course, it has affected many of these in turn.
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It represents a response, in part, to the altering size, com 
position, and geographic distribution of the population, 
labor force, and industry. It also reflects, in part, the 
transformation of popular values, attitudes, and life styles. 
Thus, with the rise of material welfare and leisure, "industry 
and frugality" have lost their old vitality as personal 
precepts; and other storied virtues, such as individualism and 
self-reliance, have likewise lost much of their pristine appeal. 
Furthermore, voluntary association for the advancement of 
group interests, so much admired by early foreign observers 
like de Tocqueville, has increasingly involved the unabashed 
quest of political favor and even of public financial 
assistance. But American society is still open, as the 1980 
elections remind, so it remains responsive even to nostalgia 
in its continuing evolution.
Does the 1980 shift in the political spectrum foretoken a 
diminished federal presence in industrial relations? Probably 
not, despite some decentralization of power to the states and 
greater reliance on private decisionmaking. Not only will the 
traditional concerns that prompted the past growth and 
diversification of the federal economic role persist, but many 
new issues and problems will also demand federal address. 
For such reasons, government may be expected to remain a 
visible and potent third party in industrial affairs. Further 
more, it may be tempted during the first presidential 
quadrennium of the 1980s to act like a dominant first par 
ty for example, prescribing new rules of behavior for the 
other two parties, reversing the relative influence of labor 
and management in public counsels, and relinquishing 
established responsibilities or relegating them to the states. 
Such alterations of the status quo could, for a while, en 
courage retreat from competition to conflict in industrial 
relations. On the other hand, they could also improve the 
willingness of labor and management to seek cooperative 
solutions to the common problems that they face at the com 
pany, community, and industry levels. The coexistence of
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cooperation and adversarial strivings, as we have said so 
often in preceding pages, is not at all paradoxical.
American and Foreign 
Cooperative Styles33
At this juncture, we extend our opening remarks on inter 
national and intercultural differences affecting cooperative 
styles. We start with a few observations, some of them 
restating points already made, about the United States. Then 
we proceed to comment briefly on other nations with which 
we trade and compete for markets.
Five points regarding the United States deserve mention:
1. The basic adversarial premise of American labor- 
management relations historically has proved consistent with 
a preference for negotiation over open hostilities and, 
moreover, with a disposition to seek collaboration beyond 
the pale of prior contract.
2. The large federal presence has exerted a subtle pressure 
for labor-management cooperation, and this pressure can 
only increase with the devolution of various federal respon 
sibilities to the states.
3. Cooperation is also favored by the relative informality 
of interpersonal communications in our country between 
workers and their leaders, between workers and their super 
visors, between ordinary citizens and government officials.
4. The same may be said about the comparative lack of 
class rigidity and class consciousness (and the corollary no 
tion that room still exists for upward economic and social 
mobility).
5. The usual focus of American contract negotiation is the 
company or plant, even when bargaining is conducted on an 
industry level. (Thus, attention is given to local, shopfloor 
issues and to the workers' immediate concerns with pay, 
leisure, status, and aspects of the quality of working life. 
Matters left unresolved by contract are more likely to be ad-
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dressed cooperatively than to be deferred to tripartite com 
missions or to national elections.)
Manners of speaking in Western Europe may have con 
tributed to a mistaken view that workers there enjoy a 
superior shop environment. In 1969, a Canadian professor 
of industrial relations perceptively remarked that 
" misleading labeling" tends to convey the impression that 
"North American workers have less control over their daily 
lives than do their European counterparts." Actually, "the 
situation is just the reverse":
Neither codetermination, nor works councils, nor 
anything else European industrial relations systems 
have thus far produced protects workers as much as 
a local union can in North America, given the more 
sophisticated nature of our collective agreements 
and our grievance and arbitration procedures. 34
This appraisal still appears valid after a dozen years of 
quickening interest on both sides of the Atlantic in measures 
to "humanize" work or otherwise to improve the quality of 
working life. Three later informed comments follow.
In a comparative survey of industrial relations made in the 
late 1970s, American students saw labor and management in 
the United States matter-of-factly testing schemes of 
cooperation that were euphorically and grandly being iden 
tified in West Europe with "industrial democracy" and with 
evolution from "economic man" to "social man." Indeed, 
some of the European advances would not have been regard 
ed in the United States as evidences of "democracy" at all, 
or have been welcomed by workers there any more en 
thusiastically than by managers. The American observers 
considered symptomatic the absence, at a major conference 
on worklife quality held in the United States in May 1977, of 
buzzwords familiar to the European scene: codetermination, 
works councils, self-management, worker influence, rights
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to consultation, financial participation, shopfloor 
democracy, and so forth. Instead, they heard "words com 
ing from deep inside the American libertarian tradition," 35 
words like cooperation, dignity, trust, experiment, shared, 
collective bargaining, involvement, and human. In the Euro 
pean cases that they studied, they discerned little emphasis 
on worker decisionmaking and voluntary union- 
management collaboration; they missed the "pragmatic uni 
quely American sense of evolutionary trial and error growth 
without legal prescriptions therefor.*' 36
A group of American labor and management represen 
tatives touring three West German factories in May 1981 
found, unsurprisingly, that "the work humanization move 
ment, now about 10 years old, is taking divergent ap 
proaches in different countries, depending largely on each 
nation's culture." In the United States, where "in 
dividualism" has long held sway, the emphasis is on rank 
and file involvement in shopfloor decisionmaking. In West 
Germany, where "humanization" is supported by govern 
ment as well as private funds, an elected works council con 
sults with management on productivity issues. At each of the 
visited plants,
council members seemed offended when asked if 
they had an organized method of eliciting work- 
improvement ideas from ordinary employees, such 
as quality-of-worklife committees and quality 
circles so popular now in the U.S. and Japan. "We 
know what the workers want," they would reply. 37
A principal official of the United Auto Workers (UAW), 
writing in 1974, underscored the American difference while 
conceding European priority in efforts to increase 
significantly the explicit participation of workers in manage 
ment. 38 First, he observed that American unions have a daily 
and persistent responsibility for improvement of worklife 
quality, as any modern contract should make clear. Second,
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he stated that American unions would rather join with 
management in the design of satisfying jobs than stand by 
passively. Third, he claimed that greater participation of 
workers in decisionmaking is perceived in the United States 
as one of the elements of worklife quality. Such participa 
tion, he further opined, would, in keeping with the 
nonideological temper of American industrial relations, 
develop incrementally and focus on "managing the job" 
rather than "managing the enterprise."
Before turning to Japan, we note a curious proposal made 
in the European Economic Community in 1981 that is at 
great variance with the spirit of diversity that rules, even in 
the quest of greater cooperation, in the United States. This 
proposal contemplated compulsion of member countries to 
adopt a standard form of consultative council or board to 
serve as the vehicle of worker participation. It looked toward 
"harmonization" through a choice among four forms 
already used in Europe, including the German-style works 
council. 39
The cultural heritage of Japan has decisively shaped her 
pattern of industrial cooperation. It has transmuted such 
"American" ideas as statistical quality control and matrix 
management as tellingly as it has absorbed and exploited the 
principles and processes of Western technology. It is a 
holistic tradition that sets high value on patience, education, 
industriousness, parsimony, loyalty, mutual obligation, peer 
approval, respect for age and authority (which tend to be 
highly correlated), conformity, and consensus. Workers 
prefer attachment to firms offering lifelong employment; do 
not mind membership in company unions; identify their own 
welfare with their employers'; reputedly put forth more ef 
fort than their counterparts in the United States or West Ger 
many; often try to learn each other's jobs; accept pay that 
largely reflects company performance and their own age and 
seniority; and willingly master elementary statistics for better
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communication with supervisors and resident engineers on 
production problems. Management seems to be accessible 
and paternalistic, and department heads apparently avoid 
suboptimization in pursuit of company profitability. Par 
ticularly impressive to foreign observers is the close integra 
tion of productivity and cost objectives with the maintenance 
and improvement of quality, which is a paramount concern 
of all employees, all departments, and even of vendors and 
suppliers.
A few quotations from very recent (1980-81) writings add 
some detail to these general remarks on the significance of 
cultural factors in defining labor-management cooperation 
in Japan:
1. An article in an American business magazine states that 
the mass of learned studies of the Japanese style leaves 
" totally ignored" one vital element: " Japanese managers 
trust not only their workers but also their peers and 
superiors." This "all-encompassing trust leads to a 
simplified organizational structure that has helped many 
Japanese companies become low-cost producers." 40
2. According to the founder and president of a Japanese 
company making tapes and electronic parts, "the Japanese 
way of thinking about the enterprise is based on Buddhism: 
dedicating oneself to pleasing other people in the 
company." 41
3. A survey of Japanese industry made by a leading British 
weekly finds that "unions are still a cross between collective 
bargainers and personnel departments; 16 percent of com 
pany directors in Japan have once been union officials." In 
some of the large companies, unions are apparently retained 
"only as a formality." 42
4. The manager of the Washington office of the Japan 
Productivity Center declared in an interview that the worker 
safety record of his country is far better than ours and that 
"absenteeism is almost unheard of." He noted that chief ex 
ecutive officers are "usually" 65-70 years old and that pro-
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motion on the basis of seniority is still the rule: "If we don't 
do that, it will disrupt that teamwork concept." A foreman 
has at least 10 years of prior company experience and is also 
skilled in a broadly defined craft. Because he is allowed to be 
a member of the company union, he is a particularly useful 
two-way channel of communication between labor and 
management. Furthermore, he is encouraged by manage 
ment to be close to his workers, ideally to serve as a "parent 
figure." 43
5. Statistical quality control has become a national creed 
and the subject of a coveted annual prize and subsidiary 
awards. The prize is named for W. Edwards Deming, the 
American who lectured on the nature and use of the 
statistical technique in prostrate Japan after World War II. 
The award ceremonies are broadcast live on television. 
"Each year the competition grows in intensity as more and 
more companies volunteer to undergo the close scrutiny re 
quired." Winners of the prize and associated awards gain in 
"profits and prestige." For other companies, "the ceremony 
is a time for self-reckoning." 44
6. An American expert on business in Asia notes that "in 
Japan quality control is a management technique. It is a 
method of mobilizing, organizing and motivating people, a 
way of treating them with respect." 45
7. The managing director of a prominent Japanese firm 
speaks of the quality control circle as a means of restoring 
the "joy of production," the pride of craftsmanship, lost in 
scientific management. Members of the circles have the 
"pleasure" of hearing evaluations of company products 
directly from customers and also have the "excitement" of 
making presentations to their fellows. 46
8. The director of productivity improvement of an 
American aircraft company that has adopted the quality cir 
cle points to 15 years of Japanese development of the con 
cept before its attainment of worldwide attention. Our own 
culture, he surmises, may "not yet" provide a "fertile soil" 
for the concept, being disposed to seek "quick results" and
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"panaceas." All quality circles in our country represent, in 
his view, "pilot projects," none having yet "achieved in- 
stitutionalization." 47
Collaboration for Economic Renewal
In the years ahead, American labor and management will 
have good reason to explore more seriously than ever the 
potential benefits of cooperation. Foreign competition will 
prove a more cogent goad than will the claims made for 
foreign models. But additional threatening circumstances 
will also compel labor and management to adjust bargaining 
aims, strategies, and postures with more evident regard to 
their common interests. Among these circumstances are: a 
stubborn, revivable inflation; sustained high interest rates 
and reduced federal expenditures, both of which are intend 
ed to check this inflation; a further revolution in energy 
costs; and a major retreat of the federal government from 
responsibilities assumed during the past half century. The 
combined effect of all these pressures is to menace the pro 
fitability and viability of many major manufacturing firms 
and industries, the credibility of unions and of common 
managerial practices, the stability of once flourishing com 
munities and regions, and the future availability of jobs.
Cooperation will presumably be facilitated by a 
widespread and sober realism concerning the conditions of, 
and impediments to, success. Experience cited in later 
chapters should have taught labor and management that, 
despite the enthusiasms of many popular and scholarly 
writings, the path to significant and mutually beneficial col 
laboration is neither smooth nor unique, the journey is not 
costless or quick, and the desired end results are not assured 
or necessarily durable. Experience also underscores the im 
portance of top-level involvement, sustained commitment by 
the two parties, professional guidance and special training of 
pertinent personnel, reorientation of attitudes of middle and 
lower-level management as well as of local union officials,
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and so forth. The great payoff within a firm, industry, or 
community can come only with an evolution from isolated 
and tentative "experiments" in cooperation to more com 
prehensive and institutionalized practice.
In addition to the voluminous evidence of contemporary 
experimentation, it is desirable to take note of earlier im 
pressive collaborative responses to perceived industrial 
challenges. Outstanding in our nation's history was the for 
mation (detailed in chapter 5) of some 5,000 plant commit 
tees to help meet the massive production demands of World 
War II. Similar responses on a much smaller scale have also 
been called forth in the aftermath of disastrous strikes in 
various industries e.g., railroads, steel, and men's 
clothing. 48
Indicative of the new inclination to collaborate is the crea 
tion of a prestigious Labor-Management Group in March 
1981 without government participation. The coordinator of 
the Group is John T. Dunlop, a former Secretary of Labor 
who has long been a leader in the field of industrial relations. 
According to the Group's statement of purpose (see 
documentary appendix), "the national interest requires a 
new spirit of mutual trust and cooperation, even though 
management and organized labor are, and will remain, 
adversaries on many issues." Among its tasks will be the ex 
ploration of "a wide range of issues with particular emphasis 
on revitalizing the nation's economic base, rebuilding the 
private and public infrastructures on which our productive 
capacity as a nation depends, and stimulating safe and effi 
cient means for meeting the nation's energy needs." 49
Another indication of the ripeness of the time for 
widespread commitment to collaboration beyond the usual 
limits of collective bargaining is contained in the 1980 ad 
dress of the president of IRRA, the same scholar whose 1979 
observations have already been summarized. "A questioning 
mood," he stated in 1980, "is abroad in our land as we grope
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for explanations of our economic comedown in the 
world if we have come down." Indeed, "in industrial rela 
tions we are questioning once again the adversarial principle 
and its institutions." It is evident that, in the public sector, 
especially at the local government level, the principle too 
often is applied with great inconvenience to the citizenry. In 
general, the institution of bargaining operates best in deter 
mining financial rewards and the distribution of economic 
power. But, "come new questions like inflation, quality of 
worklife, affirmative action, which involve problem-solving 
rather than distributive processes, and collective bargaining 
either rejects these sorts of issues or adapts only with great 
strain." Our time of adversity requires a rethinking of "an 
cient truths." The afflicted automobile and steel industries 
provide a "laboratory" for new "experiments" in the "art 
of collaboration and problem-solving" experiments con 
cerned with " 'co-determination,' employee ownership, 
quality of worklife, and quality control." 50
An article of February 1981 in a major business magazine 
bears on the change in traditional attitudes already occurring 
in the beleaguered automobile industry. The UAW leader at 
Chrysler (where workers had agreed in 1979 to give up some 
of their negotiated gains in wages in behalf of employment 
maintenance and future profit sharing) is quoted as saying 
that his union would show "how to build cars cheaper, or to 
save on scrap" if such assistance would help keep a high-cost 
plant open. At Ford and GM, the article noted, management 
still balked at the suggestion of profit sharing, but "opposi 
tion to some forms of decisionmaking with the UAW may 
not be as adamant as in the past." According to a "manage 
ment insider,"
We can't afford to be too adversarial any more. 
The Japanese are taking care of that for us. A dif 
ferential of $700 a car is pretty persuasive evidence 
for gaining the cooperation of the union. 51
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By the end of 1981, Japanese competition and sluggishness 
of the American automobile market obliged (1) several 
UAW locals to accede to cost-saving work-rule concessions 
and (2) the national union board to allow company-level 
discretion on the reopening of the contracts before expira 
tion. Commenting on the work-rule concessions, the presi 
dent of UAW noted that "adversity causes people to change 
their minds." Other remarks suggest that the new bargaining 
agenda will include profit sharing and worker representation 
on company boards of directors as well as work-rule and 
wage concessions. 52
The 1980 contract between steel producers and the United 
Steelworkers (USA) called for establishment of "labor- 
management participation teams" as a means for improving 
productivity and worklife quality. This venture will be 
discussed in chapter 6. Meanwhile, we note a report on train 
ing begun for teams set up at selected plants on a trial basis 
that states: "The biggest problem, as other industries have 
discovered in trying the participatory approach, is convinc 
ing first-line supervisors that they must change their manage 
ment style and listen to the suggestions of workers instead of 
merely barking orders." There are skeptics, of course, in 
both USA and the companies, but a major movement has 
started with awareness that, at best, "it will take years for 
this shopfloor cooperation to spread throughout the in 
dustry." 53
Are the automobile and steel industries unique in their 
readiness to reconsider the sociology of work? No. In many 
others, such as aircraft and machinery construction, com 
munication equipment, and food, the enlistment of blue- 
collar interest in production methods, quality, and perfor 
mance is on the union-management agenda. 54 "Evidence 
suggests," according to an article of March 1981, "that the 
untapped potential may be substantial." The finger is now 
"pointing to managerial failings as a major cause of the 
decline in competitiveness"; and one egregious alleged fail-
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ing is that a "poor job" has been done "of enlisting 
employees on the side of increasing productivity." The same 
article cites a poll conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Com 
merce that indicates a surprising percentage of American 
workers thinking about ways to enhance company perfor 
mance. It concludes that "good management" would en 
courage such thinking by treating employees as "col 
laborators." 55
The Secretary-Treasurer of AFL-CIO concurs that 
workers constitute a "virtually untapped natural resource of 
ingenuity and enthusiasm." In an article published in 1980, 
he proposed that management can tap this resource by allow 
ing significant scope for worker participation in decision- 
making. Within the adversarial framework of collective 
bargaining, he called for a "limited partnership" for 
labor-management cooperation through committees, 
etc. to quicken national productivity and raise worklife 
quality. 56
We close this chapter with the pertinent authoritative 
testimony of the retiring chief executive officers of two of 
the nation's largest corporations. In an interview reported in 
February 1981, the retiring head of Du Pont attributed the 
Japanese productivity achievement to the close relationship 
between workers and management and tartly observed that 
his own company's efforts to maintain such a relationship 
since 1802 had often been deplored as "paternalistic." 57 The 
other retiree, from leadership of General Electric, told the 
same interviewer in March 1981 that "managerial malaise" 
is a principal factor in the decline of quality of American 
manufactures. He counseled a shift in company emphasis 
from short-run profit to longer term targets. He also saw a 
need for more direct involvement of workers in quality and 
productivity improvement: a turnaround is achievable, in his 
view, "only with tremendous cooperation between labor and 
management." 58
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NOTES
1. Our position, or at least our language, differs from that of, say, Business Week, May 
11, 1981, p. 85, where the adversarial approach is declared outmoded and obsolete, a threat 
to "the competitiveness of many industries"; and where a "march away" is sensed "from 
the old, crude workplace ethos and the adversarial relationship it spawns." We prefer a dif 
ferent well-established view that the adversary principle is a fundamental feature of the 
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2
The National Scene: 
Government as Third Party
This chapter deals with tripartite ventures initiated by the 
federal government with labor and management representa 
tion. These ventures have been concerned with vital national 
issues of peacetime as well as wartime. Their increasing 
number and expanding purview over the years attest less to 
their success 1 than to their necessity and utility as in 
struments of statecraft. With the continuing growth and 
changing needs and structure of the American economy in a 
world becoming increasingly interdependent, the federal 
hand has also become larger and more visible.
The first chapter has already said something about the 
growing federal presence, especially during the past half cen 
tury or so. In 1929, the federal share in the gross national 
product, reckoned in 1972 dollars, was a bit over 2 percent; 
in 1980, the corresponding figure was a bit more than 7 per 
cent. The portions of national product identified with state 
and local government were comparatively static, increasing 
during the same period from 10.7 percent to 12.3.
Other statistics are sometimes cited to dramatize the 
growth of central government. Thus, in current dollars, 
federal expenditures for "grants-in-aid to state and local 
governments" and for "transfer payments" to individuals
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have risen even more rapidly since 1929 than the outlay for 
"purchases of goods and services," which constitutes the 
federal component of the gross national product.
By the end of World War II, it already seemed appropriate 
to call our economy "mixed." 2 This designation is likely to 
remain suitable despite the lingering and revived rhetoric of 
"free enterprise" and the apparent revulsion of the public 
against "big government" in the 1980 elections. The addi 
tion of other adjectives to "mixed," like "monitored" or 
"mediated," will also remain appropriate if cognizance is 
taken of the objectives of continuing federal intervention in 
the nation's economic affairs.
Although primary attention in this chapter is directed 
toward entities set up under federal auspices and with federal 
representation, the government, in addition, strongly affects 
labor-management cooperation at the company level 
through laws and the agency programs that implement them. 
This federal engagement in "action at a distance" is il 
lustrated in the first section of the documentary appendix a 
section devoted to the national scene. Thus, some of the 
items presented there, emanating from the Congress and the 
executive branch, have aimed at encouraging and assisting 
the formation of joint, plantwide, labor-management com 
mittees. 3
Joint Consultation in Wartime
At the outbreak of each World War, the president then in 
office moved quickly to enlist the cooperation of labor and 
business leaders in the mobilization of the nation's produc 
tive resources. On each occasion, the leaders pledged to 
avoid disruptive strikes and lockouts. Compliance was 
generally good, impressively so in the light of the high degree 
of decentralization of bargaining, the great variation in local 
conditions, and the prior histories of labor-management 
conflict.
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In February 1918, President Wilson convened 10 union 
and management representatives in a bid to ease evident 
strains in industrial relations. Labor leaders agreed to refrain 
from strikes and major organizing drives, while business 
leaders agreed to operate under collective bargaining and to 
suspend anti-union campaigns. 4 In April 1918, as a 
followup, a tripartite National War Labor Board was 
established for the settlement of labor disputes.
Even the year before, in 1917, other important steps were 
being taken to strengthen the homefront. Thus, labor 
representatives were appointed to key coordinating 
bodies the War Industries Board, the Food Administra 
tion, the Energy Conservation Board, and various Army, 
Navy, and shipbuilding entities concerned with the "adjust 
ment" of wages, work standards, and grievances. Inclusion 
of union officials in these endeavors helped the labor move 
ment to acquire a much needed aura of legitimacy. 5
Ten days after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt, who 
had had experience in wartime industrial relations as 
Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy, convened 26 
union, business, and public leaders to assure needed 
cooperation in production. The conferees quickly consented 
to ban strikes and lockouts for the duration of World War 
II. They also consented to establishment of a tripartite Na 
tional War Labor Board for expeditious resolution of 
disputes over wages, working conditions, and union security. 
Again, labor leaders were included on equal terms with 
businessmen in entities dedicated to achievement of a 
supreme national purpose.
When each World War ended, the willingness to cooperate 
that had been engendered by a sense of extreme common 
danger vanished. Presidential efforts to keep alive the tran 
sient spirit of unity proved vain. In September 1919, Wilson 
called a conference on postwar labor-management accord, 
but no agreement was forthcoming on such major issues as
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the 8-hour day, child labor, and worker rights to organize 
and bargain collectively. In 1945, Truman's National Labor- 
Management Conference similarly failed to achieve consen 
sus on key matters the scope of management prerogatives, 
acceptance of collective bargaining, and avoidance of 
strikes. During the two World Wars, union membership 
grew; and the implied shifts in the balance of power between 
labor and management needed testing and clarification in the 
field before Washington table talk could become productive.
Cooperation during the New Deal6
The first two years of the first Roosevelt Administration 
witnessed remarkable changes in industrial relations and in 
the magnitude and diversity of federal involvement in 
economic affairs. The Great Depression inspired numerous 
schemes for reviving employment, production, and purchas 
ing power. A frequent assumption underlying these pro 
posals was that the economy was "mature" and faced with 
chronic "stagnation." Unprecedented labor-management 
cooperation under federal aegis seemed to spell the only 
possible solution. Some businessmen favored a triple "part 
nership" modeled on the War Industries Board. Some 
favored instead the planning of production and the adjust 
ment of prices through stronger trade associations. Labor 
leaders, especially in such depressed industries as coal and 
clothing, opted for a 30-hour week and for tripartite 
stabilization of output and employment. Sentiment built up 
for even more fundamental changes in the character of our 
republic for central planning with industry councils of 
employers, investors, and workers empowered to make 
market allocations. Voices were many, and often shrill and 
confused; and, as the sense of crisis deepened with plant 
shutdowns, price and wage cuts, and growing unemploy 
ment, the pressures for governmental action became irresisti 
ble.
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Perhaps, the single piece of legislation that is most often 
identified with the New Deal is the National Industrial 
Recovery Act of 1933, which looked to a system of "self- 
government in industry under government supervision." Ac 
cording to Title I, the intent of the Congress was to promote 
"the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperation 
among trade groups." An outstanding feature of the Act 
was the requirement that a National Recovery Administra 
tion (NRA) establish industry codes of fair competition. 
These codes set minimum wages and maximum hours, pro 
scribed child labor, and sought to eliminate certain unfair 
trade practices and destructive price-cutting. Employers who 
upheld labor standards were to be protected from loss of 
business to competitors who undercut wages.
A most controversial aspect of the codes was their accord 
of new status to labor. To counterbalance the right conferred 
on business to organize trade associations for price-fixing 
and market allocation, Section 7(a) of the Act set forth a 
Magna Carta for labor, encouraging, in particular, the for 
mation of independent (i.e., noncompany) unions:
Every code of fair competition, agreement, and 
license approved, prescribed, or issued under this 
title shall contain the following conditions:
(1) that employees shall have the right to organize 
and bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and shall be free from the in 
terference, restraint, or coercion of employers of 
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-organization or in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) that no employee and no one seeking employ 
ment shall be required as a condition of employ 
ment to join any company union or to refrain from
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joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organiza 
tion of his own choosing; and
(3) that employers shall comply with the maximum 
hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other 
conditions of employment, approved or prescribed 
by the President.
Within six months, the NRA succeeded in writing codes 
for almost all industries, major and minor. Its symbol, the 
Blue Eagle with a cog in its talons, was ubiquitously 
displayed. Advisory boards were established by the president 
to assure an opportunity for business, labor, and consumer 
interests to contribute to policymaking and have a stake in 
the results.
After an initial outburst of enthusiasm and with the first 
signs of recovery, the NRA came under heavy criticism. A 
review board found, for example, that the NRA code 
authorities for many industries were actually dominated by 
large corporations, to the presumed disadvantage of small 
business, labor, and the general public. But, even before in 
dicated reforms could be instituted, the Supreme Court 
declared the whole program unconstitutional in a decision of 
May 27, 1935.
Apart from the fleeting sense of "national solidarity" that 
it conferred on a people in despair, the National Industrial 
Recovery Act left a deep imprint on future labor- 
management relations. The support that it provided for 
labor to organize and bargain collectively was carried into 
the Wagner National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Business 
strongly challenged this provision, which has, however, sur 
vived court tests. The concept became more firmly establish 
ed after World War II, but it is still not universally accepted 
(especially in the public sector).
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From Eisenhower to Johnson
Fear of a return to the dismal 1930s after the war prompt 
ed a federal resolve in the Employment Act of 1946 to aim 
for "maximum employment, production, and purchasing 
power." Every president has since had to contend with the 
problem of maintaining reasonable price stability, a problem 
that has many sources, especially the tendency of hourly 
wages to outrun hourly productivity in a regime of high 
employment expectations. Decentralized bargaining, on an 
industry or company level, cannot take account of the 
macroeconomic interest in keeping unit labor cost in general 
from exerting an upward pressure on prices in general.
During the Eisenhower Administration, labor and 
management were exhorted to show restraint in bargaining; 
the imposition of an incomes policy was as unthinkable as 
the sterner remedy of mandatory wage and price controls. In 
contrast, President Truman, as his many new admirers may 
never have known or have forgotten, taunted the Congress 
with his "do-nothing" epithet because it failed to enact a 
10-point program to contain the post-decontrol upsurge of 
wages and prices. The Economic Reports of the President 
issued in the Eisenhower years talked of "shared respon 
sibility" between the government and private decision- 
makers for economic growth and improvement, not federal 
leadership. Despite the shock of a mild post-Korea inflation 
that is enviable according to today's standards, the Reports 
were satisfied to lecture on wage-price-productivity connec 
tions and to exhort private parties to behave responsibly. 
The unfortunate and lengthy steel strike of 1959, which first 
opened our markets to sizable imports from Japan, prompt 
ed the final (1961) Report to warn labor and management 
that failure to reach voluntary agreements recognizing a 
public interest could only lead to "new Government controls 
and new limitations on their initiative." The 1960 State of 
the Union address declared an intention "to encourage 
regular discussions between management and labor outside
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the bargaining table," but the idea was not carried out in the 
remaining months of Eisenhower's tenure.
The Eisenhower interlude of public relaxation after two 
decades of depression, large war, small war, and cold war 
was followed by President Kennedy's call to get the economy 
"moving again." A month after his inauguration, he set up a 
21 member Advisory Committee on Labor-Management 
Policy with equal representation of unions, business, and the 
public. Two of the seven public members of this high-level 
forum were actually Cabinet officers, the Secretaries of 
Labor and Commerce, who alternately served 1-year terms 
of chairmanship. Underlying the president's action was the 
view, expressed in his address at Yale University, that the 
central domestic challenges of our time
relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology 
but to ways and means of reaching common 
goals .... What we need is not labels or cliches 
but more discussions of the sophisticated and 
technical issues involved in keeping a great 
economic machinery moving ahead. 7
Executive Order 10918, which established the Committee, 
outlined a broad agenda: collective bargaining, industrial 
peace, wage-price policy, productivity increase, and the ad 
vance of living scales. Two topics were marked for special 
study: the international competitiveness of American pro 
ducts and the positive and negative implications of automa 
tion and other technological change. The Committee was 
often consulted by, and held meetings with, the president.
The Committee's first report, The Benefits and Problems 
Incident to Automation and Other Technological Advances, 
impressively opposed the media-enhanced apocalyptic views 
prevalent at the time. It considered the advances to be essen 
tial, but not to be made without due regard to human 
values; and it expressed confidence that a proper balance 
could be achieved by a combination of public and private ac-
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tions consonant with the principles of our free society. From 
the specific recommendations, it is evident that business 
members recognized a need to cooperate with unions in eas 
ing the negative impact of technological change on workers 
and that union leaders were ready to give up the remedy of a 
shorter workweek.
Two years later, at the request of President Johnson, the 
Committee again addressed the real and alleged challenges of 
automation. This time, it sponsored three regional seminars 
in cooperation with universities. The meetings afforded op 
portunities for exchange of information and views on 
measures recommended in the initial report and on the ad 
justment of companies and unions to technological change.
The Committee's second report, Free and Responsible 
Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace, affirmed "that 
free collective bargaining should constitute the primary pro 
cedure by which the essential terms and conditions of 
employment should be determined." It also insisted, 
however, that such bargaining should be responsive to the 
public interest. It suggested specific improvements in Taft- 
Hartley procedures for dealing with national emergency 
disputes an increase in the president's authority and a 
strengthening of the role of the Emergency Disputes Board 
in mediation, fact-finding, and recommendation of terms of 
settlement.
Although the Committee was able to agree on such mat 
ters as taxation, public expenditures, and Vietnam financing, 
it failed to achieve accord on wage-price policy. 8 Perhaps, 
this failure to accept and attempt to rehabilitate the 
guidepost program instituted in 1962 evidenced a strong con 
viction that the traditional adversary principle still had a 
vital role to play in wage determination.
On the whole, the record of the Committee is considered 
to have been creditable, 9 about as good as might be expected 
in a democratic and pluralistic society. George W. Taylor, a
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distinguished mediator, saw in the Committee (of which he 
was a public member) an important means by which 
"representatives of the interdependent interests involved 
might, through understanding, gradually increase the area of 
common agreement." Furthermore, "the myriad of micro 
bargainers in our society" needed the considered judgments 
of "senior peers at the national level." 10 In its final report, 
the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability offered an op 
timistic appraisal of its progress to the president (December 
20, 1968):
The Advisory Committee on Labor-Management 
Policy has made a good start in launching the 
dialogue necessary to develop rules of the game 
that business and labor might be willing to accept 
jointly in order to promote the vital objectives of 
prosperity and price stability that we all endorse.
With the change in administration in 1969, the Committee 
was discontinued.
From Nixon to Carter
Economic troubles of the first half of the 1970s reces 
sion, inflation, the energy crisis, slowdown of productivity 
growth, etc. prompted new interest in tripartite problem 
solving. Three entities formed in the Nixon-Ford era stand 
out: the National Commission on Productivity (established 
in 1970), the Pay Board (1972), and the President's Labor- 
Management Advisory Committee (1974).
The Productivity Commission was created by the presi 
dent with 24 members drawn from labor, management, 
academia, and government. According to the Secretary of 
Labor, the Committee's first chairman, the purpose of the 
new forum was to generate ideas about appropriate eco 
nomic policy and ways to quicken productivity, and provide 
a basis "for better wage and labor-utilization policies." 11 In 
August 1971, when Phase I inaugurated an unexpected man-
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datory program of wage and price stabilization, the Com 
mission's membership was expanded to give visible represen 
tation to farmers, consumers, and state and local govern 
ment. Section 4 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1971 
provided a statutory basis for the Commission. Echoing 
language in the declaration of policy of the Employment Act 
of 1946, the new law stated the Commission's objective to be 
the enlistment of "the cooperation of labor and manage 
ment, and state and local government in a manner calculated 
to foster and promote increased productivity through free, 
competitive enterprise." Under this broadened charter, the 
Commission engaged in informational, educational, and 
research programs as well as made policy recommendations 
to the president.
Over the next six years, the Commission went through ad 
ditional metamorphoses, including name changes, as public 
uneasiness over accelerating inflation and lagging produc 
tivity mounted. 12 In June 1974, the Commission was 
transformed by P.L. 93-311 into the National Commission 
on Productivity and Work Quality. For the first time, the 
Congress cited improvement in "the morale and quality of 
work of the American worker" as a concern of policy. The 
new law specifically authorized the Commission "to en 
courage and assist in the organization and work of labor- 
management committees, which may also include public 
members, on a plant, community, regional and industry 
basis." Vice President Rockefeller was appointed chairman.
When the Commission's term expired in November 1975, 
P.L. 94-136 provided a replacement called the National 
Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. The 
Center was to be governed by a board of 27 members 
representing labor, business, and (federal, state, and local) 
government. The board members were to be appointed by 
the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The main purpose of the Center was to encourage, under 
joint labor and business guidance, concerted public and
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private efforts to improve productive efficiency compatibly 
with other national goals. "Quality of Working Life," a 
phrase added to the title of the law following much discus 
sion, was defined to concern "conditions of work relating to 
the role of the worker in the productive process." It was 
recognized as relevant, no less than the quality of technology 
and management, to productivity performance.
Like its predecessors, the Center was required to "en 
courage, support, and initiate efforts in the public or private 
sector specifically designed to improve cooperation between 
labor and management in the achievement of continued pro 
ductivity growth." Its responsibilities also included policy 
development, sponsorship of research and demonstration 
projects, and dissemination of information about "best" 
practices. Two new concerns were a review of government 
regulation and the coordination of productivity-enhancing 
activities of other federal agencies.
During the Carter Administration, the Center was ap 
parently marked early as a candidate for extinction in fulfill 
ment of a pledge to reduce the number of government agen 
cies. While continuation of the Center's authorization after 
September 1978 was being pondered, the chairmanship was 
left vacant, and the members of the board were not reap- 
pointed. The staff, however, continued to carry out its 
duties, adding to its sizable legacy of widely used reports.
In May 1978, the Carter Administration decided to allow 
the Center to expire on September 30, 1978. Nominally, the 
Center's functions were transferred for interment, it would 
appear, rather than performance to various government 
agencies. A paper organization, the National Productivity 
Council, was supposed to coordinate the dispersed functions 
of the defunct Center. This Council rarely met, and its 
nonaccomplishment has been duly noted in publications and 
Congressional testimony of the General Accounting Office.
When the nation embarked on a program of mandatory 
controls in 1971, the thorny perennial problem of harmoniz-
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ing micro decisionmaking with respect to wages and the 
macroeconomic desideratum of reasonable price stability 
had to be squarely faced. Immediately after the imposition 
of a 90-day price and wage freeze in August 1971, a tripartite 
Pay Board was set up to function in tandem with a Cost of 
Living Council. Its job was to promulgate standards for 
wage increase and to decide cases. The Board included 15 
members representing labor, business, and the public. 
Several members of the National Commission on Productivi 
ty were included in this group. The appointment of a judge 
with no experience in collective bargaining was an unfor 
tunate one. Labor's participation hardly lasted beyond the 
vote on the Board's basic rules of operation. Indeed, the 
labor members withdrew a month after the Board's forma 
tion, charging inequity and injustice in its earliest 
decisions. 13
The advent in January 1973 of Phase III of the mandatory 
stabilization program occasioned the formation of the Cost 
of Living Council. The widely respected John Dunlop was 
installed as director. Ten business and labor leaders, 9 of 
whom served on the National Commission on Productivity, 
were appointed as a Labor-Management Advisory Commit 
tee. The purpose was to advise the Cost of Living Council on 
the consistency of particular wage settlements with national 
stabilization objectives. The Committee met often between 
January 1973 and May 1974, concentrating on collective 
bargaining in such inflation-prone industries as food, health, 
energy, and construction. For these industries, it helped set 
up labor-management committees to assist the Cost of Liv 
ing Council.
In the spring of 1974, the mandatory stabilization pro 
gram came to an end. The Administration refrained from 
asking the Congress to renew authorization of controls. The 
Labor-Management Advisory Committee concurred in this 
decision.
A new Labor-Management Committee reminiscent of 
President Kennedy's was appointed by President Ford after
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the business-labor-academic "summit conference" on infla 
tion at the end of 1974. Dr. Dunlop again served as Commit 
tee head. In 1975, a year of recession, the Committee met 
frequently and agreed on proposals for job creation, tax 
cuts, incentives for electric utility and multifamily building 
construction, and collective bargaining reform in the retail 
food, health care, maritime, and construction industries.
In 1976, the Committee took a dramatic step, severing its 
connection with the White House when Dunlop resigned as 
Secretary of Labor. His resignation was prompted by the 
president's veto of previously agreed upon legislation to 
reform collective bargaining in construction. The Committee 
continued to function unofficially as a labor-management 
group, with members exchanging views on many pertinent 
issues. It refrained from offering a wage-price stabilization 
plan to the Carter Administration, asserting instead its op 
position to voluntary guidelines and mandatory controls.
In mid-1978, the Committee's post-official life ended 
when the president of the United Auto Workers and other 
labor members withdrew. The climate for labor- 
management cooperation had deteriorated as union and 
business leaders took strongly opposing positions on pending 
legislation concerning industrial relations.
Three Carter gambits deserve mention although they prov 
ed unavailing as a result of the Democratic defeat in the na 
tional elections of 1980. One of these was the formation of 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation to encourage production of 
domestic alternatives to imported petroleum with price sup 
ports and billions of dollars of federal grants and loan 
guarantees. Prominent labor and business figures were to 
serve as part-time directors of the Corporation. The second 
aborted Carter initiative envisaged the provision of financial 
assistance for the revival of lagging industrial regions 
through a high-level Economic Revitalization Board. The 
Board was to include prominent labor, management, and 
public representatives.
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The last Carter venture was actually the first of the three in 
point of time. On September 28, 1979, the Administration 
and leaders of AFL-CIO reached a bilateral "National Ac 
cord," which provided for "continued involvement and 
cooperation" of organized labor in formulating and im 
plementing "voluntary programs of pay and price restraint" 
and a "disciplined fiscal policy." An immediate result of this 
Accord (which itself was made possible by the passage of the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced 
Growth Act of 1978, a law that drastically rewrote the 
Employment Act of 1946) was the creation of a tripartite Pay 
Advisory Committee. 14 This Committee had 18 members 
representing labor, management, and the public. 
Unremarkably perhaps, Dunlop again was in charge.
The Pay Advisory Committee's responsibility was to 
review and revise the basic standards for allowable pay in 
creases established in 1978 by the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability (COWPS) as part of the Carter program of volun 
tary action for pay deceleration (initiated in October 1978). 
The Carter program was devised and launched without labor 
and business participation and hence encountered skepticism 
and reluctant compliance from the start. Although it assisted 
COWPS, the Committee made clear its position that both 
voluntary and mandatory wage controls impede bargaining 
and distort pay patterns. It recommended return to free 
bargaining as soon as possible.
New Initiatives
Even during the young Reagan Administration, we find 
the indefatigable Dr. Dunlop trying to bring labor and 
management together, this time without the blessing of 
government from the start. As noted in the preceding 
chapter, he announced formation of a new Labor- 
Management Group in March 1981. Although he expected 
the two private parties to remain "adversaries on many 
issues," he also recognized that "the national interest re 
quires a new spirit of mutual trust and cooperation."
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Late in 1981, the Administration launched its own joint 
national productivity committee under the leadership of a 
former Secretary of the Treasury. Top-level labor leaders 
declined to participate, largely because of dissatisfaction 
with Administration social and tax policies and the treatment 
of striking federal air traffic controllers. The new National 
Productivity Advisory Committee included 4 minor union 
figures in its unusually large membership (33); it also includ 
ed 21 business leaders, 5 academics, and 2 government of 
ficials. The Committee's charge was to "conduct a continu 
ing review and assessment of national productivity" and ad 
vise the president and other high officials on the federal 
"role in achieving higher levels of national productivity and 
economic growth" and on "the potential impact on national 
productivity of ... laws and regulations." No funds were 
provided for the Committee's work, and December 31, 1982 
was provisionally set as the termination date. 15
The skewed composition of the new productivity commit 
tee does not encourage high hopes for practical accomplish 
ment. Like the National Accord, the committee's concept 
suggests an attempt to erect a "social contract" on too nar 
row a base. By the omission of management, any national 
arrangement between labor and government diminishes its 
chances of stabilizing wages and controlling inflation. 
Similarly, by giving labor only token representation (or by 
failing to elicit stronger labor participation) and by using 
government mostly as an ear, a national productivity com 
mittee limits its chances of arriving at potent, implementable 
recommendations for improvement of economic perfor 
mance. In short, much room remains in our kind of society 
for wholehearted tripartite cooperation in the address of 
issues of major national concern. 16
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1. Note, for example, the second half of the title of an article that has been used extensive 
ly in the preparation of this chapter: W. T. Moye, "Presidential Labor-Management Com 
mittees: Productive Failures," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1980. All 
human institutions, of course, are describable as "productive failures," being much less 
than perfect but often effective enough to help a nation or a group to get satisfactorily from 
there and then to here and now. One such human invention, the much admired Constitu 
tion of the United States, simply aimed in 1787, according to the Preamble, to form a 
"more perfect union," not a perfect one.
2. Still useful for its discussion of the background and emergence of the present American 
economy is G. A. Steiner, Government's Role in Economic Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1953).
3. The first section of the appendix also illustrates that private organizations, as well as 
government, seek to encourage labor-management cooperation in the firm for particular 
purposes.
4. Jack Stieber, "The President's Committee on Labor-Management Policy," Industrial 
Relations, February 1966, p. 2. On signing the Adamson Act (1916), which established the 
8-hour day sought by the Railroad Brotherhoods, President Wilson made a statement 
amounting to "an official declaration of the acceptance of trade unionism as an integral 
part of the American commonwealth." See H. A. Millis and Royal Montgomery, Organiz 
ed Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945), p. 131.
5. J. T. McKelvey, AFL Attitudes toward Production: 1900-1932 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer 
sity Press, 1952), pp. 29-35. On later national experience in wartime wage stabilization (in 
cluding the Korean Conflict) with tripartite pay boards, see D. Q. Mills, Government, 
Labor and Inflation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
6. See, for example, A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 93; and W. E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New 
Deal, 1933-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). Although unions were intended to 
have equal representation with business on boards formulating industry codes, few had suf 
ficient economic strength and technical expertise to play a decisive role in NRA. See Mur 
ray Edelman, "New Deal Sensitivities to Labor Interests," in Milton Derber and Edwin 
Young, eds., Labor in the New Deal (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 
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7. A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 646.
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10. See W. J. Gershenfeld's paper on "The Elusiveness of Finality" in E. B. Shils et al., 
eds., Industrial Peacemaker: George W. Taylor's Contribution to Collective Bargaining 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), p. 222.
11. G. P. Shultz and Kenneth Dam, Economic Policy beyond the Headlines (Stanford: 
Stanford Alumni Association, 1977), p. 156.
12. The work of the Commission and its successors is chronicled in its annual reports. See 
documentary appendix for legislative mandate and policy statement.
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13. See Moye's article, cited in footnote 1.
14. For two different views of the National Accord, see the 1980 Economic Report of the 
President, pp. 81-82, 101; and R. J. Flanigan, "The National Accord as a Social Docu 
ment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1980, pp. 35-50. (The latter gives 
the text of the Accord.) The documentary appendix contains pertinent excerpts from the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act and the Joint Economic Committee's report.
15. The Executive Order establishing the National Productivity Advisory Committee is in 
cluded in our documentary appendix.
16. Flanigan's discussion of the failure of the National Accord (see article cited in footnote 
14) recalls some of the points made in chapter 1 regarding international differences in in 
dustrial relations and, in particular, the importance of collective bargaining in the United 
States. These points are pertinent to any serious effort to stimulate productivity advance.
Industry-Level 
Collaboration
This chapter deals with mechanisms established at the in 
dustry level for labor-management cooperation on matters 
of mutual concern. It focuses on five major industries that 
have had extensive experience along such lines: construction, 
retail food, men's clothing, railroads, and steel. Additional 
cooperative committees have recently been formed in the 
coal, health, and trucking industries. As the first chapter has 
noted, the federal government is often involved to some ex 
tent in the organization or operation of industrywide 
mechanisms; a notable instance, considered later, is the Steel 
Tripartite Committee, which has been urged as a model for 
the automobile industry. As might be expected, the format 
of cooperation and the dominant concerns vary from in 
dustry to industry; and, where geographic differences in con 
ditions and issues are great, as in construction, vehicles for 
industrywide cooperation may be set up on a regional or 
metropolitan basis as well as a national basis.
Construction Industry
The size of the construction industry (it has over 4 million 
workers), its complexity, the diversity of its products, its 
functional fragmentation, and its geographic dispersion have 
impeded effective labor-management cooperation therein.
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The same factors also underlie better publicized problems of 
the industry, such as instability of employment, a propensity 
of costs to outrun estimates, lagging productivity (according 
to statistics that are, however, admittedly inadequate), and 
slow or uneven absorption of improvements in technology 
and materials. Returning to the barriers to cooperation, we 
should be mindful particularly of the necessity to assemble 
labor, equipment, management, materials, and energy at dif 
ferent sites in a timely manner and to shift or disperse these 
inputs upon project completion; the multiplicity of contrac 
tors and subcontractors typically required for a project; and 
the variety of participating crafts, each of which may be 
represented by a different union.
Despite these negative factors, mechanisms for labor- 
management cooperation have been established joint coun 
cils, commissions, committees, etc. to deal with a wide 
range of topics, including apprenticeship, industrial peace, 
stabilization, productivity and seasonality. Some have been 
organized on a branch or trade basis; others involve all bran 
ches. In some instances, the federal government has par 
ticipated in tripartite arrangements.
Apprenticeship and Training
Apprenticeship for skilled trades, which include about 
half the construction workforce, has long been administered 
by local joint committees (JACs), composed of an equal 
number of union representatives (usually rank-and-file 
members or business agents) and management (usually ex 
ecutives from a local contractor's association or individual 
employers). 1 Local JACs establish specific standards for 
their apprenticeship programs, following guidelines sug 
gested by the national JAC in the trade. They also select ap 
prentices from qualified applicants and direct the programs. 
Labor-management cooperation is encouraged by the U.S. 
Department of Labor's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Train 
ing, which sets minimum standards and registers approved 
programs.
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Joint labor-management programs to upgrade the skills of 
journeymen have also been organized in some sectors of the 
industry. The International Training Fund of the plumbing 
and pipefitting industry, one of the most extensive plans, 
was established in 1956 by the United Association of 
Plumbers and Pipefitters and the National Constructors' 
Association to enrich the competence of the workforce and 
to assist adjustment to changing technology.
In 1981, the Bricklayers Union and the Mason Contractors 
Association expanded their longstanding joint programs to 
improve training and to engage in broader cooperative ef 
forts for enhancement of the masonry industry's com 
petitiveness. A new cooperative entity, known as the Interna 
tional Masonry Institute, was set up for technical research 
and market development, as well as for training. These func 
tions of the Institute are funded by collectively bargained 
contributions called for in Bricklayer agreements. The In 
stitute also conducts a labor-management relations program.
Industrial Peace
Although construction is generally described as a "strike- 
prone' ' industry, some branches of it have developed volun 
tary, cooperative means for peaceful settlement of disputes. 
In this regard, the Council on Industrial Relations for the 
Electrical Contracting Industry (CIR) has been especially 
successful. 2 Established in 1921, the Council serves as a na 
tional joint tribunal of the National Electrical Contractors 
Association and the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers. The Council has rendered final and binding deci 
sions in over 4,000 disputes concerning contract terms or 
grievances.
CIR meets quarterly and operates with panels of six 
members appointed by the union president and by the 
association president. A representative from each side serves 
as co-chairman. No neutrals have ever been used. Disputes 
are referred to the Council after local labor-management
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committees have failed to resolve them. Its decisions are by 
unanimous vote, and they are final and binding on both par 
ties. With rare exceptions, Council decisions have been 
observed by the local parties. Virtually no strikes or lockouts 
have occurred in over 60 years, despite tremendous changes 
in the industry and the economy.
In addition to industrial peace, CIR contributes to stabili 
ty by taking into account, in its joint decisionmaking, broad 
criteria related to the industry's economic health as well as 
the local interests of the parties. In the long run, of course, 
the success of this combination of arbitration and negotia 
tion depends on the trust that local parties have in their na 
tional representatives.
The CIR system has influenced national leaders in several 
other branches of the construction industry to develop 
similar voluntary mechanisms for dispute settlement. The In 
dustrial Relations Council of the Plumbing and Pipefitting 
Industry and the National Joint Adjustment Board for the 
Sheet Metal Industry are promising examples.
Tripartite Stabilization
As construction costs began to rise sharply in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, the government became increasingly con 
cerned lest its programs for housing, defense, and economic 
stabilization be endangered. Several tripartite bodies were 
established to deal cooperatively with problems of dispute 
settlement, wage adjustment, skill shortages, regulations, 
productivity, and other matters of mutual interest.
The President's Missile Sites Labor Commission, which 
operated from 1961 to 1967, sought the orderly settlement of 
disputes over terms of collective bargaining agreements at 
sites around the country. This group, including union, 
business, and government representatives, also helped to 
secure labor-management agreement in eliminating 
uneconomic work practices. 3 Government funding of the 
projects was certainly a factor in the Commission's effec 
tiveness.
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The Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Com 
mission (CICBC), established by Executive Order in 
September 1969, functioned until 1976. 4 This tripartite body 
undertook studies of ways to expand the geographic scope of 
bargaining and thereby reduce the "leapfrogging" that 
escalates costs. It also developed a joint program to improve 
vocational education in construction trades, linkage with the 
apprenticeship system, the quality of work, and the dignity 
of skilled labor. Among subjects addressed by the Commis 
sion were the reduction of employment seasonality, the 
modernization of building codes, and the measurement of 
construction productivity. A bill to replace CICBC with a 
national tripartite board was vetoed by President Ford. The 
bill sought to promote regional bargaining, but it also would 
have allowed situs picketing.
The unusually sharp increases in construction wage rates 
in 1970 compared to manufacturing prompted establishment 
in March 1971 of a tripartite Construction Industry 
Stabilization Committee (CISC), five months before adop 
tion of a national wage and price control program. 5 CISC, 
operating through craft dispute boards, decided whether or 
not major local agreements met noninflationary wage and 
salary standards. CISC also experimented with various ar 
rangements for reforming the bargaining structure, such as 
regional and multicraft bargaining. The reduction in wage 
and benefit increases in collective bargaining settlements 
from 15.2 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1971 is attributed 
to the CISC program. Along with statutory controls for the 
economy, CISC expired in May 1974, and collective bargain 
ing in construction returned to its earlier status.
Productivity and Seasonality
While national tripartite committees and commissions 
provide needed linkage with policymakers at the federal 
level, some form of joint industrywide consultation is also 
appropriate at the local level, where economic decisionmak- 
ing actually takes place. During the past decade, the U.S.
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Department of Labor has helped organize local tripartite 
construction coordinating committees in a number of 
cities Chicago, San Francisco, Kansas City, Denver, and 
Boston. 6 These committees seek more efficient use of con 
struction labor and capital and lower costs by streamlining 
government procurement, training, and regulatory practices. 
Local officials of unions, contractor associations, and 
government agencies meet regularly to exchange information 
about prospective government contracts, training programs, 
and environmental policies. The committees avoid involve 
ment in jurisdictional and collective bargaining disputes.
Since government construction often comprises a substan 
tial portion of local activity, the coordinating committees 
concentrate on testing procedures for spreading out govern 
ment contracts over the year. Each committee compiles a bid 
calendar, listing planned public construction to facilitate bet 
ter coordination of government projects. If too many pro 
jects are planned for the same period, the bid calendar 
discloses this uneconomic concentration and helps in 
rescheduling. A small Labor Department staff conducts 
research and disseminates findings on local construction in 
dustry trends and on counterseasonality techniques. Unfor 
tunately, the program is wholly dependent on federal funds, 
so its survival in an era of drastic budget cuts is very doubt 
ful. 7
In addition to these government-sponsored committees, 
unions and contractors themselves, in several areas, have 
agreed to cooperate to improve productivity on the job, 
mainly in defense against competition from nonunion 
builders. Prominent among these areas are St. Louis, In 
dianapolis, Boston, Columbus, and the states of Nevada and 
Colorado. The committees focus on work practices and 
other possible sources of insufficient productivity and cost- 
competitiveness. 8
PRIDE (Productivity and Responsibility Increase 
Development and Employment), the cooperative program
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instituted in St. Louis, has been operating with distinction 
since 1972. It extends beyond contractors and unions to in 
clude construction users, architects, builders, and engineers 
in a continual dialogue. The building trades and the contrac 
tors have modified restrictive manning rules, curtailed 
jurisdictional disputes, and improved communication and 
morale at the jobsite. Once ranked among the most expen 
sive home-building areas, St. Louis is now considered among 
those having lowest cost.
Retail Food Industry
This industry employs over 2.2 million people and has an 
nual sales exceeding $200 billion. Collective bargaining is 
highly decentralized, with contracts differing from city to 
city. The contracts cover about 650,000 employees and near 
ly all of the major chains. Two large national unions are in 
volved: the United Food and Commercial Workers (which 
was formed in 1979 by merger of the Retail Clerks Interna 
tional Division and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and But 
cher Workers) and the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters.
An important incentive for some type of formal accom 
modation between labor and management is the industry's 
sensitivity to public opinion. Both parties are especially fear 
ful that government control over wages and prices might be 
sought if the public perceives collective bargaining to be 
unresponsive to the national need for moderating inflation. 
As in the case of construction, extreme structural fragmenta 
tion of the retail food industry threatens cost escalation 
through "leapfrogging" and "whipsawing," as each local 
union tries to achieve ever higher wage increases and each 
company fears loss of business to competitors if its service is 
interrupted.
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Origin and Work 
ofJLM Committee
The Joint Labor-Management (JLM) Committee of the 
Retail Food Industry has been operating, since 1974, as an 
arrangement for joint consultation among leaders on major 
problems that affect the industry as a whole. 9 The decision 
of the parent unions and the major chains to enter voluntari 
ly into a cooperative arrangement was greatly influenced by 
1973-74 experience under the wage-price controls program. 
For 14 months, a tripartite committee of five labor, five 
management, and five public members, meeting weekly, 
helped administer the food industry controls program under 
the Cost of Living Council. This experience created interest 
in the possibility of dealing with the industry's collective 
bargaining problems, after mandatory controls were lifted, 
through new arrangements for consultation at the industry 
level. The ubiquitous Dr. Dunlop, then director of the Cost 
of Living Council, initiated discussions among union of 
ficials and supermarket executives that led to agreement to 
form the Joint Labor-Management Committee of the Retail 
Food Industry. A participant in the controls program has 
observed that the Committee "could well be the most impor 
tant legacy that the food wage control program left for the 
industry. 10
A working agenda was drawn up by the presidents of the 
(then) three major unions and the chief executive officers of 
eight major supermarket chains and announced on March 
29, 1974. The Committee would (1) collect and exchange 
reliable wage and benefit data to help the parties reach con 
structive decisions; (2) assist in key negotiations by en 
couraging early discussion and exchange of information;
(3) serve as a national forum for discussion of longer-range 
industry problems "that often surface in local negotiations 
and which may benefit from national attention," such as 
technological change, government regulation, and the 
authority and responsibility of management and unions; and
(4) provide an "ongoing forum to broaden the base of com-
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munication between labor and management at all levels and 
on all subjepts of mutual concern to labor and 
management."
To carry out the work of the Joint Committee, Wayne L. 
Horvitz, an experienced mediator, was appointed chairman 
with a small staff of industrial relations experts. The Com 
mittee is supported entirely by contributions from member 
supermarket chains and unions. In its few years of existence, 
the Joint Committee has gradually evolved, chiefly under 
Horvitz's leadership, from a tentative experiment to an 
established institution. Its steering committee of corporate 
vice-presidents of labor relations and union officers, meeting 
monthly, has dealt with a variety of major issues of mutual 
interest with differing degrees of success such as the im 
provement of collective bargaining procedures, employee 
health and safety, adjustment to technological change, and 
cost of health benefit plans. 11 Comments on each of these 
four issues follow.
Improvement of Collective Bargaining
The JLM Committee has proceeded by stages to try to im 
prove the process of collective bargaining for the promotion 
of industrial peace and achievement of "fair and equitable, 
noninflationary settlements." In its first year, the Commit 
tee agreed on a list of basic bargaining procedures that are 
characteristic of successful negotiations and recommended 
that both sides in the industry follow them to avoid work 
stoppages. As both parties have gained confidence in the 
chairman's neutrality, his role in specific local negotiations 
has been expanded.
With the cooperation of the Federal Mediation and Con 
ciliation Service, the JLM Chairman now follows the pro 
gress of the key negotiations in the industry and determines 
whether he and members of the Committee might assist in a 
particular dispute, subject to the agreement of the parties. 
The Committee has also given the chairman authority to 
convene pre-negotiation conferences, 90 to 120 days in ad-
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vance of the expiration of contracts deemed critical to the in 
dustry. These conferences help the parties to identify issues 
likely to prove troublesome and to analyze the implications 
of possible settlements.
Health and Safety
The two parties have preferred to look after the health and 
safety of employees by themselves instead of risking the im 
position of protective measures by the government. 12 In 
1976, for example, the JLM Committee undertook a joint 
study of the proper use of personal protective equipment in 
meatcutting operations. Its findings and recommendations 
resulted in a clarification of OSHA standards that has 
discouraged litigation.
A more extensive joint effort was initiated in the same year 
to identify work practices that could cause respiratory 
ailments among department employees who cut and wrap 
meat in polyvinyl chloride film. "Meat-cutters' asthma" was 
generally attributed to the decomposition of plastic wrap 
ping film with a hot wire, but the available scientific evidence 
was skimpy. Accordingly, JLM health and safety experts 
agreed to commission a comprehensive study of materials 
and conditions in retail meat departments, selecting the Har 
vard University School of Public Health to carry out a five- 
year research program with partial financing from the plastic 
film manufacturers. Union leaders, under pressure from the 
rank and file, naturally preferred a shorter period, but 
agreed that a voluntary independent study yielding 
authoritative information was better than legislation or pro 
tracted litigation. The study, scheduled for completion in 
1981, was expected to provide the basis for an industrywide 
effort to control an important health hazard.
Technological Change
Electronic scanning at supermarket checkout stands has 
been recognized as a potential bargaining snag as well as a 
source of productivity advance. In 1975, the JLM Commit-
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tee agreed on a set of general principles for negotiators that 
acknowledged management's and labor's interests in the 
pending change and the desirability of information-sharing 
and prior consultation.
While subscribing to the general principles, the Retail 
Clerks were eager, nevertheless, to prevent loss of any jobs 
through the elimination of manual item-price labeling. Ac 
cordingly, in the early 1970s, they joined with consumer 
groups and succeeded, by 1976, in obtaining legislation in 
several states requiring item-price labeling. When federal 
legislation was introduced in 1977, industry members of the 
JLM Committee proposed a continuation of item pricing 
while the effects of front-end automation could be studied 
over a four-year period; in return, the union was to suspend 
its lobbying for mandatory legislation. The national union 
agreed to defer a push for federal price labeling, but it did 
not discourage locals from seeking state and local restric 
tions. Union and management officials also continue to 
bargain at the local or enterprise level over the introduction 
of new technology, regardless of national developments.
Cost of Health Benefit Plans
The rapidly rising costs of health and welfare plans put 
unusual pressure on both parties in collective bargaining. 
The JLM Committee accordingly commissioned an extensive 
study in 1977 to find possible means of reducing the surging 
costs of the plans without reducing benefits. 13 To give the 
study's findings and recommendations the widest circula 
tion, the JLM Committee conducted a series of seminars for 
union and management trustees, administrators, and lawyers 
on the nearly 100 funds in the retail food industry.
An Assessment
As might be guessed, some of the participants in the JLM 
Committee's work consider its accomplishments unim 
pressive, but there is also no disposition to discontinue the
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initiative. According to one appraisal, both sides are 
satisfied with actions taken on several fundamental prob 
lems. 14 Business leaders, however, had hoped for more 
moderate wage settlements from an expansion of the 
geographic basis of bargaining; but this structural 
breakthrough has yet to be accomplished. Unions, for their 
part, remain concerned about job loss through technological 
change and store closings. Predictably, knowledgeable 
observers counsel the only possible remedy for the two sides: 
more efforts to solve problems jointly within the framework 
of collective bargaining. 15
Men's Clothing Industry
Union-management cooperation in the clothing industry, 
both men's and women's, has a long history. Since the 
1920s, employers and unions have extended the scope of col 
lective bargaining beyond the elementary matters of employ 
ment and wages to include their common interests in stabiliz 
ing production, reducing costs, and improving efficiency. 16 
Because of the industry's fragmented and labor-intensive 
character, organized labor the Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers and the International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union has played a leading, cohesive role. The 
competitive threat of nonunion employers has made both 
these unions especially sensitive to production costs. Indeed, 
these unions have even employed industrial engineers to help 
endangered small firms to remain competitive. The surge of 
imports during the past decade and a half, particularly from 
the Far East and Eastern Europe, has induced labor and 
management to adopt a still more comprehensive strategy 
that includes not only the improvement of productive perfor 
mance but also a quest for government protection in the 
form of higher tariffs and stringent quotas.
Joint Job Training and Research
In 1977, leaders of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers and the Clothing Manufacturers Association met,
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with encouragement from John Dunlop and the National 
Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, to 
discuss opportunities for working together to improve the 
competitive position of the men's tailored clothing in 
dustry a branch of the apparel industry employing about 
100,000 workers. It was agreed that major benefits could be 
derived from improvements in the recruitment, training, and 
retention of labor; better methods of production, manage 
ment, and innovation; and expanded technological research 
and development. A nonprofit corporation Joint Job 
Training and Research (JTR), Inc. was established to 
design and carry out joint programs to meet these objectives. 
A board of directors three officers of the union and three 
officers of the Clothing Manufacturers Association super 
vises JTR. A small, full-time staff of professional experts, 
independent of the union and management, carries out the 
policies set by the board. In addition to support from the in 
dustry, JTR draws on resources provided by existing govern 
ment programs.
The first JTR program dealt with the industry's need for a 
more stable and better trained workforce. Many disadvan- 
taged, low-skilled workers are hired, but small firms can af 
ford only a minimum of training. Turnover is considerably 
above the average for manufacturing. JTR accordingly 
organized a National On-the-Job Training Program, with 
funding by the U.S. Department of Labor at $2.5 million a 
year. A total of 80 plants are providing on-the-job training 
to over 4,000 employees who had been previously 
unemployed or receiving public assistance or wages below 
the poverty level. JTR reimburses employers for half of the 
starting wage (not less than $3.25 per hour) for the first 490 
hours worked by each trainee. Employers must keep records 
of the trainee's performance.
Along with the training program, JTR has contracted with 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration to 
analyze the body of data collected on trainees and to 
evaluate methods of training used in the industry. Recom-
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mendations from the study will provide the basis for reform 
of recruitment, training, and retention methods.
A second JTR program addresses deficiencies in manage 
ment methods and procedures. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce has, under the technical assistance provisions of 
the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, made grants to 
JTR for a series of projects to test new ideas of wide ap 
plicability at selected firms. Among these ideas are systems 
for speeding delivery of garments, reducing investment in 
goods in process, training first-line supervisors, and control 
ling product quality. To speed application, JTR reimburses 
firms for 75 percent of the total cost of an experiment if they 
agree to share the results with others. Advisory boards, com 
posed of union and management experts, work with JTR in 
selecting and administering projects to assure relevance to in 
dustry needs. 17
Railroad Industry
Recent initiatives in labor-management cooperation in the 
railroad industry have been taken against a backdrop of long 
argumentation over productivity specifically, the reduction 
of train crew size and the modification of work rules 
rendered obsolete by dieselization and later technological 
changes. 18 The rail unions have strenuously resisted ad 
justments that would spell force reduction in the face of stag 
nant or only slowly increasing traffic. Economies through 
collective bargaining have been difficult to achieve despite 
the financial frailty of many of the carriers.
A Joint Committee that Failed
Cooperative approaches are not unfamiliar to the railroad 
industry (recall the "B&O Plan," a textbook model in 
troduced in 1923 after a bitter and unsuccessful strike of 
railway shopmen), but the new initiatives probably come too 
late to reverse the decline. In any case, in 1968, the presidents 
of 11 railroads, the industry association, and six railroad
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unions established the Railroad Labor-Management Com 
mittee to consult jointly on matters of mutual interest, such 
as safety, training, and legislation affecting the industry's 
financial difficulties. 19 The committee lasted until 1977, 
when meetings were discontinued because of a breakdown in 
bargaining negotiations over crew size.
A Task Force that Succeeded
The defunct committee left a valuable legacy a Task 
Force on Rail Transportation that set up cooperative useful 
projects for improving terminal efficiency. Its method was 
nonadversarial. It considered not only work rules but the 
validity of managerial, operating, and marketing practices. 
It explored work rules and other changes experimentally, 
measuring the consequences and proposing collective 
bargaining remedies. It contemplated the prospect of main 
taining or expanding employment opportunities through cost 
savings and improved service that brought new business.
The Task Force's first project focused on the terminal of 
the Missouri Pacific Railroad at St. Louis. A full-time joint 
labor-management team was assigned "to identify barriers 
to efficiency, propose changes in management and labor 
practices and government policies and regulations, and con 
duct on-line experiments to test the effectiveness of the pro 
posed solutions." Over a three-year period of the 1970s, the 
project team conducted 24 experiments, half involving terms 
of collective bargaining agreements and half involving prac 
tices of management. The findings led to shortening of the 
average time spent by a boxcar in a terminal, increased 
reliability of car movements, and accident reduction. 20
The success of the St. Louis project led to similar ex 
periments at the Houston Terminal and the Buffalo Ter 
minal. Others were attempted but were discontinued when 
the parties disagreed over the scope of the program.
The Task Force's cooperative, problem solving approach 
has been praised by a railroad labor expert as a "necessary
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institutional change" that "offers the chance to move away 
from the rigid, conflict-based bargaining process to explore 
avenues of mutual concern." Its experience also 
demonstrated that an alteration of ingrained attitudes and 
long-standing customs is slow and complex21  and could 
come too late for decisive restoration of a moribund in 
dustry.
Steel Industry
Collective bargaining in the basic steel industry, as in other 
major industries, is seen by labor experts as evolving over the 
past 40 years from a state of mutual distrust to "more ac 
commodative, sophisticated relationships in which the par 
ties understand each other's needs, motives, and problems, 
and, more often than not, are able to resolve their dif 
ferences amicably." 22 In the past 20 years, the steel industry 
has expanded communication at all levels during the life of 
contracts, has avoided government intervention in set 
tlements, and has introduced several cooperative ar 
rangements. Since 1959, the parties have negotiated eight 
times without losing a day in a nationwide strike.
One of the most important inducements for greater union- 
management cooperation was the great surge of steel imports 
following the 116-day strike of 1959. The interruption of 
domestic steel production and the buildup of inventories 
before the next contract expiration date helped foreign pro 
ducers to enter and become established in the American 
market. Subsequent declines in employment, intensifying 
competition from imports and substitute materials, and low 
profits have further convinced labor and management of the 
need for industrial peace and collaborative efforts.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, labor and management 
experimented with various types of arrangements to achieve 
a more harmonious relationship and strengthen the 
industry's competitive performance. It is generally agreed
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that labor-management cooperation was facilitated by the 
establishment in 1959 of a four-member committee to 
negotiate on behalf of the 12 major companies on all issues. 
Later cooperative endeavors, discussed below, include the 
Human Relations Committee, Joint Labor-Management 
Committees, the Experimental Negotiating Agreement, and 
the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee.
Human Relations Committee
The Human Relations Research Committee was establish 
ed in the 1960 agreement to study mutual problems not easily 
resolved under the pressures of periodic negotiations. The 
parties dropped the word "Research" from the title in 1962, 
when it became clear that the committee's function was not 
only fact-finding but also to make recommendations and to 
conduct negotiations. With the chief negotiators for the 
union and the industry as co-chairmen, the Committee had a 
broad mandate "to plan and oversee studies and recommend 
solutions" of such complex problems as guidelines for the 
determination of equitable wage and benefit adjustments, 
the job classification system, wage incentives, seniority 
(especially as it relates to layoff and recall), medical care, 
and "such other overall problems as the parties, by mutual 
agreement, may from time to time refer to the Committee."
While the Human Relations Committee found it impossi 
ble to reach an agreement on wage guidelines, subcommit 
tees dealing with less controversial subjects on the list, accor 
ding to one industry expert, were "highly productive." 23 
However, the work of staff technicians on the Human Rela 
tions Committee in resolving issues even before bargaining 
began was resented by local and regional union officials who 
served on negotiating committees. With a turnover in union 
leadership in 1965, the Human Relations Committee was 
eliminated, but the principle of cooperative study and joint 
consultation on matters of mutual interest was established as 
a part of the industrial relations system.
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Joint Labor-Management Committees
Since the mid-1960s, a variety of joint committees were 
established under collective bargaining contracts and 
memoranda of agreement. These committees operate at the 
industry, company, and plant levels. Some continue work 
begun by the Human Relations Committee in a problem 
solving mode, away from the bargaining table. Some 
develop information for use in negotiations. They may deal 
with a wide variety of subjects, such as contracting out, civil 
rights, safety and health, job classification, incentives, 
grievance and arbitration procedures, apprenticeship, 
employment security, and plant productivity.
Experimental Negotiating Agreement
The adoption in 1973 (and a renewal in 1974, 1977, and 
1980) of the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) as 
the industry's bargaining instrument is considered one of the 
most important steps toward more cooperation between the 
steel union and management. 24 Under the ENA, the parties 
agree to avoid strike or lockout at the expiration of the col 
lective bargaining contract and to submit all national issues 
not resolved through bargaining to a panel of impartial ar 
bitrators for final and binding decision. Thus, the agreement 
guarantees no interruption of steel production in contract- 
bargaining years. By giving up the strike threat, the union 
hoped to dissuade steel users from building up inventories 
(including imports) before contract expirations and then cut 
ting back orders after agreements are reached. (In 1968 and 
1971, cutbacks in orders resulted in drastic reduction in pro 
duction and employment.) In return for the national no- 
strike concessions, the industry agreed in 1973 to the right to 
strike over local issues, gave a bonus of $150, and agreed to a 
minimum wage increase of 3 percent per year.
The ENA governed negotiations for the 1974, 1977, and 
1980 contracts. Production was not interrupted, but this 
benefit to the economy came not without cost. The wage set-
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tlements achieved in the industry's more harmonious setting 
have been followed by price increases propagated to many 
other products, such as automobiles, home appliances, 
machinery, and buildings.
Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee
The federal Interagency Steel Task Force that in December 
1977 recommended a "trigger-price" system for limiting im 
ports also recommended "establishment of a tripartite com 
mittee of industry, labor, and government representatives as 
a mechanism to ensure a continuing cooperative approach to 
the problems and progress of the steel industry." 25 The Steel 
Tripartite Advisory Committee was established in July 1978 
to study problems of the industry and to prepare recommen 
dations to the president for its revitalization. The Committee 
includes eight labor representatives, eight management 
representatives, and various high-level government officials. 
It is chaired by the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of 
Commerce.
Shortly after its establishment, the Committee agreed to 
concentrate on five selected problems that required govern 
ment policy changes for their resolution: capital formation, 
trade, environmental and other regulations, worker and 
community adjustment, and technology. Tripartite working 
groups were assigned to develop findings and recommenda 
tions on each subject. The results were reviewed by the full 
Committee and a final report was transmitted to the presi 
dent. 26 The recommended measures became the basis of a 
legislative and administrative program announced by the 
president on September 30, 1980.
The report of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee 
represents an historic event in the steel industry. In its 
preparation, labor participated as an equal partner. Forty 
years earlier, Philip Murray and Clinton Golden, leaders of 
the fledgling Steelworkers Union, proposed a joint labor- 
management industry council to deal with common prob-
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lems affecting the steel industry's prosperity and the security 
of worker livelihoods. Adversity and the maturation of 
union-management relationships appear to have brought 
about a high degree of the cooperation that they envisaged; 
but, unfortunately, their harmony also has inflationary 
macroeconomic implications that they could not have fore 
seen and that we, as a nation, are not yet able to handle.
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The message of this chapter is that alert leadership and time 
ly action for labor-management (and broader) cooperation 
can help a community to keep or recover economic viability. 
The continual flux of competition always tends to threaten 
some geographic areas while favoring others. Thus, changes 
in technology, tastes, demographic characteristics, laws and 
regulations, the size and distribution of private and public 
expenditures, and the volume and structure of international 
trade affect the comparative production costs of different 
communities (and countries) and the demand for their goods 
and services. When local enterprises fail to perceive or to res 
pond adequately to competitive challenges, their com 
munities can suffer significant damage. Plant closings, 
bankruptcies, and employment cutbacks can undermine 
local tax bases, reduce public services and amenities, en 
courage outmigration of the young and the skilled, and set in 
motion a downward spiral that is hard to halt or reverse. 
Recognizing this common threat, business, labor, and other 
local leaders have on occasion rallied to counteract or limit 
the erosion of the economic foundations of the areas in 
which they live and work. While it may appear that not 
enough communities rise up to the challenge,' it is also pro 
bable that no other nation can boast so much evidence of 
local resourcefulness for voluntary self-help.
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This chapter starts with a general review of the nation's ex 
perience in local collaboration and then concentrates on six 
cases: Jamestown (N.Y.), Buffalo-Erie (N.Y.), Cumberland 
(Md.), Muskegon (Midi.), Evansville (Ind.), and Haverhill 
(Mass.). These six ventures, all started in the 1970s and still 
operating, illustrate the variety of motivations, explicit aims, 
feasible structures, and potential accomplishments of their 
genre.
A Very Short History
Many urban areas, and most or all states, have had some 
kind of economic development program since the end of 
World War II. Faced with the demobilization of millions of 
men and women and with the closing of war plants and 
military bases, community leaders across the country made 
plans to ease the transition to peacetime. In addition to the 
ineffectual efforts of such unremembered federal agencies as 
Reemployment and Retraining Administration and the work 
of local civic and veterans organizations, important con 
tributions to postwar planning on the community level were 
made by the Committee for Economic Development, a 
business-oriented group. This group has included the im 
provement of local job opportunities on its research agenda 
in more recent years. 2
Typically, the early private initiatives were dominated by 
public-spirited businessmen, 3 and only token support was 
enlisted from labor, educational, religious, civic, and 
government ranks. One good reason for labor's minor or 
defensive participation was the insecurity of the hard-won 
concept of seniority; a Selective Training and Service Act of 
1940, not designed originally for a lengthy war, contained a 
Section 8 on reemployment rights that threatened a basic 
premise of unionism and had to be clarified in the courts. 
Two exceptional cities, Toledo and Louisville, did establish 
early tripartite labor-management-citizens committees, in 
1945 and 1946 respectively, to mediate local industrial 
disputes and to create a climate and image of industrial
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peace. A later example, which includes only the first two par 
ties in its title, dates from 1963 and relates to the community 
severely affected by the disappearance of Studebaker from 
the roster of automobile manufacturers: the South Bend 
Labor-Management Commission, organized to promote 
good industrial relations through studies and conferences.
In the 1970s, communities became more aware of 
peacetime needs for economic cooperation. As the nation's 
economic growth slowed, as foreign producers penetrated or 
wrested away markets thought to be "ours," and as inflation 
and uncertain petroleum supplies altered patterns of invest 
ment and consumption, many local areas with long- 
established plants and industries suffered unexpected hard 
ship. Advocates of labor-management cooperation sought to 
encourage the idea that the attenuation of conflict might in 
fluence corporate headquarters to consider modernization of 
old facilities instead of shutting them down.
The accompanying table shows 28 cities, towns, and coun 
ties in which labor-management entities have been establish 
ed, mostly in the 1970s and in the northeast and midwest. 
These joint undertakings are found not only in smaller 
places, like Cumberland, but also in more populous places, 
like Buffalo (and its environs) and, most recently, 
Philadelphia.
Membership and Financing
Prominent local government officials, whose experience 
has made them cognizant of the link between amicable labor- 
management relations and sound economic development, 
have often taken the lead in bringing the two parties (and 
others) in a constructive joint organization. In other in 
stances, labor, business, and political leaders have acted 
more spontaneously in concert after a serious strike or pro 
longed industrial dispute has made the implications of a per 
manent shutdown more vivid. Sometimes, a key role has 








Buffalo, New York 1975
St. Louis, Missouri 1977
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1980
100,000 - 300,000 population
South Bend, Indiana 1963
Evansville, Indiana 1975
Riverside-San Bernadino, California* 1977
Under 100,000 population
Jackson County, Michigan 1958
Green Bay, Wisconsin 1965
Upper Peninsula, Michigan 1970
Fox Cities Area, Wisconsin 1970
Jamestown, New York 1972
Cumberland, Maryland 1975
Chautauqua County, New York 1975
Mahoning Valley, Ohio 1975
Clinton County, Pennsylvania 1975
Elmira, New York 1976
Springfield, Ohio 1976
Muskegon, Michigan 1977






Sioux City, Iowa 1981
* Discontinued in 1981
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Conciliation Service, who preach the merits of cooperation 
and assist in defusing tensions between the two parties. 
Usually, these intermediaries withdraw to background ad 
visory roles if they succeed in stimulating the principals to 
form cooperative committees; the leadership is left in the 
hands of labor and management co-chairmen. 4
The area committees are made up of roughly equal 
numbers of recognized labor and management represen 
tatives who usually serve without compensation and leave 
much of the active planning, scheduling, and general direc 
tion to small executive cores or steering groups. In addition, 
small professional staffs are hired for day-to-day operations 
and research. Consultants also are used as required. If the 
staff is large enough to have a director, his neutrality is im 
portant for retention of member confidence. Committee 
meetings may be held monthly or quarterly, and they are in 
formal as a rule.
Funds for committees come from private sources (e.g., the 
companies and unions with which members are affiliated) 
and from government, usually state or local. In the past 
decade, some committees received seed money from such 
federal agencies as the Economic Development Administra 
tion, the Department of Labor, and the Appalachian 
Regional Commission. Federal sources, however, are best 
for short-run assistance at the start or for the conduct of 
specific projects. A committee that relies too heavily on 
federal money risks limitation of its activities to meetings 
and occasional conferences when this funding ceases.
Functions and Objectives
It is up to each committee to determine how best to func 
tion. Some are more ambitious than others. All are realistic 
in assessment of community needs and of the roles in which 
they could constructively serve. At least five roles are dis 
cernible. First, they may serve as forums for exchange of 
ideas between labor and management and for communica-
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don and dealings with federal, state, and local governments. 
Second, they may concentrate (as did the Toledo and 
Louisville committees, which actually operated as offices 
within their city governments) on mediation of industrial 
disputes. Third, they may function as information and 
research centers to keep labor and management abreast of 
changing local circumstances that are relevant to bargaining 
and of pertinent developments elsewhere. Fourth, they may 
offer technical assistance to employers and unions willing to 
experiment with new ways of organizing work, etc. Fifth, 
they may act as catalysts, encouraging and assisting labor 
and management at the company level to organize in-plant 
committees and to improve internal communications.
Through service in these roles, areawide committees could 
contribute signally to the current performance and the pros 
pects of their localities. As honest brokers trusted by both 
sides, they could assist in bringing difficult labor- 
management negotiations to successful conclusions. They 
may encourage community colleges to offer courses useful to 
foremen, supervisors, local union officers, and shop 
stewards. They may sponsor workshops on collective 
bargaining, absenteeism, output quality, and productivity 
enhancement. They could help small firms to upgrade 
managerial and other pertinent skills. They could mobilize 
public support and negotiate for government funds for im 
provement of transportation, establishment of industrial 
parks, attraction of new business, and so forth. They could 
conduct programs that aim at lifting morale and civic pride 
and at changing earlier adverse reputations of their localities 
as places in which to live and work. A more detailed picture 
of community strategies and objectives emerges from the 
case studies that follow.
Jamestown Labor-Management Committee5
The joint committee established in 1972 in Jamestown has 
been acclaimed for its dramatic contribution to the com-
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munity's self-renewal and has become a model for other 
distressed manufacturing centers. The immediate crisis that 
culminated in joint action was the shutdown of a metal fur 
niture plant after a four-month strike in 1971. Over 400 jobs 
were lost when the unemployment rate already stood at 10 
percent. Other companies were also experiencing work stop 
pages at the time, and the specter of bankruptcy loomed.
These troubles came to this community of some 40,000 
persons against a background of earlier labor-management 
strife and decline or loss of once-thriving textile and wood 
furniture industries. Indeed, the community had acquired a 
reputation as a low-productivity and high-cost area with a 
"poor labor climate."
A decisive factor in Jamestown's turnaround was the 
leadership of Stanley Lundine, a young, energetic, and deter 
mined mayor (now a Congressman). With the help of 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) 
mediators, he took the initiative to bring together the ex 
ecutives of leading manufacturing firms and the labor 
leaders of the workers therein, winning their agreement to 
join in a committee for open discussion of industrial rela 
tions and economic revival. This Labor-Management Com 
mittee includes representatives of large international con 
glomerates, large locally-owned companies, and small firms. 
It also includes representatives of the steel, auto, machinist, 
furniture, and glass and ceramic unions. The executive direc 
tor of the Manufacturers Association and of the AFL-CIO 
Central Labor Council also are members. In 1977, represen 
tatives of a hospital and the school system were added. With 
the aid of a professional staff and occasional task forces in 
cluding outside experts, a 10-member executive board carries 
on the Committee's actual business.
The first joint meetings considered alternative develop 
ment strategies. One featured "conversion," accepting the 
decline of manufacturing and expanding tourism, recrea 
tion, research, and other services. A "replacement" strategy
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contemplated attraction of new factories to compensate for 
departure of others. A third possibility, "renewal," envisag 
ed joint action to assist existing industries, the encourage 
ment of new industries in novel ways, and the development 
of people and programs to meet private and public needs. 
The "renewal" option was deemed most consistent with the 
common interests of labor and management.
In the spring of 1972, the new Committee announced four 
principal goals: "the improvement of labor relations, man 
power development, assistance to industrial development 
programs, and productivity gains in existing industries." 
Despite a traditional distaste for the proclamation of pro 
ductivity increase as an explicit objective of a cooperative 
undertaking, labor members went along. The notion was 
rendered palatable to rank-and-filers who tend to equate 
"productivity" with job loss and speedup by elucidation of 
the term to include less threatening objectives, like reduction 
of absenteeism and of material and energy waste in the 
manufacturing process.
The Committee quickly compiled an impressive record of 
accomplishment. Frequent meetings away from the bargain 
ing arena permitted concentration on community objectives 
of training and industrial development and helped engender 
a mutual respect conducive to industrial peace. With a 
record of fewer strikes, earlier settlements, and a reduction 
of grievances, Jamestown shed its reputation as a "bad" 
labor town.
Cooperative efforts to develop needed skilled workers 
have been particularly fruitful. The Committee has been in 
strumental in the design of industrywide training courses for 
upgrading workers in 12 local wood furniture plants to 
replace retiring skilled craftsmen. It has helped metalwork- 
ing companies and unions to identify skill needs and has par 
ticipated with the community college in the design of ap 
propriate upgrading programs. It has sponsored courses for 
training first-line supervisors in leadership, shop stewards in
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communication, and management and labor officials in con 
tract administration and grievance processing. Employer and 
county funds have been supplemented by federal Com 
prehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) money.
A unique feature of the Jamestown plan is its strong com 
plementary effort to create in-plant labor-management com 
mittees, involving workers and supervisors on the shop floor 
in the improvement of productivity, quality of worklife, and 
industrial relations in general. Consultants have assisted in 
experimental projects concerned with sharing the productivi 
ty gains, joint redesign of plant layout, and worker par 
ticipation in bidding for new business. Many of these in- 
plant projects were temporary, but they collectively gave rise 
to community "themes" (such as skill development, gain 
sharing, and layout redesign) that served to stimulate further 
organizational change, often in unexpected ways.
The positive climate resulting from the Committee's work 
has improved Jamestown's economic outlook. Local in 
vestors have come to the rescue of five failing firms; in one 
case, the employees were the investors. Several companies 
announced enlargement and modernization programs in 
1975. For the first time in a half century, a major industrial 
firm, Cummins Engine Company, decided to move into 
Jamestown, taking over a vacant plant and creating the 
potential of 1,500 new jobs.
Buffalo-Erie County 
Labor-Management Council6
Like the much smaller Jamestown community, the Buf 
falo area has had a long history of labor-management strife 
and a reputation discouraging to new enterprise. Between 
1970 and 1975, it lost 30,000 manufacturing jobs, or 30 per 
cent of the total; and, in 1970-1972 and 1975, it ranked 
among the top three cities in the nation in loss of worktime 
due to strikes. In addition to these troubles, the city and 
county have teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.
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These dire circumstances prompted the head of the AFL- 
CIO Council to meet informally with a leading businessman 
in the area and with various government officials the 
mayor, Congressmen, and county executives. It was decided 
that a joint labor-management venture could interrupt the 
downward slide. A joint Labor-Management Council was 
formed in 1976 with 9 members from management and 10 
from labor. Political leaders were not included but were ex 
pected to be supportive.
The Council employs an executive director with extensive 
experience as a mediator and a small staff with backgrounds 
in business and labor relations. In addition, an Advisory 
Committee has been established with members from the 
FMCS, the State Mediation Service, the State Industrial 
Commissioner's office, private industry, universities, and 
the AFL-CIO Human Resources Development Institute.
In selecting a strategy for its operations, the Council con 
sidered two different models: the Jamestown Plan of train 
ing and in-plant labor-management committees and the 
older Toledo Labor-Management Committee. The latter 
concentrates on mediation or arbitration by tripartite panels 
when its aid is requested in local negotiations, strikes, and 
grievances. It is said to be successful largely because of the 
network of close contacts among committee members and 
other labor, management, and public leaders; it can function 
informally to resolve problems both before and after a 
dispute is submitted to it. The Council concluded that it 
could not copy completely either of these models but would 
draw on both experiences in formulating a program ap 
propriate to Buffalo's larger size, political complexity, and 
diverse industry and union mix.
The Council has, through its staff, concentrated on en 
couraging formation of joint committees at the plant level 
and facilitating the bargaining process. By the end of 1979, 
the Council was working with 42 in-plant committees in 
firms ranging in size from 100 employees to 3,000. In some
Communitywide Collaboration 85
firms, more than one committee was established. In conjunc 
tion with Cornell University, the Council has set up training 
sessions for the committees on grievance processing and 
analysis, contract administration, safety issues, and tech 
niques for improving operations. On request, it reviews and 
tries to improve grievance processes where these are con 
troverted in bargaining; this step is necessary before an at 
tempt is made to form a plant committee. As the Council's 
executive director has observed, "the grievance process must 
have some minimum level of civility and effectiveness if an 
LMC is to be effective." 7 Also at the request of the parties, 
the Council may undertake a fact-finding study prior to 
negotiations and thereby facilitate concord.
A distinctive contribution to economic revitalization of 
the Buffalo area has been made through the joint committees 
that the Council has helped to organize on the waterfront. 
The Port of Buffalo reached its heyday in the 1950s; by 1975, 
it had declined far below its peak and the prospects for 
recovery were considered dim. Here is how the Council has 
helped to improve the outlook:
1. With the assistance of the Council, three companies in 
the cargo industry and the International Longshoremen's 
Association established a joint labor-management commit 
tee to study the Port's future and found a significant poten 
tial for handling shipping containers at the Port if work 
practices were modernized and made more flexible. Subse 
quent modification of the contract for warehousing resulted 
in lower labor cost and business expansion, which more than 
tripled employment in two years.
2. In the grain-milling industry at the Port, which pro 
cesses wheat shipped from the midwest, labor was reputed to 
be resistant to adjustment of practices and crew size in the 
face of technological change. A joint study, directed by the 
Council's staff, found that crew sizes, on the whole, were 
not unreasonable but that, in a few cases, obsolete work 
rules did restrict productivity. The study led to changes in
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work practices and a better understanding between the par 
ties.
3. In 1978, the local longshoremen's union and five com 
panies in the grain-milling industry, together with the cargo 
and steel industries and their respective unions, established 
the Buffalo Waterfront Labor-Management Committee, 
with the Council's assistance, to concentrate on the 
economic development of the Port. One of this Committee's 
major projects was a study of the transportation network. 
The study led to state approval of funds for modernization 
of the Port's equipment.
The Council has also contributed to the strengthening of 
the area's manpower base. In 1977, it established a Human 
Resources Subcommittee to consider the problem of chronic 
shortages of skilled craftsmen and to help obtain com 
mitments from employers to hire trainees. When a major 
steel plant reduced its workforce by 3,000, the Human 
Resources Subcommittee was asked to assist the laid off 
employees; it established a Transition Center which cen 
tralized and expedited all placement, training, and other 
community services for the displaced workers. Some of these 
workers were trained in shortage skills as welders, 
machinists, tool and die-maker apprentices, maintenance 
mechanics, precision machine operators, and industrial elec 
tricians. According to the Council director's report, "when 
the Transition Center closed in late 1978, 1,200 of the 1,891 
center registrations were in new jobs, training for new jobs, 
or back to work with Bethlehem. By mid-1979, all the laid- 
off employees who had registered were successfully transi- 
tioned or recalled."
While the Transition Center was considered a success, the 
Council decided that work on human resources diverted too 
much time from its basic mission and recommended the 
establishment of a city-county Private Industry Council 
(PIC) under the new CETA program. Many members of the 
Human Resources Subcommittee were appointed to the PIC,
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and the Council assumed the avuncular role of "ad hoc 
catalyst to energize the PIC staff."
Federal budget stringency now clouds the future of 
organizations like the Council, regardless of their effec 
tiveness, and the new mood is to have every local tub rest, if 
possible, on its own bottom. Although the Council gets 
funds from the city of Buffalo, Erie County, and union and 
business groups, it has lately depended most heavily on 
grants from the Economic Development Administration, an 
agency marked for sharp reduction or demise.
Cumberland Area 
Labor-Management Committee*
The Cumberland Area Labor-Management Committee 
(CALM) was established in 1975 "to enhance the economic 
development potential of the Cumberland area through 
programs and activities which focus on cooperative action." 
Located in the foothills of the Appalachians in western 
Maryland, the Cumberland area has a population of 84,000, 
slightly larger than the Jamestown area's, and similar pro 
blems of job development. Fifty years ago, Cumberland was 
a major railroad and coal center, but dieselization and other 
changes have diminished its importance. Today, the area's 
main industries make tires, textiles, glass, steel, and 
paper all heavily unionized and impacted by severe foreign 
and domestic competition and by slow growth of demand.
Although industrial relations are now stable, a reputation 
for labor strife gained in the 1930s and 1940s persists as a 
discouragement to new investment. The 1974-75 recession, 
the loss of 1,400 jobs because of a shutdown of a major part 
of a large plant, and the shaky condition of other firms 
worsened the long term economic outlook. Cumberland has 
tried to reverse the unfavorable trend through such industrial 
development schemes as low-interest financing programs, a 
10-year tax exemption on real and personal property, and the 
construction of industrial and office parks. In 1978, business 
groups and the Allegany county government launched a civic
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campaign with the slogan "PACE Positive Attitudes 
Change Everything."
Over its first five years, CALM has concentrated on the 
improvement of labor-management relations at individual 
plants as one of the keys to assuring retention and expansion 
of area employment. While recognizing that many economic 
factors go into decisions to close, expand, or build new 
plants, the CALM Executive Board agreed that "labor- 
management relations should never be the reason behind a 
plant shutdown or the rationale for losing a prospective new 
industry."
CALM's principal contribution to improving the collec 
tive bargaining process at member firms is its program to 
assist the formation and operation of in-plant labor- 
management committees. The only condition that the 
CALM consultant imposes on a new committee is that it give 
the concept a six-month trial before deciding to keep or 
discontinue. All the in-plant committees concentrate on 
plant operations procedures, equipment, maintenance, 
productivity, and job-related complaints. Grievances under 
the contract are excluded from their purview. By 1980, there 
were 10 committees in operation, of which two had been in 
existence before CALM. More than half of the employees in 
Allegany County's manufacturing and service organizations 
with union representation are in firms that have committees; 
they work in the tire, foundry, paper, steel, and cement in 
dustries and in local government.
CALM gives high priority to educational programs in 
labor relations, for both management and union represen 
tatives, as a key to "mutual understanding." Over 400 
managers, supervisors, union officials and hourly workers 
have participated in CALM-sponsored programs. Training 
sessions are held, free of charge, at the plant site, in the 
union hall, and at the Allegany Community College and 
Frostburg State College. A unique program sponsored by 
CALM features "bootstraps" training of union and 
employer selectees as instructors in industrial relations; they
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return to design and conduct in-house courses for local 
union and company officials. Another unusual CALM pro 
ject involves team-teaching of a high school course in in 
dustrial relations that realistically presents union and 
management views on issues in the world of work.
CALM has also functioned as a forum for joint action on 
problems of economic development. For example, it helped 
persuade the Environmental Protection Agency to allow area 
industries to convert from oil to the kind of coal that is abun 
dant in western Maryland. It worked closely with the con 
struction industry to assure that several significant building 
projects were completed within competitive budget con 
straints. It also focused public attention on the need to 
minimize overlapping services and contain rising health-care 
costs.
Finally, mention should be made of the close ties establish 
ed by CALM with cognate entities the Allegany County 
Economic Development Company, the Maryland State 
Department of Economic and Community Development, 
and the Maryland Center for Productivity and Quality of 
Working Life. These connections facilitate diffusion of the 
concept of community-based labor-management coopera 
tion to other parts of the state.
Muskegon Area 
Labor-Management Committee9
Labor-management cooperation in Muskegon County has 
evolved as a joint effort to expand job opportunities in this 
relatively distressed area of about 157,000 people on the 
southeastern shore of Lake Michigan. Machinery and 
metalworking are now the primary industries of a region in 
which lumber and automotive firms once dominated. 
Unionism is strong, with the United Auto Workers and the 
Electrical Workers much in evidence. A series of strikes in 
1971 aroused local labor, business, and community leaders 
to the weaknesses of Muskegon's economy. Several major 
companies were planning either to shut down local plants or
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to move operations elsewhere. Closer cooperation between 
labor and management seemed vital to survival.
Several models of community-based labor-management 
consultation were already in operation in Michigan. The 
Jackson County Labor-Management Board had been 
meeting monthly since 1958 to share information and ideas 
about local and state economic conditions and community 
betterment. The Upper Peninsula Labor-Management Com 
mittee was established in 1970; it concentrates on annual 
communitywide conferences for improving the collective 
bargaining process.
The labor and business leaders of Muskegon decided in 
1972 to establish the Industrial Expansion Board. From its 
membership dues, an executive director was hired, and 
several consultants were engaged to develop a work plan, 
known as "Project Priority," for the Board's operations. 
Subsequently, a group of 40 business and labor leaders iden 
tified three issues of greatest common concern: poor com 
munications and hostility between labor and management, 
the need for joint support of a community effort to stimulate 
economic growth and productivity, and an excessively 
critical attitude of the news media in their portrayal of local 
economic conditions. Task forces were assigned to deal with 
each of the issues. Among the proposed solutions were: the 
award of major new construction projects to local com 
panies, the establishment of in-plant labor-management 
forums for discussion of mutual concern, and meeting with 
representatives of the local news media to discuss the quality 
of coverage in general and to initiate coverage of Project 
Priority's activities.
In 1977, the Industrial Expansion Board, having received 
a grant from the federal Economic Development Ad 
ministration, was transformed into the Muskegon Area 
Labor-Management Committee (MALM). The Committee 
appointed a full-time coordinator, created a board of eight 
directors (four each from management and labor), and in 
troduced Project Priority. Five objectives were approved:
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1. To help raise the quality of working life in Muskegon 
and contribute to productivity improvement.
2. To assist business and labor or any county organization 
to increase effectiveness through a joint working relationship 
as a third party.
3. Upon request, to assist in plant and business seminars 
for bringing the parties together and solving problems on a 
cooperative basis.
4. To improve the community image, making it attractive 
for new business to locate in Muskegon.
5. To respond to requests of local business and labor in 
problem solving.
Neither the coordinator nor a Committee member may 
serve as a private mediator in any case involving grievances, 
complaints, or other labor-management differences.
Continuing attention has been devoted by MALM to the 
organization of in-plant labor-management committees (or 
"forums," as they are locally called) and to the encourage 
ment of "brainstorming" sessions on such topics as 
absenteeism, alcoholism, and quality of working life. One 
example of payoff refers to a plant making bearings: design 
changes recommended by a machinist enabled the company 
to obtain a contract for which it had previously bid unsuc 
cessfully. In several plants, work rules have been modified 
with benefit to productivity. MALM also shares some of the 
credit for local decisions to modernize equipment and ex 
pand facilities.
The Committee has worked to build public support for a 
variety of economic development projects. New facilities for 
solid waste disposal have attracted three chemical plants to 
the area. Among other forward-looking projects are a new 
industrial park and a new downtown shopping mall.
Evansville Area 
Labor-Management Committee
The economic well-being of this area of some 133,000 peo 
ple in a largely rural corner of Indiana is linked to the for-
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tunes of a few multiplant manufacturing firms. Evansville 
makes home appliances, automotive parts, and other metal 
products.
Two efforts have been made in the area since the end of 
World War II to organize a communitywide vehicle for the 
advancement of labor-management harmony and coopera 
tion. One occurred in the 1950s and the other in the 1970s.
The first effort began when the curtailment of defense 
production after Korea meant the shutdown of area plants of 
several major employers. Business leaders formed a Com 
mittee of 100 to advertise the area's assets to potential in 
dustrial developers. 10 After this gambit was criticized by a 
panel of Indiana University experts as too narrow a concept 
for revitalization of the economic base, a new organization 
was formed to draw support from the whole com 
munity the Evansville Futures Committee (EFC). This 
Committee adopted a broader concept of redevelopment 
that included the upgrading of education and training and 
the improvement of industrial relations. A firm of plant 
location specialists recommended a labor-management coun 
cil to promote industrial peace and cooperation.
In 1958, the Labor-Management Committee of EFC was 
formed. It sponsored informal luncheon meetings and a 
series of institutes on industrial relations, and it also func 
tioned as an unofficial mediator of strikes. During the 1960s 
several major companies built plants in Evansville, and this 
return to prosperity diminished labor and management in 
terest in the Committee, which became inactive.
Slow economic growth in general, strikes at major firms in 
the area, and threats of shutdown and relocation prompted 
the establishment of the Evansville Area Labor-Management 
Committee in 1975. 11 A federal mediator played a key role in 
the formation of this second area venture in cooperation. He 
attributed the high frequency and long duration of work 
stoppages to inadequate communication between union and 
business leaders and noted the connection between industrial
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turmoil and the reluctance of investors. Under his guidance, 
ten labor and management leaders met voluntarily for 
several months before the new Committee became a reality.
The Evansville Area Labor-Management Committee was 
set up as a nonprofit organization to serve as a forum for 
open communication on threats to industrial harmony. The 
board of directors at first included representatives of the 
local teamster, machinist, electrical worker, and construc 
tion unions and of local plants engaged in production of 
aluminum, electrical goods, containers, home appliances, 
and food. More recently, representation from the public sec 
tor has been added. A professional coordinator was hired 
with CETA funds in September 1976.
The activities of the Committee are thought to have helped 
reduce strike-proneness and to promote cooperation. The 
improvement of attitudes on both sides of the bargaining 
table are thought to have influenced some major corpora 
tions to remain in the area and to expand employment. The 
Committee conducts seminars, conferences, and workshops 
on industrial relations and has succeeded in establishing in- 
plant labor-management committees at eight facilities, two 
of them operated by major appliance producers. 12
Haverhill Growth Alliance 13
In 1979, the Haverhill Growth Alliance (HGA) was 
launched to help restore the economic vitality of an old, 
historic city of 75,000 people on the Merrimack River. Once 
a major shoe center, the city had declined for some eight 
decades. Western Electric Company, with 5,200 workers, is 
the dominant employer. Old homes and factories, some 
abandoned, testify visibly to the area's candidacy for 
renewal.
The impetus to labor-management cooperation came from 
outside the community the Massachusetts Labor- 
Management Center, a tripartite, nonprofit organization 
established in Boston to encourage joint consultation in the
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interest of economic and social development. The Center has 
been influential in making Massachusetts business and labor 
leaders aware of innovative practices in industrial relations 
and in assisting them to organize community-based and in- 
plant labor-management committees. It was enabled to pro 
vide needed technical assistance to Haverhill (and other 
areas) by a grant from the Economic Development Ad 
ministration.
The idea of setting up a communitywide labor- 
management committee as a basis for reviving Haverhill was 
broached to the mayor and other civic leaders in 1978 by the 
Center's director. The former mayor of Jamestown was 
present too. The Haverhill mayor undertook to encourage 
favorable consideration of the proposal by businessmen and 
the unions.
Although the experience of Jamestown inspired 
Haverhill's action, HGA has varied the prototype according 
to its own circumstances. For one thing, it has opened 
Alliance membership to all residents on payment of dues. 
Thus, it is not confined to business and labor support. It 
focuses on the public sector as well as the private. In addition 
to concern for improving labor-management relations and 
worklife quality, it deals with issues of urban rehabilita 
tion of the quality of life of the whole community. It coor 
dinates the activities of neighborhood associations preoc 
cupied with such issues.
It supports efforts to refurbish the downtown shopping 
area and to instill a sense of civic pride. A task force organiz 
ed in cooperation with the North Essex Community College 
is identifying training needs of local workers and promoting 
vocational adjustment to demands of high-technology in 
dustries.
To encourage labor-management cooperation, the 
Alliance staff has concentrated on opening up communica-
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tions and promoting better understanding between the city's 
managers and public employee unions. It has helped the par 
ties reach an "Agreement in Principle," which outlined joint 
goals to improve the collective bargaining process. In the 
private sector, it has organized training workshops for union 
stewards of the Communication Workers local at Western 
Electric. It has also sought to increase labor and business 
awareness of the objectives and techniques of in-plant 
cooperation. Such cooperation, however, is not likely to 
become an urgent item on the agenda of a community that 
lost its main industry decades ago, is not currently wracked 
by serious labor unrest, and is not awaiting an influx of new 
industry.
HaverhilPs experience suggests that a community may 
beneficially add an herb of common sense to the medicine 
prescribed by specialists for a disease from which it does not 
suffer. This lesson could be very important for the large 
number of localities that have outlived one economic career 
and seek another which is not assured. For a community to 
improve its quality of living is really its prime challenge; and 
this challenge includes, but is not synonymous with, im 
provement in the quality of worklife, although the latter 
often merits a high strategic priority.
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NOTES
1. Organizations such as the Appalachian Governors' Conference and the National Coun 
cil for Urban Economic Development have endorsed the establishment of areawide com 
mittees. In 1979, the National Association of Area Labor-Management Committees was 
formed by 13 such entities to share information and to lobby for federal appropriations for 
implementing the Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978, which would provide 
grants to cooperative committees at the area, industry, and plant levels. An appropriation 
of $1 million was finally approved for fiscal year 1981, to be administered by the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service. See Appendix B for list of 14 grantees.
2. See, for example, a publication prepared by the Area Development Committee of the 
Committee for Economic Development Community Economic Development Efforts: 
Five Case Studies (New York: Praeger, 1966).
3. It should be recalled here that the original title (1945) of the sponsor of this volume was 
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Community Research.
4. On the nature of community-based committees, see, for example, Establishing a 
Community-Wide Labor-Management Committee, National Center for Productivity and 
Quality of Working Life, Washington, 1978; Area Labor Management Committees, 
Bulletin No. 12, National Council for Urban Economic Development, Washington, 1977; 
and J. J. Popular, "Solution A Community Labor-Management Committee," Labor- 
Management Relations Service Newsletter, November 1979, pp. 2-3. An unpublished study 
that deserves mention is F. F. Foltman, Labor-Management Cooperation at the Communi 
ty Level; it was prepared for the National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working 
Life and is available from the author at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cor 
nell University.
5. Detailed accounts are given in reports of the Jamestown Area Labor-Management 
Committee: Three Productive Years: The Three- Year Report of the Labor-Management 
Committee (1975) and Commitment at Work: The Five-Year Report (1977), which is ex 
cerpted in the documentary appendix. Also of interest is "How Jamestown Averted 
Disaster," Business Week, July 21, 1975, pp. 66-68; a paper by R. W. Keidel, "The 
Jamestown Area Labor-Management Committee: An Overlapping of Community and 
Organizational Cooperation," presented at the Second Annual United States-Polish Con 
ference on the Management of Large-Scale Organizations, Tarrytown, N.Y., June 11-17, 
1978; and "Theme Appreciation as a Construct for Organizational Change," Management 
Science, November 1981.
6. The story of The Buffalo-Erie County Labor-Management Council is recounted in a 
report by its executive director, R. W. Ahearn, The Area-Wide Labor-Management Com 
mittee: The Buffalo Experience, November 1979; and in a statement by G. L. Wessel, its 
co-chairman, and I. C. Francis at a Hearing before the Subcommittee on Employment, 
Poverty, and Migratory Labor of the Committee on Human Resources, U.S. Senate, on 
Human Resources Development Act of 1977, September 27, 1977, pp. 103-161.
7. Ahearn, Labor-Management Committee, p. 10.
8. See Popular's article, cited in footnote 4, and a brochure published by Allegany County 
Economic Development Co., Cumberland Area Labor-Management Committee, 1980.
9. On Muskegon's organization, see report cited in footnote 4, Establishing a 
Community-Wide Labor-Management Committee, pp. 22-24.
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10. On Evansville's first committee, see the report cited in footnote 2.
11. See article by U. C. Lehner, "Committees of Labor and Management Enjoying 
Resurgence in Communities," Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1979.
12. See the final report submitted to the Economic Development Administration, 
Evansville Area Labor-Management Committee, March 1980.
13. An account of the Haverhill Growth Alliance appears in the April 1980 Newsletter of 




This chapter and the next three relate to labor-management 
cooperation at the company (or intracompany) level beyond 
the minimum requirements of the productive process. 
Cooperation is usually, but not necessarily, effected through 
joint committees and other ad hoc entities. Through such 
media, the two parties may consult on "extra-normal" mat 
ters of mutual concern or engage in joint exploration and 
solution of problems without prejudice to their standard 
adversarial commitments. Where employees are represented 
by independent (i.e., noncompany) unions, the negotiation 
of agreements on these additional matters extends the "nor 
mal" (wage-hour and noneconomic) scope of collective 
bargaining, keeping it the all-purpose basic instrument of the 
American version of "industrial democracy." 1
General Observations
Circumstances, perceived needs, and the climate of in 
dustrial relations critically affect the decision of labor and 
management to collaborate or not beyond the normal 
bounds of bargaining. These factors also largely determine 
the topics, modes, and vehicles of collaboration.
A decision to collaborate does not at all assure that a ven 
ture will prove successful will survive and yield the promis-
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ed bilateral net benefits. Adverse business conditions, 
cyclical as well as longer term, are inimical to the viability of 
extra-normal cooperative arrangements once these have been 
adopted. In the early stages of a venture, strong bilateral 
leadership at the top, patience, and good will are essential; 
and so is skill, or knowledge of what to do and how to go 
about doing it. In later stages, commitment at the top re 
mains indispensable as the original protagonists leave the 
scene. In particular, as the opening chapter insists, it is futile 
to try to copy in any literal sense what some other firm is do 
ing in the same or in another industry or in some foreign 
country. The garment of cooperation has to be tailored; it 
cannot just be taken off a rack. Finally, company-level ar 
rangements cannot survive in a larger competitive environ 
ment unless the two parties retain their adversarial identities. 
The trick is not to eliminate or suppress the tensions that are 
so vital to cost control in a plant or shop but to rechannel 
and release them for constructive advantage to both sides.
Not only are collaborative arrangements slow in develop 
ing but they also have a disappointing survival rate. Mortal 
ity, however, should not be deplored altogether. If a venture 
does not serve as intended or desired, there is little point in 
prolonging its token existence. As with other ventures, 
benefits should preferably exceed costs, and the reckoning 
here should include coin other than money in a strict 
accounting sense. What is regrettable, however, is the too 
common experience that the cooperative impulse cannot 
withstand hard times or lack of cost discipline.
Three Categories
The many varieties of collaborative ventures in which 
company-level management and labor join may be subsumed 
under three heads. The first of the three main categories in 
cludes general purpose committees and other entities that are 
concerned primarily with company functionality and perfor 
mance. Examples are consultative committees intended to 
assure reasonably peaceable conditions of operation by deal-
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ing with problems as they arise, production and productivity 
committees, and quality or quality-control circles. In the 
second category are entities that aim explicitly at con 
tributing to worker satisfaction, well-being, and security. 
Among these are committees concerned with worklife quali 
ty, flexitime, health and safety, and alcohol and drug abuse. 
The third category embraces incentive arrangements that 
focus on monetary and quasi-monetary rewards—the 
Scanlon plan, profit sharing, and employee stock ownership.
The next three chapters deal with these three categories in 
turn. More than one variety of arrangement may be en 
countered in some companies. The reader is reminded that 
the documentary appendix to this book contains materials 
relating to the structure, mission and operation of specific 
cooperative entities. These materials may contain useful 
hints for the design of additional ventures.
Looking Backward
Contrary to a common contemporary impression, labor- 
management cooperation at the enterprise or plant level is 
not a novel idea in the United States. Without difficulty, it 
may be traced back to the 1920s and World War I. A deter 
mined search would even disclose some 19th century an 
ticipations for example, the Procter and Gamble profit- 
sharing plan introduced in 1887 and the Utopian schemes of 
the pre-Civil War era, such as Robert Owen's community at 
New Harmony, Indiana, established in 1825. The rest of this 
chapter examines some of the cooperative highlights of the 
decades since the 1920s, when employers subtly fought the 
unions for the souls of workers and labor leaders offered 
cooperation in return for a share in gains from higher pro 
ductivity. 2
B&O Plan 3
One of the most publicized ventures in cooperation of the 
decade after World War I was the program introduced in 
1923 at the Glenwood shop of the Baltimore and Ohio
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Railroad following the unsuccessful strike of craftsmen in 
1922. This shop was regarded as highly inefficient, and the 
relationship between labor and management there was poor. 
A background fact of some relevance is that the railway 
brotherhoods, the usually conservative "aristocrats" of 
American unionism, endorsed the postwar Plumb Plan, 
which called for government ownership and operation of 
railroads with worker participation in their management. 
The B&O Plan for raising productivity and improving 
morale at Glenwood began uncertainly but soon seemed suc 
cessful enough to be adopted in all 45 of the company's 
shops in 1924. B&O's favorable experience led to imitation 
in the mechanical or shop departments of other American 
and Canadian systems in ensuing years.
Joint committees were set up at the various B&O facilities 
with members chosen from the ranks of the appropriate craft 
unions and from management. The committees met at least 
once a month to consider ways to improve performance and 
working conditions. A higher-level review committee was 
also established to deal with systemwide issues and to ex 
amine proposals referred to it.
In the first 15 years of operation, workers contributed 
almost 31,000 suggestions for efficiency, safety, training, 
quality of work, conservation of tools and materials, and so 
forth. Of the more than 18,000 contributed in the first five 
years, 83 percent were considered of sufficient merit for ap 
proval and application. When cutbacks in employment dur 
ing the great depression discouraged a flow of labor-saving 
suggestions, the emphasis shifted toward union-management 
relations and communications. The B&O Plan became inac 
tive during the 1940s.
The benefits of the program were numerous and bilateral. 
According to Otto S. Beyer, the consulting engineer who in 
stalled and directed it, the public attitude toward the railroad 
improved, and so did worker morale. Shop discipline and 
workmanship were better, grievances were fewer, turnover 
was lower, employment was more regular, and pay was 
somewhat higher. Goodwill and common understanding 
provided the basis for practical gains to the two parties.
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For trade unions, the B&O Plan represented a fundamen 
tal break with past policies. They did not passively acquiesce, 
but instead actively pursued the improvement of shop 
methods. In return, they got a company commitment to 
steady employment and gain-sharing.
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company*
Unfortunately, another experience of the 1920s shows that 
goodwill and common understanding may not be able to 
withstand prolonged economic strain. It involves the 
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company and the United Textile 
Workers in Salem, Massachusetts.
In the late 1920s, when labor cost got seriously out of line, 
the local union proposed cooperation for reduction of waste 
and inefficiency. In 1928, as the situation worsened, 
management proposed new work assignments entailing some 
dismissals and demotions. While the workers were unen- 
thusiastic, the union leadership recognized the need to cut 
costs for survival.
With management's consent, the union leadership hired a 
prominent engineer to study plant operations. His recom 
mendations for improving labor utilization led to a union 
proposal for a joint Waste Elimination Committee to deter 
mine new work assignments. A technician who had been 
associated with union-management cooperation in the gar 
ment industry carried out a required joint research program 
and reported his findings and a plan to the Committee. The 
result was a stretchout of workloads with more dismissals 
and demotions, but workers with greater workloads also 
received pay increases.
Although the company's competitive position improved, 
the strengthening was only temporary. As the depression 
deepened in 1931, the company was obliged to propose wage 
cuts. The workers demurred; they would go along only if the 
stretchout was discontinued. This counterproposal was
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refused, and additional wage cuts were made. The strikes 
that followed sealed the fate of cooperation and of the com 
pany.
Labor-Management Committees 
in World War IP
The drive to become the "arsenal of democracy" during 
World War II provided a unique focus for civilian American 
energies. Cooperation of labor and management was spon 
taneous and voluntary, and government had merely to steer 
it.
Three months after Pearl Harbor, the chairman of the 
War Production Board (WPB) appealed to employers and 
unions to organize joint labor-management committees in 
plants, mines and shipyards to speed production of needed 
material. The heads of national unions and employee 
associations encouraged full participation, having already 
agreed to the president's proposal for maintenance of in 
dustrial peace during the war. The government set guidelines 
for the committees, offered technical assistance, and 
monitored progress, leaving the development of the in-house 
programs to the parties themselves.
About 20,000 defense plants had been urged by mail to set 
up labor-management production committees, and about 
5,000 did so during 1942-45, with about 3,000 the maximum 
functioning at one time. The 5,000 plants employed 7 million 
workers, about 40 percent of the target workforce registered 
with WPB. Although the response may appear small, these 
considerations should suggest otherwise: the government's 
low priority on the program and minor investment in it, the 
immaturity of collective bargaining at the time, the historic 
distrust of government initiatives that may include reporting, 
the voluntariness of participation, and the intense an- 
tigovernment sentiment that pervaded the business com 
munity in particular during the New Deal "revolution" 
preceding the war.
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It is easy to imagine that management in plants experienc 
ing unstable relations with labor just before the outbreak of 
war might have construed the WPB guidelines as biased. The 
committees, according to WPB, were to deal with in 
terferences to production, not with issues normally within 
the purview of collective bargaining and established 
grievance procedures. On the other hand, recognized 
bargaining agents were to choose committee members on the 
labor side. Active unions the Steelworkers, Machinists, 
Auto Workers, and Electrical Workers were especially well 
represented on committees, but the plants with these com 
mittees comprised only a small portion of the total number 
under contract with these unions.
Perhaps, only 1,000 of the 5,000 committees really dealt 
with productivity improvement and the conservation of 
scarce materials and energy. The others were primarily con 
cerned with the boosting of general morale, practical matters 
like carpooling, or a show of patriotic fervor without func 
tioning at all. On the other hand, even in this dominant 
category, issues that had an ancillary bearing on production 
were not entirely neglected issues such as absenteeism, 
safety, and provision for, and utilization of, employee sug 
gestions. The committees that did operate effectively also in 
cluded indirect supports to production (e.g., the health and 
training of workers) within the scope of their concerns while 
they centered attention on: efficient use of raw materials, the 
reworking of damaged products, the salvage of waste 
materials, redesign of tools and products to facilitate 
manufacture, fuller use of available capacity, better 
maintenance and repair of equipment, improvement of 
product quality through analysis of defects and change in in 
spection methods, change in methods of work assignment, 
and so forth.
For believers in cooperation as a social end rather than as 
an instrument to be chosen or ignored, the denouement is 
disappointing. When World War II ended, it was as though
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Cinderella had reached midnight; most of the committees 
simply vanished. With wage and price controls lifted, a wave 
of strikes swept the country in 1946 and 1947. Few tears were 
shed over the end of an interlude of cooperation reminiscent 
of, and more enthusiastic than, the collaborative effort of 
World War I. Labor and management returned to their basic 
adversarial postures in quest of a new modus vivendi ap 
propriate to peacetime and to the unsettled state of industrial 
relations obscured by the war.
The 1950s: Consolidation 
and Reflection
In a review of industrial relations in the 1950s, two themes 
stand out. These themes are also discernible in the subse 
quent decades; and their importance is underscored, rather 
than gainsaid, by such adverse developments as the flurry of 
"wage inflation" in the middle 1950s and the crippling steel 
strike of 1959.
One of these two themes was the elaboration of collective 
bargaining between management and unions beyond the nas 
cent state of the 1930s. The directions of elaboration were 
determined, in part, by the wartime opportunities of union 
and business leaders to work at closer range. They were also 
influenced by a public wish for release from sustained ten 
sion, a wish expressed in the election of a presidential can 
didate who vowed to end the stalemate in Korea.
The second theme was the increasing concern of 
thoughtful students of the economic scene to discover and 
prescribe formulas for "civilizing" the interaction of labor 
and management. The costs of disruption to the two parties 
and to society at large were recognized as excessive; and even 
a mild inflation, associated with a propensity for peaceable 
wage settlements to outrun productivity advance, was 
perceived as dangerous to personal well-being and to 
economic and social stability if allowed to become virulent 
through mindless neglect.
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With respect to the first theme, some tendencies in 
bargaining deserve mention. Contracts were extended to sub 
jects not previously covered. Contract periods were increas 
ed, and provision was made for arbitration, mediation, and 
conciliation in the expectation that work stoppages would be 
reduced thereby in frequency and severity. Similar benefits 
were imagined from the more general linkage of wage ad 
justments to the past long term annual advance in the na 
tional productivity trend, whether or not the trend was 
matched by new annual changes in output per hour. 6
Although many of the contracts of the decade were prefix 
ed by pledges of cooperation on behalf of efficiency, rarely 
was machinery introduced for enlisting the active participa 
tion of workers or their unions. The Korean conflict, in 
cidentally, did not sufficiently burden the economy to re 
quire a call for organization of labor-management commit 
tees as part of a national scheme of industrial mobilization. 
True, some participatory programs were installed in the 
1950s, such as Scanlon Plans in various companies and Ten 
nessee Valley Authority's system of cooperative committees, 
but these did not inspire the founding of a fashion.
Labor economists and specialists in labor-management af 
fairs did, however, recognize and articulate the desirability 
of a heavier accent on cooperation, the next "higher" step in 
a perceived progression beyond the conflict and competition 
of the parties. They appreciated the potential of workers and 
unions to contribute to the upgrading of company perfor 
mance. 7
Management, however, was inhibited. One of its reserva 
tions was that union and worker participation would 
strengthen labor in bargaining. Another was fear of dilution 
of prestige and authority. Still another was doubt that 
workers and unions could actually contribute much of value. 
In newly decentralized corporations, plant managers were 
unsure that they could initiate change without approval of 
headquarters. Furthermore, corporate officials still har-
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bored the desire to communicate directly with employees 
over the heads of unions. Finally, where bargaining was ac 
cepted with some reluctance in the first place, there was no 
disposition to enlarge the scope of negotiations. 8
Labor leaders, especially those of impermanent tenure, 
also had reservations about formal cooperative ar 
rangements. Among their attributes is memory of labor 
history for example, of the futility of extending an open 
hand to employers bent on "unionbusting" in the 1920s. 
They have traditionally been wary of seeming to be "too 
cozy" with management, too disposed to "class collabora 
tion" with the "enemy." Accordingly, union leaders were 
often content, in the 1950s as in other times, to concede the 
burdens of production to management and to fight for 
"more" at the bargaining table a fight that itself has been 
rationalized as contributing to technological improvement 
and to the upgrading of worker qualifications.
The 1960s: Technological Threat
The "automation" scare, real and exaggerated by jour 
nalistic hyperbole, prompted a few vulnerable industries to 
establish joint study groups and other cooperative 
mechanisms in the 1960s to help them cope with large-scale 
displacement. These ad hoc entities seemed necessary as sup 
plements to "normal" collective bargaining.
As a rule, problems of labor displacement are addressed 
through contract clauses relating to seniority in layoff and 
transfer and to severance pay. But the changes contemplated 
in the meatpacking, longshoring, steel, railroad, and prin 
ting industries in the 1960s were so extensive that they re 
quired special preparation for easing human hardship. Ac 
cordingly, joint study groups were set up to consider advance 
notice to employees, retraining, interplant transfer, early 
retirement, attrition, relocation, and so forth, as elements of 
a mitigative program. 9 In 1963, the Secretary of Labor 
observed that the complex issues could be addressed "only
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by a process of accommodation and arrangement which is 
almost impossible in the countdown atmosphere of the 30 
days before strike deadline." 10
Armour Study Committee 11
To assist 5,000 workers released by the closing of six ob 
solete plants and the opening of modern plants elsewhere, 
Armour and Company set up a joint study committee and a 
special fund in 1960. Many of these workers were unskilled, 
poorly educated, and elderly as in so many other cases of 
required adjustment to the combined pressures of competi 
tion and technological opportunity.
The committee had nine members. Two represented the 
union of meatcutters and butchers; two represented the 
packinghouse workers; four were company employees; and 
the ninth member was a distinguished neutral from academia 
(Clark Kerr at first, later George P. Shultz).
The committee was given responsibility for designing, in 
itiating, and administering programs for training and in- 
terplant transfer, and it also could originate additional cor 
rective measures. A fund of $500,000 was provided.
Over a five-year period, a tailored program was developed 
for each of the closed plants. The aim in each case was to 
retrain displaced workers for greater employability. Con 
sideration was also given to relocation and placement in the 
light of labor market opportunities and the workers' 
characteristics. Experience gained in one locality was used in 
the design of programs for others.
The committee's work helped the company to take addi 
tional steps that could not be foreseen as useful or necessary. 
Thus, "flowback" rights were granted in the bargaining con 
tract to disappointed workers who had relocated. Liberalized 
early retirement benefits were provided for older workers 
who could not compete in productiveness. What Armour 
learned also proved valuable in the design of government's
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own active manpower policy. The committee was disbanded 
in 1966; the cycle of closings had been completed.
Kaiser Steel Long-Range Committee 12
Another social invention of the 1960s was the Long-Range 
Committee established by Kaiser Steel Corporation and the 
United Steelworkers as part of their separate agreement to 
end the 1959 strike. The prime purpose was to find a way to 
avoid future strikes, but the Committee also served to 
facilitate the modernization of company plants and the 
reduction of costs to meet foreign competition. The respon 
sibility actually assigned to the Committee was to devise "a 
long-range plan for the equitable sharing of the company's 
progress between the stockholders, the employees, and the 
public." A unique feature of the Committee was the inclu 
sion of three public members in its total of nine. The three 
were distinguished mediators and arbitrators.
After more than two years of deliberation, the Committee 
in 1963 presented a plan that was overwhelmingly endorsed 
by the employees. It was a four-year program providing for 
virtual guarantee of job security through transfer with 
maintenance of wage rates; workforce reduction through at 
trition; and a new group incentive system giving par 
ticipating employees 32.5 percent of any reduction in the unit 
cost of production. The group incentive was intended to sup 
plant gradually an older scheme that had developed 
disparities in pay between skilled and unskilled workers.
At first, the program gave gratifying results, but the new 
incentive was unable to pay adequate bonuses, so some 
workers were allowed to return to the older individual basis. 
The program lasted for two four-year terms. During its 
lifetime, it lessened resistance to modernization, allowed 
reduction of crew size on existing equipment, and relieved 
the parties of crisis bargaining.
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The 1970s: Breakdowns 
and Breakthrough
An upsurge of labor-management and popular interest oc 
curred in the 1970s in various styles of cooperation at the 
workplace. This upsurge was manifested in a veritable flood 
of professional and anecdotal literature, 13 produced under 
both governmental and private auspices, on programs and 
experiments 14 relating to worklife quality, the "humaniza- 
tion" of work, participatory management, "shopfloor 
democracy" and so forth. These topics were also treated in 
Congressional hearings and at numberless conferences, 
seminars, workshops, and panels. Newspapers, magazines, 
radio, and television played dual roles, as in the case of the 
"automation" scare of the 1960s: they not only provided 
news but also competitively "educated" the public with 
human interest feature stories and in-depth interviews. 
Among the mass media, television was particularly influen 
tial in dramatizing cooperative schemes.
Apart from attributing some of the new interest in 
cooperation in the 1970s to the volume and character of 
public information, we should take cognizance of three addi 
tional (but not independent) influences:
1. A striking change in the tenor of our economy and 
society, discouraging to the automatic optimism that long in 
spired a sense of uniqueness among nations.
2. An apparent alteration of attitudes toward work: a 
disposition to reexamine its nature, purposes, and rewards in 
the larger context of human values and possible life styles. 15
3. The proliferation of organizations governmental, 
private nonprofit, and academic available not only for 
research and information but also for assistance in the 
design, establishment, and conduct of cooperative labor- 
management committees. The rest of this section (and 
chapter) elucidates these three statements in turn.
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Among the blows and disappointment suffered by the 
American economy during the 1970s were several that had a 
bearing on the need for cooperation:
1. A rising rate of price inflation that at first was expected 
to be a temporary nuisance but finally had to be acknowledg 
ed as a problem of first magnitude.
2. The coexistence of high unemployment rates with high 
inflation.
3. A revolution in the price of petroleum (and other fuel), 
with growing uncertainty over its availability.
4. The failure of wage settlements to be keyed to produc 
tivity, which advanced less rapidly than in the 1960s and even 
showed occasional reverses.
5. The loss to foreign competitors of sizable shares of 
markets, at home and abroad, that used to be dominated by 
goods of American origin.
6. The difficulty of raising funds for new equipment in 
inflation-wracked equity and bond markets.
Confidence in the American future and its leadership was 
also shaken by political scandal, adverse international 
developments, and disturbing social trends. In the new en 
vironment of instability and turmoil that marked the 1960s 
and 1970s, it no longer seemed unnatural to question long- 
accepted modes of work and long-established workplace 
practices. The constants that guided in the past came to be 
seen as tentative and fluid, subject to reappraisal and revi 
sion. In particular, the hard economic facts themselves 
argued the desirability of trying to improve output per hour 
and the quality of products, at low cost and with limited new 
capital outlays, by resort to "soft technologies" for exam 
ple, by alteration of individual work schedules, reward 
systems, job content, worker skills, plant layout, and work 
flows. The same economic considerations led management in 
some cases to allow more latitude in decisionmaking and to 
test cooperative ventures that hitherto had seemed imprac 
tical or philosophically offensive.
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Many sociologists have attached considerable weight to 
evidence of a rising "new breed" of self-indulgent labor 
force participants uncommitted to the "work ethic," skep 
tical of "material" culture, scornful of "bourgeois" institu 
tions, sensitive to "dehumanization" of work, and desirous 
of more autonomy in the workplace. They made much in the 
1970s of "blue-collar blues" and "white-collar woes," 
worker "alienation," and signs of dissatisfaction with the 
tyranny of the assembly line (as in the Lordstown, Ohio 
strike of 1972). Whether disaffection with work itself had in 
creased in comparison with earlier years, however, was not 
clear. Again, we must refer to television this time to the im 
pact of addictive viewing of disparities in wealth and well- 
being on standards of reference and on modes of expression.
Studies conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor in 
1977-78 by the University of Michigan's Survey Research 
Center did not disclose any crisis of job dissatisfaction. Only 
about 12 percent of the respondents reported being "not too 
satisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with their jobs. Further 
more, comprehensive measures of the actual behavior of 
workers labor force participation rates, quit rates, 
absenteeism, and strikes showed no symptomatic depar 
ture from trend in the 1970s. 16
The Michigan survey did, however, report a substantial 
proportion of workers dissatisfied with particular 
noneconomic aspects of their jobs. About a third to a half of 
the workers cited lack of control over days that they work 
and their job assignments; rules and regulations inhibiting 
speech and behavior; underutilization of skills; and lack of 
feedback on quality of job performance. These discontents 
are potential sources of "avoidance" behavior (absenteeism, 
tardiness, grievances, sabotage, low morale, poor workman 
ship, and indifference to customers) detrimental to organiza 
tional efficiency.
As the first section of the documentary appendix shows, 
the federal government had a visible hand in encouraging 
employers and unions to consider collaboration to mutual
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advantage. One of the relevant agencies, the National Center 
for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, helped 
(before its demise in 1978) to increase awareness of the 
potential of joint plant committees. In addition to endorsing 
the committee concept, providing information on pros and 
cons, compiling directories of existing committees, holding 
conferences, and contributing to demonstration projects, the 
Center stimulated the establishment of several counterpart 
agencies on the regional and state levels. 17
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), 
working out of field offices around the country, offered 
assistance, through its mediators, in setting up plant-level 
committees. Its functions were expanded by the Labor- 
Management Cooperation Act of 1978 (Section 6(a) of the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments 
of 1978). It was empowered to make grants for the start and 
support of committees, but no funds were available for the 
purpose until fiscal year 1981, when $1 million was ap 
propriated and grants were made to 14 projects (see Appen 
dix B).
Other federal agencies were also involved in the 1970s in 
the support of pertinent research and demonstration pro 
jects. Among these were the Economic Development Ad 
ministration and the Appalachian Regional Commission of 
the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, 
and the National Institutes of Health.
Nonprofit, impartial organizations were also active in pro 
moting labor-management cooperation. Among these were 
the Institute of Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, the American Quality of Work Life Center, Work 
in America Institute, the American Productivity Center, and 
the Harvard Project on Technology, Work and Character. 
These organizations received grants from the federal govern 
ment, private industry, and foundations. They also obtained 
fees from companies and unions for consulting services, con 
ferences, publications, and research.
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Finally, centers were established in various parts of the 
country to offer services for facilitating cooperation in their 
geographic areas. Some of the centers were associated with 
schools of business administration at state universities, as in 
Maryland, Arizona, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Utah; some 
were located at schools of industrial relations, as in Califor 
nia, Illinois, Ohio, and New York. The Massachusetts and 
Michigan centers were set up as nonprofit organizations 
separate from universities. The boards of directors of the 
centers usually include members representing business, 
unions, and the public. As for financing, the federal govern 
ment provided start-up funds for some centers, while state 
agencies, unions, private industry, and foundations made 
additional contributions or paid fees. 18
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As the preceding "swing" chapter anticipated, this one is 
devoted to labor-management initiatives that are intended 
primarily to help companies keep or improve their economic 
vitality. It is concerned with arrangements that aim at con 
tinuity of production, higher productivity, or better product 
quality. In addition to providing general descriptions of such 
arrangements, it offers a few examples. Material included in 
the documentary appendix amplifies the discussion.
Joint Consultation
Entities that are formed to facilitate two-way communica 
tion in a company or plant are called by various 
names e.g., joint consultation committees, joint study 
committees, plant coordinating councils, or simply labor- 
management committees. They provide channels for 
dialogue on matters of mutual interest. Some of these mat 
ters require early address; they cannot be disposed of by 
benign neglect. Timely sharing of opinions or information, 
informally and at will, can help maintain uninterrupted pro 
duction.
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As entities designed to deal with a wide range of topics ac 
quire experience, they may sharpen their focus and 
specialize. Thus, they may concentrate, in response to cir 
cumstances or emergencies, on such areas as productivity, 
worklife quality, or health and safety. In such cases, they 
become indistinguishable from some other committees 
discussed later in this chapter and in the next one. Another 
evolutionary variant, to which further reference is made 
later, is the entrepreneurial team, in which workers share a 
high-level decisionmaking responsibility with management.
Where Unions Exist
Joint committees can be especially useful in union settings. 
The opportunity to discuss problems as they arise permits the 
defusing of potentially explosive situations. Serious 
grievance and breach-of-contract cases can be diminished in 
number or avoided during the life of a negotiated agreement. 
The experience of dialogue, furthermore, may incline both 
sides to accommodate or compromise more readily the next 
time they come to the bargaining table.
In a unionized company, a joint consultation committee 
may be negotiated into existence or be given formal bilateral 
recognition through a contract clause or through a special 
letter or memorandum of understanding. Such a legalistic 
formulation has the added purpose of precluding committee 
interference in the bargaining process or in the operation of 
regular grievance machinery. Advocates of cooperation, 
especially on the union side, are sensitive to the danger that a 
committee might appear as an alternative to bargaining, 
rather than as a complement to it. 1
Nevertheless, the potential effectiveness of a joint con 
sultation committee as an instrument of "prebargaining" or 
"continuous bargaining" is recognized and welcomed. A 
committee may contribute to industrial peace by studying 
complex issues outside the context of deadline bargaining.
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These issues may already be included within the purview of 
bargaining, or they may be expected to become candidates 
for inclusion. An analysis of 1,536 major bargaining 
agreements (i.e., covering 1,000 or more workers) by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 1978 found that 
62, covering some 340,000 workers altogether, provided for 
labor-management committees dealing with "industrial rela 
tions issues." 2 Among these issues are job classification, 
contracting-out, fringe benefits, pensions, and equal 
employment opportunities.
A Federal Contribution
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), 
as noted earlier, has long encouraged joint consultation as a 
means of reducing the emotional content of labor- 
management relations. In fiscal year 1979, mediators were 
involved in establishment or administration of 375 labor- 
management committees, 36 more than in the preceding 
fiscal year. 3 This role of "preventive mediation," authorized 
by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, has received high ratings 
from students of industrial relations. 4
"Relations by Objective" (RBO), a technique used by 
FMCS to promote cooperation, 5 involves a step-by-step ap 
proach to identification and solution of in-plant problems:
1. The process starts with a mediator's help to each side in 
proposing what the other side should do to improve relations 
and in determining what each side could do itself.
2. After such a separate session, a joint meeting is held to 
discuss opposing views and to develop a mutually agreeable 
objective. The meeting is attended by all relevant manage 
ment officials, from top executives down to line supervisors, 
and all relevant union officials, down to shop stewards.
3. Separate discussions of the list of agreed-upon objec 
tives then lead to a joint session on "action steps" for
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achieving each objective, assignments of responsibility, and 
a time schedule for achievement.
4. The process culminates in establishment of a consulta 
tion committee to continue and extend cooperation.
The consultation committees vary in composition and 
mode of operation. FMCS recommends that each side have 
five members of high rank; it also calls for regular monthly 
meetings, rotation of chairmanship, an advance agenda, and 
discussion of the agenda, item by item. In practice, some 
committees are much larger, having as many as 16 members.
Although committee recommendations are only advisory, 
the inclusion of the plant manager as a member often helps 
to secure company implementation. Supervisors and rank 
and file workers usually do not attend committee meetings, 
but relevant departmental representatives may be invited to 
particular sessions.
Example: A Minneapolis Newspaper6
A provision in the 1972 contract between the Minneapolis 
Star and Tribune Company and Local 2 of the American 
Newspaper Guild established a joint Guild-management 
committee for monthly consultation during company time 
on working conditions not otherwise covered by contract 
and grievance machinery. This committee has been used as a 
forum for discussing subjects ranging from such routine of 
fice matters as a shortage of telephones, office temperature, 
quality of cafeteria food, and eyestrain due to poor lighting 
to such policy issues as the quality of reporting and the con 
fidentiality of sources. The committee is also consulted on 
the selection of supervisors below the city editor level.
The 1976 contract expanded the committee's function to 
include discussion of "matters relative to the introduction 
and operation of new automated equipment and the effects 
of such equipment on the job duties of employees who
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operate such equipment." These matters have subsequently 
been addressed in collective bargaining negotiations.
A Wisconsin Paper Mill 1
The establishment of a labor-management committee in 
1970 at a paperboard plant employing 80 in Marinette, 
Wisconsin followed a period of unrest and discontent over 
the terms of the collective bargaining contract between the 
company and its Teamsters union local. With the help of an 
FMCS mediator, a labor-management committee of three 
management and three union representatives was established 
to seek solutions to mutual problems before they became 
formal grievances. Committee discussions have covered such 
shopfloor problems as early leaving of work stations by 
employees, scheduling of shift work, and allowance of days 
off during the deer hunting season. Contract negotiations 
reportedly have become smoother, with quicker resolution 
of recognized issues.
A Paper Mill in Michigan*
After a six-months strike in 1976 involving 800 hourly 
employees at its Escanaba, Michigan plant, the Mead Cor 
poration decided to hire a consultant to initiate a "conflict 
reduction" program. A problem action committee, compris 
ed of about 40 members from management and four union 
locals was formed. It now meets monthly to discuss and 
resolve millwide problems, while five departmental subcom 
mittees meet regularly on their own concerns. Consultants 
have conducted "organizational development" training 
seminars for committee members. After a year, several con 
crete results were reported, including revisions of the 
employee parking system and of grievance procedures, and 
establishment of a multicraft maintenance trades program. 
Opinion surveys are conducted; findings are fed back, and 
the labor relations climate has been greatly improved.
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Evaluations
In general, members of joint committees consider their ef 
forts to be productive. They particularly cite a reduction of 
grievances and the contribution of easier two-way com 
munication to a lessening of frictions and of demoralizing 
rumor propagation. The fragility of committees, however, is 
candidly recognized too.
One of the favorable evaluations refers to five cases in 
which the RBO technique of conflict management was used. 
The parties achieved progress toward specific goals they had 
jointly selected. 9 Another survey, addressed to union and 
management representatives on 26 joint committees in Il 
linois, found all but four respondents satisfied; they deemed 
their committees either moderately or very successful, suffi 
ciently so to warrant continuation. 10
On the other hand, joint consultation committees are ad 
mittedly vulnerable to both apathy and continuing conflict 
over fundamental issues of economics and power. One in 
vestigator, who had studied 38 committees, found frequent 
complaint regarding absence of commitment to common 
goals and only perfunctory attendance at meetings. He also 
noted a "spillover" of attitudes and issues of the bargaining 
table. Effectiveness, according to participants in the 38 com 
mittees, depended not only on the degree of problem solving 
behavior of the numbers but also on the strength of outside 
pressures, the relative strengths of union and management in 
bargaining power, support from the top, the educational 
level of the workforce, and length of experience in collective 
bargaining. 11
From the foregoing, it is not difficult to conclude that pro 
longed and sharp disagreements between the two parties on 
wages, fringes, and layoffs could provide occasion for ter 
minating a committee as well as for establishing one. Not 
everywhere or at every time are the parties ready to adjust
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their adversarial imperatives to the constructive potentials of 
joint problem solving. The necessary "attitude 
restructuring" could be induced by overriding economic 
necessity. It would help, perhaps, if schooling in group 
dynamics and organization development were part of the 
background of persons already skilled in the arts of negotia 
tion and bargaining. 12
Bilateral recognition of the need for attitudinal change is 
only the first step toward accomplishing such change. When 
the two sides have undergone such change, they are readier 
to form an effective committee. In 1978, the National Center 
for Productivity and Quality of Working Life distilled 10 
points for guiding the formation of effective committees on 
the basis of discussions with participants. The first point 
says:
The parties have a mature, open relationship. Each 
is willing to listen to the other side. Both agree to 
concentrate on finding answers to problems at 
hand and discovering opportunities for collabora 
tion. 13
The other nine points are shown in the documentary appen 
dix.
Joint Productivity Committees
Like consultation committees that start or remain con 
cerned with general purposes, production or productivity 
committees aim at maintaining or improving a company's 
competitiveness its survivability and profitability. While 
engineers have traditionally shouldered the explicit respon 
sibility to look after production and productivity, it has also 
been evident over the years that workers have relevant 
"know-how," acquired by experience, for reducing waste 
and otherwise cutting costs. Ample testimony has been 
recorded on this point. Here is an illustrative statement on
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the hidden reserves to be tapped in appropriate cir 
cumstances, a statement by a graduate of Yale Law School 
who spent five months working in a Western Electric fac 
tory:
I am certain that workers could increase production 
if they wanted to. Workers are ingenious at finding 
short cuts to beat rates set by production engineers. 
Factory workers, not surprisingly, know a great 
deal about their own jobs. They have a reservoir of 
knowledge that is underutilized, since little in the 
current work structure encourages workers to share 
their knowledge. There is some sharing among 
workers but the knowledge is usually withheld from 
management. Management is aware of this and 
hopes that instituting changes in the environment 
and jobs will make workers more receptive to shar 
ing what they know. 14
Through joint productivity committees, management 
could benefit from employee knowledge of virtually costless 
ways to improve company performance. Such a prospect 
ought to be especially attractive in an inflation-ravaged 
economy of high interest rates and uncertainty about the 
near term and longer term business outlook. Furthermore, 
labor-management cooperation is good, whenever and on 
whatever topic it can be achieved, in the interest of continu 
ity of operations with less turnover and less emotional stress.
Unlike management, workers and unions are troubled by 
mention of the work "productivity" in connection with joint 
undertakings. The word still commonly stirs up images of 
speedup, skill erosion, and labor displacement. A Gallup 
poll of 800 working adults in 1980 revealed that most ex 
pected relatively little benefit to people like themselves from 
"improved performance and productivity." 15 A 1974 
Yankelovich survey of union officials showed a preference 
for redefining "productivity" incorrectly to shift emphasis
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from output-input ratios to productivity-related ideas deem 
ed less threatening to workers, i.e., to higher output quality 
and to the reduction of waste, absenteeism, and turnover. 16 
Nevertheless, they largely agreed that "it is possible for the 
union and management to cooperate on specific programs 
which will improve productivity."
The numerical evidence available, referring to firms that 
have unions and employ 1,000 or more workers, does not 
reflect any strong movement there to establish formal pro 
grams. The 1978 Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis cited 
earlier disclosed that only 83 out of a total of 1,536 major 
collective bargaining agreements provided for labor- 
management committees on productivity committees that 
"meet periodically to discuss in-plant production problems 
and to work out methods of improving the quantity and 
quality of production." The 83 agreements covered about 
1.3 million workers, more than half of whom were concen 
trated in the automobile and steel industries. 17 Furthermore, 
they accounted for many, many more than 83 committees, as 
the following remarks, confined to steel, will indicate.
Steel Productivity Committees
The declining fortunes of the steel industry and its bleak 
prospects of recovery led in 1971, and again in 1974, 1977, 
and 1980, to provisions for collaboration in the bargaining 
agreements. In 1971, plant committees were formed to ad 
vise management on ways to raise efficiency and to promote 
the use of domestic steel. In 1974, the entities were called 
"employment security and plant productivity committees." 
An overarching industrywide joint committee was also 
established. 18
About 230 joint productivity committees were said to be in 
operation in 1974, but many apparently existed only on 
paper. From the very start, the efficacy of the approach was 
doubtful because of poor preparation, uneven and insuffi-
128 Consultation, Productivity & Quality
cient commitment at the plant level, and suspicions felt by 
each party that the committee format was being used for 
purposes incompatible with the negotiated contract. 19 
Another adverse factor was the resistance of workers in the 
Chicago region to the program, in defiance of the national 
leadership. The Chicago faction lost its fight against the Ex 
perimental Negotiating Agreement and other national 
policies of accommodation in the decisive 1977 election.
In the 1980 contract, the employment security and produc 
tivity committees were replaced by a system of labor- 
management participation committees and teams. 20 These 
would operate at plant and mill floor levels and deal with a 
wide range of job-related issues. They are intended to assure 
the teamwork essential to the smooth flow of goods in pro 
cess from one stage of production to the next. An important 
departure from the earlier initiative is that the local union 
and the plant manager are free to participate in the program 
or stay out. They are not obliged by a central office to 
become involved. In addition, the program is conceived as 
experimental, to be continued or discontinued after a three- 
year trial.
The 1980 plan envisaged two tiers of organization. At the 
department level or below, "participation teams" would 
function; on the plant level, a "participation committee" 
would provide coordination. The teams are authorized to 
"discuss, consider, and decide" issues relating to the use of 
equipment, the quality of output and of the work environ 
ment, safety and health, scheduling and reporting, 
absenteeism and overtime, incentives, job alignments, con 
tracting out, energy conservation, and transportation pools.
Both supervisory and production worker members of the 
teams must agree on all decisions. In the event of disagree 
ment, trade-off bargaining is contemplated a nice 
acknowledgment of the complementarity of the cooperative 
and adversary principles. The teams are authorized to make
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proposals concerning bonus payments and changes in the in 
centive scale. They cannot, however, alter terms of the basic 
contract or interfere with the grievance machinery.
Although company and union headquarters may designate 
plants to be considered for the experimental program, the 
final decision is local. A joint review commission will, upon 
request, provide assistance to plant committees or teams. 
The international union representative will provide for ex 
change of information among locals and evaluate the plan's 
performance. As was noted in the opening chapter, training 
has begun for teams set up at selected plants on a trial basis; 
and, as has so often been reported, "the biggest problem" is 
to teach first line supervisors to "listen to the suggestions of 
workers instead of merely barking orders."
Examples of "Entrepreneurial 
Participation"
A variant of the joint production or productivity commit 
tee features the involvement of workers in organizational 
decisionmaking i.e., above the job or bench level. In the in 
terest of job security, they may cooperate in matters relating 
to plant layout, product design, or marketing. So-called "en 
trepreneurial teams" include these workers with managers in 
task forces aiming at specific objectives. 21
In Jamestown, one such in-plant team has contributed to 
the area's job development program by helping its own spon 
sor. A small shop making hospital equipment was the site of 
a deal between labor and management to cooperate in a 
quest for new products needed to keep the staff of 200 
workers or, still better, to increase their number. Manage 
ment agreed to avoid short term layoffs, and the union, a 
local of the International Association of Machinists, agreed 
to help improve productivity and product quality. When an 
opportunity arose to bid on a new product, the management
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proposed to the joint committee that an ad hoc task force of 
experienced workers and the industrial engineers should take 
responsibility for preparing a bid. The resulting bid was 
significantly below those of competitors, and a contract was 
won for a new product representing about 30 jobs. 22 Unfor 
tunately, this cooperative arrangement has not survived a 
change in company leadership.
A second example of "entrepreneurial participation" 
refers to a plant of the Carborundum Corporation that had 
about 400 employees making cast refractories for the glass 
industry. The plant manager called on the 12-member labor- 
management committee, which normally meets bimonthly to 
consider production problems, quality control, and safety, 
to work with an engineering consulting firm on the revision 
of plant layout. The committee solicited employee opinions 
through small group meetings on company time in each 
department and shift. The information thus obtained was 
used in recommendations on machinery placement, 
materials flow, etc. in redesign and expansion of the 
facility. 23
Effectiveness: Yes, But —
As in the case of joint consultation, members of produc 
tivity committees generally testify favorably on their ex 
perience, but it is obvious that the realization of significant 
productivity benefits requires strong commitment of both 
parties. Directly traceable benefits are often difficult to 
assay, and they could easily be outweighed by the indirect 
contributions of cooperation through improved communica 
tions and labor-management relations. A study of the 
records of 262 meetings of employees and managers in a 
unionized foundry over the period 1969-1975 concluded that 
the productivity impact of a worker participation program 
was positively associated with the degree of active involve 
ment on both sides and was probably greater than that 
derivable from a group bonus plan linked to productivity. 24
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Although rare in the literature, case studies of failed produc 
tivity committees would also be instructive; they would 
underscore the fragility of the cooperative process and the 
strains that often destroy it, such as the rejection of new 
ideas by management, union indifference to a plant's com 
petitive position, and the chilling spillover effect of conflict 
over contract issues. The experience of the steel industry with 
the committees established under the 1974 agreement should 
not be ignored.
Quality Control
Japanese successes in productivity and marketing in such 
important export industries as automobiles, steel, and elec 
tronic products created a surge of interest in the 1970s in the 
structure and operation of quality control circles. The 
creative and prolific use of statistical quality control a 
system developed in the United States and brought to Japan 
by American consultants after World War II was widely 
credited with a major share of the responsibility for transfor 
ming a nation once identified with low-quality goods into a 
formidable competitor, even on our own turf.
Because the statistical technique has American roots and 
because of the demonstrated ability of the Japanese to in 
tegrate it so effectively into their own system of production, 
the superficial conclusion has often been drawn that the 
Japanese quality control circle is really acultural and is readi 
ly duplicable elsewhere. Sight should not be lost, however, of 
continuing high esteem in Japanese society for pre-industrial 
institutions and values, such as the stable family, respect for 
authority, conformity, loyalty, and reciprocity. In the 
business world, these values translate into a preference for 
lifetime employment with a major firm, managerial pater 
nalism and worker conscientiousness, progression by age, 
low absenteeism, and so forth. In the United States, where 
status has largely been displaced by contract, it is hard to im-
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agine literal adoption of the Japanese quality circle, as 
distinguished from adaptation without significant reshaping 
by the adversary principle, independent unionism, and col 
lective bargaining. If transplantation were easy, competitive 
imitation would surely have led to adoption and adaptation 
on a much grander scale than we have yet seen.
Quality control circles were actually first introduced in 
1962, and a national movement to propagate them 
throughout the productive system was spearheaded by the 
Japanese Union of Scientists and Engineers (JUSE). Much 
preparatory work had been done in the preceding decade, 
beginning with the missionary work of W. E. Deming and 
Joseph Juran, who helped train thousands of company 
directors, managers, and supervisors in the concept and ap 
plication of quality control. 25 They also helped to establish 
the principle of total quality control, requiring all 
employees, not only engineers, to assume responsibility for 
quality and to take training , accordingly, in statistical qual 
ity control. By 1980, about 600,000 quality control circles 
were in operation in Japan; over 6 million employees, or 
about 12 percent of the labor force, were members. 26 A 
reader who is impatient with the American "lag" in follow 
ing the Japanese example should ponder this paragraph and 
reflect on the dominant characteristics of our people, in 
dustry, and society and on the long interval between the 
Deming lectures and action, even in Japan.
American Programs
Even before the Japanese phenomenon gripped popular 
fancy in the United States, some smaller firms here were ex 
perimenting with participative shopfloor "circles" intended 
to raise quality of output while also improving job satisfac 
tion and productivity. Critical emphasis was not placed, 
however, on a particular statistical approach. The impetus 
was provided by the same indigenous managerial 
philosophies that have animated other joint programs
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described in this book: the worker is a person, not just a 
source of "labor power," and the more fully his capabilities 
are enlisted in the workplace and the more fully his aspira 
tions are served there, the better will be his performance.
In 1972, directly inspired by the Japanese example, the 
Lockheed Missile and Space Company started a quality cir 
cle program that attracted wide attention in American in 
dustry. Lockheed's experience stimulated other aerospace 
companies to follow suit. The diffusion was aided by the 
availability of managers who had organized the Lockheed 
program as consultants to other firms. It has been estimated 
that, by 1981, 2,000 to 3,000 quality control circles were 
operating in the United States27 a trivial number compared 
to Japan's total, and also frequently different in character.
Quality control circles commonly have about 10 
volunteers from the same work group who meet weekly, 
biweekly, or monthly for one hour on company time. 28 
Headed by a supervisor or a senior employee, the par 
ticipants identify, and discuss remedies for, problems of pro 
duct or service quality. These problems may involve, say, re 
jects or customer complaints. Proposed remedies are im- 
plementable by management upon approval.
A distinctive feature of a real quality control circle is that 
the participants, as in Japan, are explicitly trained in the 
theory and practice of problem analysis and solution (in 
cluding the use of Pareto diagrams, histograms, and other 
devices familiar to the industrial engineer). The group 
leaders also receive instruction in leadership, communica 
tion, and adult training methods. A company "facilitator" 
plays a vital role in organizing the circles and providing in 
itial orientation.
While many employees prize highly the opportunity to use 
their talents more fully and to make presentations to com 
pany officers, monetary rewards are not overlooked as in 
centives for continuing participation. A suggestion that
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results in substantial savings may rate a cash award under the 
company suggestion program, but all members of the circle 
share equally.
The Westinghouse Program29
In the spring of 1978, Westinghouse Corporation decided 
to use quality control circles at its Defense and Electronics 
Systems center in Baltimore. The word "control" was drop 
ped from the title of the program (to eliminate the possible 
connotation of coercion), and the program was placed under 
manufacturing operations rather than under conventional 
quality assurance.
The new program required intensive orientation. Top ex 
ecutives were included in this effort, as well as middle 
managers and line supervisors. The leaders of the three 
unions representing hourly and salaried workers were in 
formed about the aims and nature of the program and 
assured that their roles as representatives of employees in 
disputes over contractual matters and working conditions 
were not under challenge.
Training for supervisors and employees is an important 
element of the Westinghouse program. Each circle leader or 
supervisor was given an intensive two-day course in group 
problem solving. Next, all employees in work units where 
supervisors had volunteered to be circle leaders were in 
troduced to quality control concepts and invited to become 
circle members. Ten volunteers from each unit were selected 
for one-hour training sessions over a period of six to eight 
weeks. Among the topics covered was the use of various 
measurement techniques familiar to industrial engineers for 
pinpointing product defects.
Westinghouse is satisfied with results. Only seven circles 
were formed when the program started in 1978. By 1981, the 
number had risen to 60. The favorable experience at the 
Defense and Electronic Systems Center has persuaded top
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management to extend the concept to the rest of the com 
pany's operations.
Benefits and Barriers
Whenever substantial benefits are claimed for change in 
industrial practice (in this instance, the introduction and use 
of quality control circles), two questions are appropriate. 
First, how do the realized benefits compare to the costs en 
tailed in operating the installed program? Second, while the 
change is under contemplation, how do the expected benefits 
compare to the expected costs? Both of these questions in 
volve reckoning in nonmonetary, as well as monetary, terms; 
and the nonmonetary reckoning is subjective, unpredictably 
different for labor and management and for the people who 
comprise these two categories.
Companies that have had satisfactory results with quality 
circles cite monetary and nonmonetary net gains, direct and 
indirect. At the end of its first three years of experience with 
quality circles, Lockheed estimated that the savings of the 
program were about four times the cost of operating it. 30 An 
attitude survey conducted at Westinghouse found 
unanimous support for continuation and extension of the 
circle program. In addition to the accomplishment of their 
explicit primary purpose, circles are credited with contribu 
tions to higher productivity, better methods of production, 
improved communications and morale, greater safety, fuller 
utilization of worker capabilities, and development of 
leadership skills transferable to other settings.
What about the second question, which is more important 
to the future of the quality circle movement in the United 
States? Despite the enthusiasms of "agents of change," 
those who have to carry the costs of change are cautious with 
good reason. These costs are, as already suggested, 
psychological and institutional, as well as financial. Labor 
and management are usually inclined to keep a status quo
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they understand; they, in Hamlet's words, would "rather 
bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not 
of." Managers fear loss of authority, and unions commonly 
suspect that cooperative endeavors not originating with them 
could lure workers away in addition to yielding productivity 
gains in which workers do not sufficiently share. The costs of 
uncertainty and of power redistribution are reducible in 
some measure by advance cooperation of a company and a 
union in the planning of a program and in the selection of 
areas of most promising application. In the automobile and 
aerospace industries, this wise course has been pursued.
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Roughly speaking, we may say that the arrangements treated 
in this chapter are worker oriented in the first instance, while 
those considered in the preceding chapter were company 
oriented in the first instance. The phrase "in the first in 
stance" is not gratuitous; it is meant to imply a "second in 
stance" in which something needs to happen if cooperation 
is to prove successful. Elaboration of this point follows.
A program intended, say, to enhance the quality of work 
ing life (QWL), to increase worker participation, or to 
"humanize" work ought also to offer some positive inciden 
tal payoff to a company, whether or not this prospect is in 
itially advertised. This ulterior payoff may be an improve 
ment in intracompany communication, in the climate of in 
dustrial relations, in rates of absenteeism and turnover, in ef 
ficiency of operations, or in product quality. Similarly, a 
program intended in the first instance to meet company 
needs of the kind just cited ought also to hold forth the 
likelihood of financial or other benefit to the worker in the 
shorter or longer run. Accordingly, many of the ar 
rangements described below and in the preceding chapter ac-
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quire a strong family resemblance as the total benefits to the 
two parties, immediate and ulterior, are taken into account.
This convergence is basic to successul cooperation. Each 
party should expect a benefit to accrue to the other as well as 
to itself; indeed, it should welcome this "double plus," since 
mutuality is a more dependable foundation for effective col 
laboration than is altruism or selfishness. An untempered 
adversary spirit is shortsighted in its indifference to the com 
plementarity of benefits, in its aspiration simply for a gain to 
itself that leaves the other party to accommodate and to 
cope. This spirit is shortsighted in making demands for 
"rights" without also recognizing "duties" or 
"obligations," which really stand for the rights and benefits 
to which the second party and the public may reasonably feel 
entitled.
Adversarial language is often used as a face-saving cloak 
or disguise by labor or management as either takes tentative 
first steps toward cooperation. The tempering of the adver 
sary spirit cannot always be comfortably conceded as 
awareness of the potential benefit of collaboration dawns. 
Whatever language is used, the most viable and rewarding of 
joint ventures are those that frankly seek benefits for both 
parties from the outset. 1
Quality of Working Life
The term "quality of working life" (QWL) pays a price 
for popularity. The more widely it is used, like the term 
"productivity," the less definite is its meaning. It is used in 
terchangeably with "humanization of work," "work 
reform," "work redesign," and "work improvement." It is 
too frequently used loosely to characterize almost any joint 
program that requires a committee, but it ought to be confin 
ed to joint ventures that in the first instance aim at satisfying 
workers' desires or needs for restructuring of the workplace.
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This restructuring should allow greater participation in deci- 
sionmaking on the job, constructive interaction with one's 
fellows, and opportunity for personal development and self- 
realization.
The writings of many industrial psychologists, 
sociologists, and management theorists have inspired 
piecemeal efforts toward work reform (e.g., job enrichment 
and sensitivity training for foremen) without, however, of 
fering a new integrated vision of work improvement, which 
is the original hallmark of QWL. According to one of the 
leading spokesmen of the QWL movement, "the systemic 
redesign of work systems involves the way tasks are pack 
aged into jobs, the way workers relate to each other, the way 
performance is measured and rewards are made available, 
the way positions of authority and status symbols are struc 
tured, the way career paths are conceived." 2 Two other 
students of the participative "work culture" emphasize that 
a program of significant work improvement
requires a climate and structure that differs from 
the traditional hierarchical organization. It calls for 
an open style of management, such that informa 
tion is shared and challenges or suggestions related 
to improving the existing modus operandi are gen 
uinely encouraged. It also requires expeditious, 
respectful and appropriate responses to inputs of 
those kinds. Finally, it requires that the QWL im 
provements not be imposed from the top down. 
Rather it calls for a partnership between manage 
ment people and representatives chosen by non- 
management people or in unionized situations a 
coequal union-management structure for plan 
ning, developing, and implementing the agreed- 
upon process and program. . . . Such a par 
ticipative and responsive style of management pro 
vides a springboard from which a large variety of
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improvements in the design, structure and 
organization of work can be developed. 3
From statements such as these, which are only two of very 
many that could be quoted, it is easy to anticipate frequent 
disappointment of expectations. Despite best laid plans, 
piecemeal improvement is far more probable than a holistic 
reconstruction of the work system within a relatively short 
period. Without prior preparation of a relationship of deep 
trust on both sides, the realization of any integrated 
cooperative vision is most unlikely; so the usual practical 
question is really how to develop that trust, no matter what 
collaborative scheme one has in mind. Furthermore, it is well 
to recognize that the worker may not be as dismayed by the 
current limitations of the workplace as the sociologist who 
cannot imagine himself in the same setting; and that the 
worker does not concentrate his total life on the work rela 
tionship, but may wholesomely regard the economic nexus as 
a means to consumption off the job, in leisure at home or in 
a tavern, with family, friends, television, etc. All things con 
sidered, perhaps a sound enough guide to what QWL means 
is provided in a definition included in a news report of an in 
ternational conference that ended in Toronto in early 
September 1981: "many forms of new work 
organizations . . . involving workers in shop-floor decisions 
through problem-solving committees." 4
Two Decades of Growing Interest
Experimental QWL projects initiated in the 1960s at 
tracted wide attention in North America, United Kingdom, 
and Scandinavia. Europe is commonly regarded to have led 
the way. The principal techniques tested in the experiments 
of the 1960s required changes in the division of labor: the in 
troduction of self-managed, autonomous work teams that 
take collective responsibility for performing a set of tasks; 
the organization of simple tasks into more complex wholes
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requiring more knowledge and skill; and the use of flexible 
assignment patterns, such as progressive movement of 
workers from one set of tasks to the next in order to master 
an increasing segment of the work of a team. 5
In the 1970s, QWL experiments were started at the 
manufacturing plants of a number of large U.S. corpora 
tions. The plants, however, were not among the biggest, and 
newer ones were well represented. Two researchers have 
estimated that, between 1970 and 1976, 75-90 projects had 
been set up, mostly in nonunion plants of fewer than 500 
employees. Of these, 25-30 were begun in new settings, 
where established work procedures did not have to be over 
come. 6
In addition to background factors cited for rising interest 
in QWL in the 1960s, corporate executives were responding 
in the 1970s to concerns over flagging productivity. Union 
leaders at the top tended to cling to their preference for 
bargaining as the best way to improve the work environ 
ment, but less rigidity was evident down the line. A survey 
conducted by Cornell researchers in 1975 showed that 63 per 
cent of 211 local labor leaders and union activists favored 
joint action with management on QWL issues, while 52 per 
cent favored a joint approach on productivity issues, and 
only 23 percent favored joint programs on traditional 
bargaining issues (e.g., wages, fringe benefits, hours, and 
job security). 7 In 1979, conferees from 20 international 
unions expressed a need for more challenge, satisfaction, 
and recognition in work; for more training within the union 
at all levels and more sharing of experience; and, above all, 
for greater union initiative in stimulating, planning, and im 
plementing QWL improvement programs lest management 
act alone anyway. 8
Few major labor figures have endorsed the view of a vice- 
president of the United Auto Workers that improvement of 
QWL "is essentially an extension of the basic goals of
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unionism." 9 Nevertheless, some unions did, in the 1970s, 
cooperate with management to establish joint QWL pro 
jects, regarding such participation pragmatically as an ad 
junct to collective bargaining. Most notable for size and in 
fluence were the programs set up in the automobile, steel, 
and telephone industries (see Appendix A).
Symptomatic of the growing interest in QWL is the con 
trast between attendance at the Toronto conference in 1981 
and attendance at the first international meeting at Har- 
riman, New York in 1972. On this earlier occasion, delegates 
numbered 50, mostly from universities. In 1981, delegates 
numbered more than 1,500; and, of these, 200 were unionists 
and 750 represented management. Although labor participa 
tion in such meetings has usually been scant, this was not the 
case at Toronto. Local officers from the automobile industry 
were especially evident: "More than 80 union and company 
officials from Ford Motor Company alone were at the con 
ference," a reflection of the fact that joint QWL efforts of 
varying levels were under way in about 100 manufacturing 
and assembly plants." 10
General Motors Experience
Having just mentioned Ford, we should go on to consider 
the joint national program started by General Motors and 
UAW in 1973. This program originated out of a common 
concern about employee discontent with working conditions 
that could not be resolved through normal machinery of col 
lective bargaining.
Union and management had long ago agreed that produc 
tivity improvement was a "sound and mutually beneficial 
objective." The contractual provision for an annual im 
provement factor, first introduced in 1948, stated that this 
wage gain "depends on technological progress, better tools, 
methods, processes, and equipment, and a cooperative at 
titude on the part of all parties in such progress." Manage-
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ment decisions on issues affecting productivity (such as the 
pace of the line), job security, health and safety, and shift 
work were often a source of disputes, but these could be 
resolved in the process of collective bargaining and grievance 
settlement. 11 But low morale and discontent with the work 
environment (reflected in high rates of absenteeism and turn 
over and in wildcat strikes that especially impeded produc 
tivity on production lines involving sequential operations) 
continued to trouble both the company and the union.
Experiments to improve communication were launched in 
the early 1970s by the director of organizational research and 
development, but without union participation. In 1973, at 
the UAW's request, a two-tiered arrangement for union- 
management cooperation at the national and local levels was 
formally established in a memorandum of agreement in the 
national contract. 12 This arrangement included a National 
Committee to Improve the Quality of Worklife, with two of 
ficials of the international union and two personnel officers. 
It operated as a catalyst in creating interest among local 
plant managers and union officials and providing informa 
tion on the meaning and implications of the QWL concept; 
and it also monitored and evaluated local projects. The ar 
rangement included a second tier at the local level: the union 
"shop committee" (which handled grievances and bargain 
ing) plus local management. At this level, the groundwork 
was laid for pilot QWL projects; a climate of mutual respect 
was developed, and a commitment of both sides to the QWL 
concept was promoted. Instead of a separate QWL commit 
tee, the union shop committee was used to avoid "any con 
flict in determining which subjects fall within the purview of 
adversarial collective bargaining and which are subject to the 
cooperative effort of quality of worklife." 13
As distrust lessened, both parties proceeded to organize 
pilot projects involving workers on a voluntary basis in prob 
lem solving and in decisionmaking with regard to the
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workplace. The guidelines, usually agreed upon in advance, 
assured that workers in the projects would not be subject to 
speedup or layoff and that the national bargaining agree 
ment would not be violated. Third-party consultants, usually 
employed at company expense, facilitated establishment and 
operation of the projects.
Over 50 QWL projects have been started in General 
Motors-UAW bargaining units throughout the nation. The 
specific designs vary from plant to plant, according to the 
concerns and objectives of local unions and managements. 
The program has expanded steadily since 1973 despite 
several changes in top management.
A highly successful project was organized in 1975 at the 
Tarrytown, New York car assembly plant, which had one of 
the poorest records of labor relations and production in GM 
and was in danger of being shut down. With the support of 
top management and UAW officials, plant managers and of 
ficers of Local 664 undertook joint exploration and discus 
sion of common goals. The upshot was participation of 
employees in planning a major plant rearrangement and in 
organizing a joint training program in team problem solving. 
By 1979, nearly all 3,600 employees had voluntarily par 
ticipated. The program was followed by intense exchange of 
ideas among workers, supervisors, and technical people in 
the most efficient ways of setting up jobs on the assembly 
line to produce a radically new automobile model. After an 
investment of $1.6 million, both management and union 
believe that successful worker involvement will yield enor 
mous long term advantages. The organizational benefits 
already derived in efficiency, cost savings, lower 
absenteeism, and fewer grievances are reported to be 
substantial.
The demonstration that QWL could work in an auto 
assembly plant stimulated other producers in the troubled in 
dustry to engage in joint projects with UAW. At Ford, a
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plant-level program similar to GM's was launched in 1980 
under the guidance of a National Joint Committee on 
Employee Involvement (El). The agenda of local El commit 
tees included product quality as well as workers' attendance 
and worklife quality. By 1981, company and union 
spokesmen were already able to report significant gains in 
product quality. 14
QWL at Harman International15
The Work Improvement Program at Harman Interna 
tional Industries, Inc. attracted considerable professional 
and media attention in the early 1970s as a pioneer experi 
ment in cooperation at a unionized plant. Previous QWL ex 
periments had taken place in nonunion settings, so one goal 
at Harman was to create a model acceptable to unions. 
Located at Bolivar, in a rural section of west Tennessee, the 
Harman plant employed about 1,000 workers in the produc 
tion of auto mirrors under a collective bargaining agreement 
with the United Auto Workers.
The original impetus and plan for the project came from 
the company president, the UAW vice president, and a 
leading QWL consultant. All were strongly committed to an 
experiment in restructuring the work of the entire plant in ac 
cord with four principles "job security, equity, worker 
democracy, and individuation." This commitment at the top 
was recognized as essential for the required substantial 
changes in attitudes, organization, and management prac 
tices.
A "shelter agreement" protected workers from possible 
adverse effects. The company and the union stated that "the 
purpose is not to increase productivity. If increased produc 
tivity is a by-product of the program, ways of rewarding the 
employees . . . will become legitimate matter for inclusion 
in the program." Funds from foundations, government 
agencies, and the company enabled employment of a team of
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behavioral scientists for technical assistance to both sides. In 
many circles, the whole program was regarded as idealistic 
and academic.
A committee including plant managers and local union 
leaders was set up to oversee the design of specific work im 
provements by small core groups of workers and foremen. In 
one instance, a core group decided that a task could be ac 
complished more quickly through teamwork; management 
agreed not to raise the production standard and allowed 
workers who finished early to go home. Another cooperative 
project involved union and management participation in 
establishing efficiency rates. Still other projects focused on 
worker participation in bidding on a particular product; in- 
plant training; and internal communication.
The progress of the Bolivar experiment was closely studied 
by University of Michigan researchers over a six-year period. 
They found that jobs became more secure; that productivity 
and product quality improved; that accidents decreased at a 
faster rate than the industry average; that minor accidents 
and short term absences due to illness declined, while minor 
illnesses increased; that machine downtime increased; and 
that employee earnings held steady. Some indicators of work 
satisfaction showed declines, but others indicated gains or 
showed no change. A large proportion of the employees did, 
however, express satisfaction with the QWL program, its im 
pact, and their union's effectiveness in representing their 
concerns.
Rushton Coal Mine
A QWL project was started in 1973 at a small coal mine of 
the Rushton Company, employing 180 workers, in north 
central Pennsylvania. It was developed by a joint labor- 
management committee with the guidance of a team of 
university experts. 16 The president of the company had 
become interested in finding a system for giving miners more
Satisfaction, Well-Being & Security 149
responsibility, autonomy, and influence over how they did 
their job; his aim was to attract younger workers to Rushton 
in the future. The president of the United Mine Workers en 
dorsed the project since it was also concerned with improv 
ing safety conditions and practices. Because of its broad im 
plications, the federal government provided the initial fund 
ing for the research team.
The experiment involved major restructuring of the way 
mine work was performed. Five goals were established: safe 
ty, increased productivity, higher earnings, greater job 
skills, and greater job satisfaction. An experimental section 
was established in the mine with 27 volunteers, 9 to a shift. 
Responsibility for daily production and direction was assign 
ed to the crew instead of to the foreman, whose primary 
responsibilities became safety and coordination. The crew, 
in effect, became an autonomous work group. Each member 
of the experimental crew was expected to learn the jobs of his 
fellow workers. All received the same top rate of pay since 
they could perform multiple tasks. A major part of the 
change effort was a training program on safety, ventilation, 
roof control, and the requirements of new legislation. Day- 
to-day oversight of the experiment was performed by a small 
joint group.
Intensive evaluation of the first 18 months of the experi 
ment by an independent team of behavioral scientists found 
several positive gains: significantly fewer safety violations, 
increased jobs skills, higher pay, strong team spirit, greater 
feeling of responsibility, more interest in work, and more 
communication (vertical and horizontal). Productivity did 
not significantly increase, nor were labor-management rela 
tions improved. Supervisors and middle managers suffered 
increased stress, and conflict within the union over pay dif 
ferentials broke out.
From the mine operator's point of view, the experiment 
proved the feasibility of a new form of work organization.
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Despite a close negative vote by union membership, he decid 
ed to extend the system to the entire mine in 1976. Although 
the experiment continues at the Rushton mine, it has so far 
had no imitators in the industry.
Pros and Cons
General appraisals of the outcomes of experiments in 
work restructuring reveal the expected kinds of benefits, but 
cautions should also be observed. First, the good news 
reported in an assessment of 25 cases:
Increases in productivity seem to result from about 
half the projects, while in the other half no change 
occurs. Most of them seem to create more skilled 
and flexible workforces. Most projects also seem to 
result in increases in job satisfaction and in feelings 
of personal growth, job involvement and organiza 
tional commitment. Absenteeism, turnover and 
lateness of arrival at work seem to be very much 
reduced with most of the projects; this tallies with 
the finding that job satisfaction increases. 17
Another favorable evaluation, based on 36 projects, found 
them distributed "along a broad spectrum of effectiveness," 
but concluded that "the average effectiveness of these in 
novative work systems is higher than the average of more 
conventionally organized but otherwise comparable 
plants." 18
Now, the bad news. A leading QWL researcher has em 
phasized the fragility of the new work systems. His review of 
various projects in operation at least five years disclosed that 
they, too, eventually succumbed, despite initial success. 
Among the causes of failure were the loss of key sponsors, 
conflict between organizational elements inside and outside 
the QWL project, insufficient commitment in the company 
as a whole, and decline through time in the attractiveness of 
available rewards and in the pristine excitement of novelty. 19
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Mention was made earlier of the wariness of labor, so it is 
appropriate to add that managers at the plant level also have 
doubts and qualms. A study of work restructuring projects 
in eight firms found managers concerned about possible 
deterioration of relations with labor, the high cost in terms 
of managerial time and effort, the risk of raising expecta 
tions of benefits that could not be sustained, and the ex 
ploitation of experimental results in the process of collective 
bargaining. Although first line supervisors recognized that 
they might continue to play a constructive role if they had 
been involved in the design of a project, they were fearful of 
loss of authority or of their jobs. 20
At this juncture, it is well to observe that not all nonsuper- 
visory employees would necessarily welcome the graduation 
of a QWL experiment to a plantwide norm. Many workers 
do not mind routine jobs under the present dispensation and 
would regard the changes required in the name of work im 
provement to be unduly stressful. For a majority of workers, 
the center of gravity of life does not lie in the shop; money 
income remains a very potent salve for the subcritical bruises 
endured by the psyche in the usual, less-than-ideal 
workplace.
Resistance to change from current systems of work is very 
evident in the startup phase of a new QWL project. Two 
researchers who have studied the dynamics of 10 such under 
takings found that "the existing negative forces in a 
workplace are usually stronger than the forces that favor 
joint projects." 21 The obstacles include insufficient 
knowledge and experience; lack of a clear model appropriate 
to company conditions; threats to entrenched status and 
authority; uncertain impact on collective bargaining; and a 
lengthy and costly gestation period that may outlast initial 
enthusiasms. Where successful projects are nevertheless 
launched, the critical elements are typically supplied by the 
intervention of neutral, informed consultants acceptable to
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the two sides. These third parties provide needed informa 
tion and guidance, serve as communications links, uncover 
common goals and effectively verbalize them, and allay 
understandable fears.
It is a healthy sign that "skeptics" were reported among 
the participants in the 1981 Toronto conference mentioned 
earlier. Although many delegates told of bilateral benefits of 
cooperative ventures (e.g., improvements in efficiency, 
costs, and even in the climate for bargaining), concern was 
also expressed "whether QWL will become just a passing fad 
or a long term commitment by both management and 
labor." In particular, in the automobile industry, where 
QWL has been taken very seriously, the willingness of the 
two sides to continue their collaboration with the restoration 
of profitability "in a year or two" is a matter of conjecture.
Flexible Work Schedules
"Flexitime," another recent innovation intended to meet 
the needs or desires of workers for greater autonomy in the 
workplace, has been eyed with favor by many employers as a 
device for reducing absenteeism, tardiness, and turnover. 22 
In response to rank and file interest, a few unions have join 
ed with management in efforts to develop flexible work 
schedules without impairment of operations.
A typical flexible work schedule allows an employee to 
begin work at any time within specified limits in the morning 
(7 A.M. to 9 A.M.), and to leave work at any time within 
specified limits in the evening (4 P.M. to 6 P.M.). All 
employees, however, are expected to be on the job during the 
core periods (9 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. and 1:30 P.M. to 4 
P.M.). Lunchtime may also be left to the employee's discre 
tion, the length being set by management. 23
There are many variants, depending on the degree of flex 
ibility permitted by company operations. Sometimes, hours
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in excess of, or fewer than, the contractual workweek may be 
carried to other days: looser systems allow employees to 
determine their own daily and weekly hours, provided a 
monthly target is met. Compressed workweeks of 4 days and 
40 hours or 3 days and 36 hours have not been adopted wide 
ly.
Diffusion
After introduction at the Messerschmidt Research and 
Development Center in West Germany in 1967 as gleitzeit 
(gliding time), flexible work schedules were adopted rapidly 
by banks, insurance companies, and other white-collar 
employers in Western Europe. 24 It came to the United States 
in 1973 and since then has become fairly common. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that, in 1980, over 7.6 
million full-time employees, or 12 percent of the full-time 
labor force, were on some kind of flexible work schedule.
Although trade unions played a leading role in earlier 
reforms of worktime (e.g., introduction of the 8-hour day, 
the 5-day week, and paid vacations and holidays), they have, 
on the whole, taken an ambivalent position regarding flex 
ible work schedules. At first, they opposed the idea on the 
ground that it threatened overtime pay provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. In 1978, leading representatives of six 
U.S. unions conferred with union officials and workers 
about flexible working hours and other job innovations at 
various worksites in England, West Germany, and Sweden; 
they then reported, in Innovations in Working Patterns, a 
recognition of potential benefits if unions are involved in in 
itial discussions, planning, implementation, and evaluation. 
They also recommended that gains in productivity from flex 
ible work schedules should be shared with employees 
through collective bargaining. They concluded that 
American unions ought to become aware of alternative 
working patterns, not only to protect employees from pos-
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sible pitfalls but also to take advantage of new bargaining 
options.
Except for the Communications Workers Union, few 
unions in the private sector have become involved in 
cooperative experiments with flexible work schedules. The 
Communications Workers Union, having a high proportion 
of women clerical workers in its membership, has made flex 
ibility of work schedules, where feasible and desired by 
employees, one of its goals in bargaining with the Bell 
System. Agreements on flexitime have been reached with 
Michigan Bell, Mountain States Bell, and Pacific Bell. These 
provide for joint committees to plan the introduction of 
changes in work scheduling. 25
Assessments
As usual, bilateral benefits of flexitime are often realized, 
as intended, by both workers and employers, but failures 
and abuses are also reported. Case studies show reductions 
of absenteeism, lateness, and overtime, but little effect on 
turnover; and they also indicate gains in productivity and job 
satisfaction. Workers are better able to meet family respon 
sibilities and to conduct personal business; they may also 
make better transportation arrangements and reduce the 
stresses of everyday living. 26
Organizational efficiency can also be diminished if com 
munications and continuity of operations are disrupted by 
injudicious scheduling or failure to honor the routines 
established. Some kinds of work can be performed more in 
dependently than others; typing, filing, accounting, com 
puting, and many other office jobs are easier to perform 
with little or no interaction, while this is not the case for 
assembly line and other sequential blue-collar tasks. Flex 
itime is also difficult to apply to shift work. 27
Experts in labor-management relations commonly endorse 
flexible work scheduling. For example, in the 1976 presiden-
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tial address at the annual meeting of the Industrial Relations 
Research Association, an eminent scholar declared:
From the standpoint of improving the quality of 
working life, nothing could be healthier than these 
exercises in manipulating working hours. The 
United States, with its highly decentralized systems 
of industrial relations and collective bargaining, is 
an excellent setting for this experimentation. 28
Safety and Health
Three stages are discernible in the protection of workers 
against industrial hazards. First, employers assumed sole 
responsibility. Second, with the advent and growth of 
unions, occupational safety and health have been prominent 
ly treated in collective bargaining agreements. Third, labor 
and management have, in recent years, gone beyond earlier 
approaches to safety and health issues by establishing joint 
committees to discuss problems and to propose solutions. 
About one-third of the major bargaining agreements in force 
on January 1, 1978, covering 3 million workers, had provi 
sions for such committees. 29 Federal legislation has played 
an important role in this evolution.
Although their alertness to occupational hazards has been 
rising, workers continue to assign highest priority to 
economic concerns. Rising health and safety consciousness 
has influenced, and been influenced by, the standards and 
regulations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. In the U.S. Department of Labor's 1977 
Quality of Employment survey, 78 percent of responding 
workers noted one or more hazards in the workplace, com 
pared to 38 percent in 1969. 30 When, however, workers were 
asked in 1977 to state their choice between a 10 percent pay 
raise and working conditions that were "a little safer or 
healthier," only 33 percent of the respondents preferred 
safety over pay. For workers exposed to serious hazards, the
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figure was 42 percent. By way of contrast, 66 percent of the 
surveyed workers expressed a preference for increased retire 
ment benefits over a 10 percent pay raise. Furthermore, 
when unionists were asked where their organizations should 
concentrate, "handling grievances" ranked first, while "in 
creasing worker input in business decisions" ranked tenth 
and last and "increasing occupational safety and health" 
ranked seventh.
Two Forms of Cooperation: 
Pledges and Committees
The statistics just cited reflect the priorities of people who 
are obliged to earn a living and to provide for old age and are 
used to working conditions that are far from ideal. They do 
not indicate indifference to safety and health so much as a 
need to put "first things first." Advocates of QWL ex 
periments may find this fact of life or of other people's 
lives disappointing, but management and unions, for 
tunately, have drawn the socially useful conclusion that they 
have to exercise a responsibility of stewardship according to 
their capabilities. Evidence of acceptance of the challenge is 
offered in collective bargaining agreements.
About 16 percent of all major agreements in the BLS 
analysis of 1978 contain a pledge that the two parties will 
work together to achieve safe working conditions and that 
the union will participate in the operation of the company 
programs. Such programs usually provide for safety equip 
ment, training, information, proper use of hazardous 
materials, accident reports, safety suggestions, etc. The in 
itiative rests mostly on management, and unions have a 
relatively inactive and subordinate role.
A second type of cooperation, exemplified in about one- 
third of major contracts and covering 40 percent of employ 
ment, involves establishment of special union-management 
committees. These joint committees deal with safety and
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health problems on a continuous basis in the primary 
metals, rubber, auto, and mining industries. Representation 
usually includes three union members and three management 
members. Meetings are held at least once a month, and full 
pay is commonly allowed for time spent on committee ac 
tivities during working hours.
The joint safety committees have important advisory func 
tions, and final approval of their recommendations is up to 
management. Recommendations are adopted by majority 
vote of committee members; they are likely "to involve 
negotiation and compromise, particularly if the management 
representatives must consider the effects of safety solutions 
on costs or efficiency." 31
Indicative of the scope of joint committees is this descrip 
tion of the functions of the one established in the Fontana, 
California plant by Kaiser Steel Corporation and the United 
Steelworkers:
The function of the safety committee shall be to ad 
vise with plant management concerning safety and 
health and to discuss legitimate safety and health 
matters. In the discharge of its function, the safety 
committee shall: consider existing practices and 
rules relating to safety and health, formulate sug 
gested changes in existing practices and rules, 
recommend adoption of new practices and rules, 
review proposed new safety programs developed by 
the company, and review accident statistics and 
trends and disabling injuries which have occurred 
in the plant and make recommendations to prevent 
future recurrences. 32
What Makes a Good Committee
Like other kinds of committees, those concerned primarily 
with safety and health vary greatly in robustness and activ 
ity. Outside influences are pertinent to effectiveness for ex-
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ample, pressure for enforcement of OSHA regulations, the 
state of technical knowledge, and the vigor of research on 
problems affecting particular firms or industries. Some light 
on pertinent internal factors such as the quality of commit 
tee members, ambient conditions, and modes of opera 
tion is shed in a study made by three Cornell researchers of 
committees in about 50 New York State companies having 
contracts with the Machinists union. 33
The Cornell study indicates that committees tend, as might 
be expected, to be more effective where the local union is 
strong, the rank and file care about matters of health and 
safety, and management is disposed to deal with these mat 
ters. They are able to operate on a higher plane if union 
representatives have a wide range of skills, if first line super 
visors are included, and if management members have deci- 
sionmaking authority. They can also perform better if they 
meet monthly, precede meetings with walkaround inspec 
tions, review past recommendations and progress toward im 
plementation, keep minutes, and have procedures for repor 
ting results of committee recommendations to the rank and 
file as well as to top management.
Localization of OSHA
The role of joint safety and health committees may be ex 
panded significantly by OSHA's decision to decentralize 
some of its operations in response to business criticism of, 
and reduced funding for, government inspection of 
workplaces. Where appropriate, federal inspection will 
presumably be replaced by self-inspection by labor- 
management safety and health committees. This innovation 
is being tested at a nuclear power project by Bechtel Cor 
poration and the California Building and Construction 
Trades Council. 34 Instead of federal and state surveillance, a 
joint safety and health committee will conduct inspections 
for compliance with OSHA construction standards and try
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to assure that hazards are quickly corrected. Where the par 
ties cannot agree, OSHA will make the final decision.
Labor-management cooperation is also being strengthened 
by OSHA's expanded support for the education and training 
of union safety and health officials. A joint program spon 
sored by the Construction Employers' Association of 
Chicago and the Chicago and Cook County Building and 
Construction Trades Council is training thousands of ap 
prentices and journeymen in a variety of safety and health 
areas of an industry with one of the highest accident rates. 35
Alcoholism and Drug Abuse
Over 4.5 million persons in the workforce are estimated to 
be suffering from alcoholism, and tens of thousands from 
drug dependency. The economic cost of problem employees 
to a firm, as well as to themselves and society, is con 
siderable. Under many collective bargaining agreements, 
both parties agree that employees who report to work under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs, or who bring drinks or 
drugs into the plant, are subject to disciplinary action, in 
cluding discharge. 36 Any employee who is disciplined has the 
right to file a grievance against the action. The local union 
representative usually tries to defend the worker against the 
employer's charges and to prevent dismissal. This adversary 
proceeding assures due process or fair play to employees 
charged with drunkeness but does little to solve their prob 
lems.
The shortcomings of disciplinary action have led some 
companies to establish supplementary rehabilitation pro 
grams without waiving their rights under the collective 
bargaining agreement. A basic premise of these recovery 
programs is that alcoholism and drug dependency are correc- 
tible illnesses treatable, once detected, through education, 
counseling, and medical care.
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While management often takes the main responsibility in 
introducing and operating recovery programs, joint planning 
and administration have been established in an increasing 
number of companies, notably in the steel and auto in 
dustries, and the postal service. Of the 1,724 major 
agreements in force in 1978, 53, covering about 1 million 
workers, provided for joint programs. Many additional pro 
grams have been established under memoranda or letters of 
agreement. Employees are more likely to participate in a 
recovery program proposed by management when a union 
can assure the protection of job security rights and the con 
fidentiality of consultations with medical officials.
Guidelines for Cooperation
Broad guidelines for union-management programs have 
been developed by the Labor-Management Committee of the 
National Council on Alcoholism, which consists of seven 
union presidents and seven corporate leaders. 37 This body 
has recommended the formation of two kinds of labor- 
management committees in large multiplant corpora 
tions at the corporate level and in each plant.
The principal functions of corporate committees are to 
establish a written policy on confidentiality, job security, in 
surance coverage, and the disease concept; develop an ap 
propriate training program for all supervisors and union 
representatives; determine budgets for local committees; and 
act as a clearinghouse within the company on prevention and 
treatment. A full-time program coordinator, paid by the 
company, would carry out the committee's decisions.
The local plant is assigned the responsibility of developing 
procedures for supervisors and union representatives to 
follow in identifying and motivating workers to seek 
diagnosis and in referring diagnosed alcoholics to approved 
community treatment centers. The suggested procedures 
begin with interviews on job performance with the super-
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visor and the union representative. Employees who accept 
the offered professional services are assured of job security 
and confidential handling of their records. Plant union- 
management committees in some instances exert an impor 
tant influence in strengthening community treatment and 
educational services for alcoholism and drug abuse.
Examples of Joint Programs
A number of joint union-management programs have 
been organized on the model proposed by the Labor- 
Management Committee of the National Council on 
Alcoholism. Among the early ones were those at American 
Motors and Deere (in cooperation with the United Auto 
Workers) and American Airlines (in cooperation with the 
Transport Workers Union).
A joint program of broad counseling services for "trou 
bled employees" was organized in the 1970s at Kennecott 
Copper. 38 All employees and their family members were af 
forded the opportunity to obtain professional help, not only 
on alcoholism and drug abuse, but also on family, financial, 
and legal troubles, by telephoning a unit called INSIGHT.
One of the most extensive programs is the joint Substance 
Abuse Recovery Program developed by General Motors and 
the United Auto Workers. Originally called the Alcoholism 
Recovery Program, this effort was enlarged, as a result of 
the 1976 national negotiations, to cover drug abuse. 39 The 
local committee is called a "team." The union representative 
functions with no loss of pay under supervision of the plant 
medical department.
Although many thousands of GM employees have been 
helped by the Substance Abuse Recovery Program, one of its 
goals has remained elusive: unwarranted absenteeism con 
tinues. In response to complaints from members who resent 
burdens imposed by absentees, the UAW declared in 1979 
that "unwarranted casual absenteeism is wrong," and it
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signed a "Memorandum of Understanding on Attendance" 
with General Motors to organize joint local pilot projects 
"to reduce and minimize unwarranted absences." 40
Job Security and Reemployment Aid
The experience of plant shutdowns and employee 
shakeouts in the 1970s and the prospect of very much more 
of the same in the 1980s have alerted labor and management 
to the desirability of contingency arrangements. 41 The re 
mainder of this chapter deals mostly with private efforts to 
provide for job retention and reemployment assistance 
through bargaining clauses, "redundancy plans," and 
buyout of plants marked for closing or divestiture by af 
fected workers or communities. No account is taken of 
legislative proposals to prevent or slow down abandonment 
of obsolete or unprofitable facilities; or to require employers 
to give workers early notice of intent to shut down, to pro 
vide separation pay, to maintain health benefits, and to com 
pensate communities for tax loss. 42
Collective Bargaining Clauses
Under the National Labor Relations Act and various ar 
bitration decisions, the unrestricted right of employers to 
relocate remains a controversial and unsettled issue. Various 
provisions in collective bargaining agreements seek to clarify 
the rights and obligations of the contracting parties in the 
event of significant technological change or shutdown. For 
example, employers may be required to: give advance notice 
of change; follow seniority rules in layoffs or transfer; pro 
vide severance pay, supplementary unemployment benefits, 
or relocation rights and allowances; and pay benefits to 
displaced workers who wish to retire early. Some contracts 
contain "no layoff" attrition clauses for reduction of the 
workforce in continuing plants by turnover.
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Protection by contract, however, is spotty. For example, 
fewer than half of the workers covered by major agreements 
can draw supplementary unemployment benefits, severance 
pay, or relocation allowances. Only about 10 percent are 
covered by contracts with advance notice in plant shutdowns 
or relocation. 43 In a troubled and uncertain economy, 
employers have naturally been reluctant to extend contrac 
tual job security and eager to maintain maximum flexibility 
for themselves.
Redundancy Planning
A number of companies and unions collaborate in 
"redundancy planning," which involves anticipation of 
structural changes and preparation of retraining and job 
search programs for workers no longer needed. 44 Through 
such programs, companies can demonstrate social respon 
sibility, protect prior investments in "human capital," and 
reduce outlays for severance pay, supplementary unemploy 
ment benefits, and tax payments under unemployment com 
pensation merit-rating. Union participation is essential for 
protection of seniority rights of workers transferred to other 
plants.
Joint Planning for Technological Change. Since the in 
troduction of the dial telephone in the 1920s, the Bell System 
has planned adjustments to minimize labor displacements 
due to technological change. Its plan featured advance 
notice, attrition, reassignment, relocation allowances, and 
early retirement.
In 1980, the Bell System and the Communication Workers 
Union agreed to establish a formal joint Technology Change 
Committee in each company of the system. These commit 
tees discuss the nature and impact of any impending major 
technological change at least six months in advance. They 
also plan and recommend programs to protect the job secur 
ity and pay of employees and measures for retraining and
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reassignment. Covering over 300,000 employees, this venture 
in joint planning is one of the most extensive in the United 
States. (See documentary appendix for excerpt from agree 
ment.)
In 1979, UAW and the major automakers agreed to 
establish National Committees on Technological Progress to 
consider adjustments required (e.g., in work assignments 
and skill training) by the introduction of new processes, 
methods, or equipment. The contracts obliged the com 
panies to give advance notice of such innovations as early as 
possible. These committees, or their successors, will play an 
important role in the design of appropriate manpower 
measures for easing the changeover to robotization and 
other techniques intended to enhance the competitiveness of 
American cars.
Transfer and Retraining. The planned shutdown of a large 
tobacco plant of the Brown and Williamson Company in 
Louisville has occasioned ''one of the most comprehensive 
and ambitious readjustment programs undertaken by a large 
U.S. company." 45 A three-year program for closing out an 
old plant with 3,000 employees and concentrating produc 
tion in a new plant at Macon, Georgia was worked out in col 
lective bargaining in 1979 with the Tobacco Workers Union 
and the Machinists.
The agreement required 18 months of advance notice of a 
plant closing. It also provided several standard types of 
financial assistance: graduated severance pay based on ser 
vice, early retirement benefits for those 55 and over, and a 
guarantee of life and medical insurance up to six months 
after the shutdown. For employees desiring to transfer to the 
new Macon plant, the company paid moving expenses and 
offered a trial period of 60-90 days. Over 400 slots were 
reserved for Louisville employees.
More innovative were the provisions for training and 
placement assistance. Maintenance workers with skills
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unique to the tobacco industry were helped to take retraining 
courses for skilled jobs outside the industry. Others were 
given classroom training on company premises for the high 
school equivalency test. Group counseling was provided for 
all employees by persons from management and the union 
trained in appropriate techniques. The company also wrote 
to a large number of firms recommending its employees for 
vacancies and assisted in the preparation of resumes.The 
whole program was paid for by the company.
Outplacement Assistance. Several large companies, in 
cooperation with their local unions, have organized pro 
grams for improving the skills of displaced employees in 
searching and applying for jobs. Many blue-collar workers, 
having had work experience limited to one company or in 
dustry, feel handicapped in actively looking for jobs; they 
lack know-how in writing resumes, making telephone in 
quiries, and participating in interviews with prospective 
employees.
Shortly after Goodyear Tire and Rubber announced in 
September 1980, six months in advance, the shutdown of its 
Los Angeles and Conshohocken plants, it engaged an out 
side consultant to prepare a voluntary "career continuation 
program" for about 1,000 employees who were to be laid 
off. 46 This program covered a variety of informational, 
counseling, and training services. About 850 employees par 
ticipated in a series of small workshops on skill and aptitude 
assessment, the labor market, self-awareness, job-targeting, 
hidden job markets, resume writing, and employment inter 
viewing. Individual counseling was also offered with group 
followup for 60 days after plant closing. From the begin 
ning, local leaders of the United Rubber Workers were con 
sulted about the process although the program was outside 
the scope of the contract. According to the consultant, "this 
support from the union turned out to be very valuable in 
alleviating initial skepticism on the part of employees. 47
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The Dana Corporation often stated that "people had a 
right to expect continued employment with the 
corporation," but it was forced to shut down its Edgerton, 
Wisconsin plant in mid-1980 because of lack of orders for its 
light truck parts. 48 Since employees had considerable ad 
vance knowledge of the plant's difficulties at Edgerton from 
their participation in the corporation's Scanlon Plan, the 
decision was not wholly unexpected. Under a preferential 
hiring program negotiated with UAW, any employee per 
manently displaced had the right to a job in any other Dana 
plant, with a moving allowance and relocation assistance of 
two months' pay; but unfortunately, the shutdown of other 
Dana plants and layoffs elsewhere in the company limited 
this option.
An outplacement training program, similar to 
Goodyear's, was developed by Dana staff for all employees, 
covering a skills inventory, resume writing, and communica 
tion skills. In addition, advice on financial planning was of 
fered. A unique feature of the program was the close work 
ing relationship established with the public job service of 
Wisconsin, which supplied information on work available in 
different parts of the country.
The whole process was facilitated by a long history of 
cooperative industrial relations and the firm commitment of 
management and the union to help displaced employees to 
find new jobs quickly. A survey of opinion after the shut 
down found that workers still held favorable perceptions of 
Dana "due to the corporation's efforts to assist in the ad 
justment problem." 49
Tripartite Cooperation in the Steel Industry. A unique 
program to assist dislocated workers was organized in 1979 
by the steel companies, the union, and government agencies 
after a series of plant shutdowns. The Steel Tripartite Ad 
visory Committee, discussed in chapter 3, acted as monitor
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of programs administered at the local level. Under the collec 
tive bargaining agreement, dislocated workers were entitled 
to unemployment and supplementary unemployment 
benefits, early retirement, and relocation and retraining 
allowances. Some workers were also eligible for benefits 
under the Trade Readjustment Assistance and GET A pro 
grams.
Shortly after the announcement by U.S. Steel and Jones 
and Laughlin, in the fall of 1979, of plant shutdowns affect 
ing 13,000 workers at 15 sites, a Task Force of the Commit 
tee was sent to each site to review the progress of readjust 
ment programs and to report on any obstacles and delays. 50 
The Task Force was especially effective in coordinating 
local, state, and federal retraining efforts, in opening up 
communications among participating public agencies, and in 
breaking bottlenecks impeding needed training services. 
However, efforts of the Task Force to encourage local labor 
and management leaders to organize joint community com 
mittees achieved little success. In many cases, resentment 
over the shutdowns proved insurmountable.
A pilot project initiated by the Task Force at a plant of 
Crucible Steel involved outplacement assistance for workers 
scheduled to be permanently laid off. Job search training, 
along with intensive efforts to develop jobs by the employer 
and unions, was provided before the plant closed. The pro 
ject was funded by Crucible Steel, the Steelworkers Union, 
state and local employment services, and CETA programs.
The work of the Task Force has contributed to a better 
understanding by government officials of how management, 
unions, and government agencies could cooperate in re 
sponding to plant closings, not only in the steel industry but 
in other industries as well. In its 1980 report to the president, 
the Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee recommended the 
assignment of a local federal adviser to work as a catalyst
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with local government, labor, and management officials in 
planning assistance to workers scheduled to be laid off.
Employee Ownership Plans. In a number of cases of 
threatened plant shutdown during the 1970s, employees and 
their unions departed from traditional accommodation and 
joined with local business and government leaders to prevent 
loss of jobs and tax revenues by purchasing the facilities and 
continuing operations. Most of these actions occurred in 
small towns, where alternative employment opportunities 
were scarce and where the plant or firm was a major tax 
payer. The shutdowns generally represented divestitures by 
"absentee corporations"; the local plants no longer fitted in 
to overall financial or product schemes.
The accompanying table shows ten cases of divestiture in 
which trade unions were involved in direct purchase a small 
fraction of the thousand or so enterprises reported by the 
University of Michigan Institute of Social Research to have 
some form of direct worker ownership. 51 (Only a small 
percentage of the equity of these thousand firms,however, is 
owned by nonmanagerial employees. About 90 companies 
have been identified in which a majority of the assets are 
owned by employees, mainly under Employee Stock Owner 
ship Plans (ESOP) described in the next chapter.)
A major problem of employee and community buyouts 
has been to convince outside investors that they were not 
risking their funds in "unprofitable" enterprises. In some 
cases, the appearance of failure might be in the eye of the 
beholder rather than in the balance sheet. 52 Conglomerates, 
for example, may divest themselves of subsidiaries despite 
profitability; they may originally have had unrealistic expec 
tations of even higher profit, or they may have decided to 
change their output mix. Furthermore, gross mismanage 
ment by absentee corporate owners cannot be ruled out; in 
such instances, transfer to local managers and employees 
could revive a failing entity. The experience of 16 employee-
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owned plywood plants in the Pacific Northwest in maintain 
ing a level of productivity and profit higher than the industry 
average has been cited as evidence of the potential for suc 
cess. 53 A still broader study by the University of Michigan's 
Institute of Social Research, of 30 firms, also found higher 
profit rates than for comparable companies in their respec 
tive industries. 54
The main source of capital has been the savings of the 
employees whose jobs were at stake, but outside financing 
has also been necessary with sales of stock to local banks, 
businessmen, and the public. In the case of the Mohawk 
Valley Community Corporation, which bought the Library 
Bureau from Sperry Rand, 70 percent of the stock was 
bought by investors outside the firm. The federal govern 
ment has assisted in the financing of several employee plant 
purchases through low-interest loans or loan guarantees by 
the Small Business Administration, the Economic Develop 
ment Administration, the Farmers' Home Administration, 
and the Housing and Urban Development Department. 55 
Some states have also provided support through loan 
guarantees.
The case of the Campbell Works of the Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube Company illustrates the enormous difficulties con 
fronting employees who try to buy a large-scale enterprise to 
protect their jobs. 56 The closing, which meant the loss of 
4,100 jobs, led to formation of the Ecumenical Coalition of 
200 religious leaders which, with the local steelworkers 
union, organized a campaign for community-worker pur 
chase of the huge mill. Several private studies for the Coali 
tion suggested that the reopened mill could become 
economically viable if workers, union, and management 
cooperated in a drive to reduce labor, energy, and material 
costs of production. The Economic Development Ad 
ministration at first set aside $100 million in loan guarantees 
for one stage of the project; but, in March 1979, it decided to
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withdraw entirely from financing the venture on the grounds 
of infeasibility and high risk in a declining market for steel. 
The project was subsequently abandoned altogether.
Some Results. Employee and community buyouts of the 
1970s appear to have succeeded in many instances in preserv 
ing jobs and in producing at a profit at least for a while. 
For example, the Library Bureau earned a substantial profit 
in the first year, then wound up in the red in the next two 
years, and recovered in 1980. 57 The Vermont Asbestos 
Group prospered because of high labor productivity and a 
sharp increase in the price of asbestos. 58 Whether or not such 
enterprises survive in the long run depends not only on their 
own new capabilities but also on market, financial, and 
other conditions outside their control. In other words, the 
price of revival is to become as vulnerable in the future as 
any other competing firms.
Appraisals of the implications of employee ownership for 
worker involvement have varied widely. University of 
Michigan researchers found, in one study, better com 
munication, higher morale, fewer grievances, and greater 
job satisfaction because of changes in managerial attitudes. 
Other studies, however, report disappointment that 
employee ownership has not led to greater worker and union 
influence over management decisionmaking. In some cases, 
the same executives have continued to direct operations with 
little change in style. In the Vermont Asbestos Group and the 
Library Bureau, employees sit on boards of directors with 
representatives of local banks and other shareholders, but 
they seem to have little or no control over decisions of the ex 
ecutive committee. 59 In negotiations to save firms and jobs, 
employees and unions appear generally to have paid little at 
tention to devising arrangements to give employee 
stockholders a special voice in managing company affairs.
The role of unions becomes ambivalent in employee- 
owned firms. While unions have supported employee-
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ownership programs as a pragmatic means of saving jobs in 
areas with few alternatives, they have continued to represent 
the interests of employees in interactions with management 
on wages, hours, and working conditions. 60 They 
presumably could extend their value to employees qua 
stockholders by providing education programs on worker 
"rights" in relation to those of members of boards of direc 
tors if workers really cared.
Against a historical background of organized labor's op 
position (and general employee indifference) to worker 
ownership of enterprises, the attitude and behavior of local 
unions should occasion no surprise. The American Federa 
tion of Labor was organized partly as a result of the disen 
chantment of wage earners with the efforts of the Knights of 
Labor in the 1880s to form producer cooperatives. 61 Many 
small labor-sponsored enterprises in the shoe, mining, cigar, 
foundry, and other manufacturing industries were set up in 
those days to provide jobs to members blacklisted by 
employers after unsuccessful strikes. Although these 
cooperatives appeared successful at first, many later failed 
because of lack of capital, inefficient managers, and "in 
judicious borrowing of money at high rates of interest upon 
the mortgage of the plant." 62 Others that proved more suc 
cessful became joint stock companies in which the wage 
earner was treated as in any other private enterprise.
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Supplements to wages and salaries (and to the ordinary 
fringes) are usable as inducements to employees to cooperate 
with management on behalf of company survival, 
autonomy, and profitability. Some of these supplements are 
monetary, paid as cash; others are quasi-monetary, paid as 
claims on company income. Some are currently realizable; 
others are deferred. All are contingent, rather than certain, 
as to payability at all or as to cash value. Four varieties of 
supplements are treated in the four sections that make up 
this chapter: group bonuses, profit sharing, employee stock 
ownership, and pensions.
Group Bonuses
Among the best-known group incentive programs are the 
Scanlon Plan, the Rucker Share of Production Plan, and 
Impro-Share. 1 The first of these has features that qualify it 
for special attention in a book on labor-management 
cooperation. It not only entails greater employee (or union) 
participation than do the other two but it also proceeds from
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a sincere philosophy of reconcilability of labor and manage 
ment interests without disparagement of adversarial bargain 
ing.
Group bonuses reward employees, not as individuals per 
forming specific assigned tasks but as members of an ag 
gregate responsible for a correspondingly broad concept of 
output. The group may be as large as the whole workforce of 
a plant or company, in which case prime emphasis is placed 
in bonus payment on final salable output or on total value 
added. The payment system is intended to overcome the 
disabilities that have plagued earlier programs of individual 
incentive pay. The latter fostered competition among 
workers, rather than cooperation, and discouraged informa 
tion sharing. They often led to grievances and low morale, 
especially where difficulties in assessing individual contribu 
tions to output (e.g., in the chemical process industries and 
in sequentially dependent operations) impeded establishment 
of fair standards. An obvious virtue of the group bonus is 
that it keeps in constant view the "bottom line" of all pro 
ductive activity: workers have to perform well in making 
their specific subproducts because, in so doing, they are also 
enhancing the output of end products, which are the source 
of company revenues and of their own extra compensation.
The Scan/on Plan
In the late 1930s, Joseph N. Scanlon, steelworker and 
local union president, had a vision of harmonizing manage 
ment's concern for productivity with labor's for a fair share 
of the gains within the framework of collective 
bargaining. 2 He tried out his idea in a small company that 
was hard pressed to make ends meet while paying union 
wages. During the rest of his short life, he refined his con 
cept, first as head of the production engineering department 
of the national steel union and later as an associate of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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The Scanlon Plan rests on three legs. First, employees are 
expected to generate and communicate ideas continually for 
improving the plant's total performance. Second, a suitable 
way of measuring the company's changing performance over 
time is required. Third, an acceptable formula is needed for 
determining the company's productivity surplus and for 
distributing this bonus pool between employer and 
employees.
The three legs must rest on a floor: the advance willingness 
of the two parties to agree to consider the plan and to adopt 
it on a trial basis. This initial impulse to cooperate is ex 
pected to find reinforcement in the subsequent experience of 
operating under the plan and to culminate in a modus vi- 
vendi. 3
The two parties may first come to a Scanlon consultant to 
seek help after, say, an individual incentive program has 
become mired in sluggish productivity and poor morale. A 
committee of labor and management representatives is then 
set up to review other company plans in the next four to six 
months and to devise a version that is applicable to their own 
organization on a trial basis. For operational test of the trial 
plan for a limited period, the consultant is likely to require a 
positive vote of 80 percent of the employees. If the results of 
a trial are deemed satisfactory, the employees or their union 
sign a formal agreement with management to institute the 
plan. A sample contract is provided in the documentary ap 
pendix.
Joint Scanlon Committees
Two kinds of committees are utilized under the Scanlon 
Plan. Close to the rank and file are the production commit 
tees, which receive and discuss employee suggestions for im 
proving methods, raising output quality, reducing costs, and 
so forth. Overarching these is a plantwide screening commit 
tee.
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At plants of the Dana Corporation, which embraced the 
Scanlon concept relatively early, production committees 
comprised of elected workers and appointed managers were 
set up in every department for each shift. 4 In one of the Dana 
plants, as many as 16 committees have been known to exist 
at one time. An attempt is made to have every employee 
serve on a committee as well as to offer suggestions. UAW 
locals endorse the full participation of their members. The 
production committees meet monthly on company time to 
review the suggestions. Approved proposals requiring very 
small outlays are eligible for immediate implementation. 
More costly proposals of merit, or those impinging on more 
than one department or shift, are passed on to the higher- 
level screening committee. Rejected suggestions are returned 
with explanations or with requests for revision.
The screening committee has additional major tasks. 
Comprised of the plant manager and supervisory staff plus 
two representatives from each production committee, it pro 
vides a forum for discussion of company goals, the com 
petitive situation, technological developments, and other 
matters affecting the health and viability of the enterprise. 
One more function of the committee is its most redeeming 
feature from the standpoint of the average employee: review 
of company accounting data to determine and announce the 
monthly productivity bonus pool.
Scanlon bonus. A major difference between Scanlon pro 
duction committees and the joint productivity committees 
discussed in chapter 6 is that participants are promptly 
rewarded by cash bonuses based on measured performance 
of the enterprise as a whole. Since the main objective is to en 
courage teamwork and coordination to improve the produc 
tivity of the enterprise, bonuses based on departmental or in 
dividual performance are ruled out. The plan thus 
discourages "suboptimizing" rivalries among departments, 
shifts, maintenance and production workers, and engineers.
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These rivalries are often inimical to "bottom-line" produc 
tion. The bonus is distributed among all employees, in 
cluding supervisors, managers, clerical, and service 
workers groups usually excluded from individual incentive 
plans.
The bonus computation requires joint establishment of a 
simple quantitative standard or yardstick for determining 
whether any monthly gains have been made. 5 An outside 
Scanlori consultant often helps in deriving an acceptable 
measure from company accounts. The most commonly used 
standard is the ratio of payroll costs to sales value of produc 
tion. Labor and management jointly determine the scope of 
company operations embraced in the standard ratio and 
select a representative past time period, when the ratio was 
fairly stable, to serve as the basing point. Payroll costs usual 
ly include total wages and salaries plus fringe benefits of 
both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees. Sales value 
of production covers the dollar value of sales plus or minus 
the change in inventory. Returns, allowances, and discounts 
are subtracted from sales value to encourage quality produc 
tion. The base ratio is fixed at a level that does not jeopar 
dize the firm's competitiveness and is also perceived as 
equitable to all.
The base-period ratio of payroll to sales is applied to the 
sales value in a given month to derive allowed payroll costs. 
If the actual payroll costs are lower than the allowed 
amount, the difference constitutes the available bonus pool 
for the month. From time to time, the base-period ratio may 
require adjustment to reflect changes in technology, product 
mix, degree of plant integration, prices, wages, and inven 
tories. Some bargaining between labor and management is 
involved in all decisions relating to changes in the standard 
ratio.
Although the bonus is derived from data on financial per 
formance expressed in "current" (rather than "constant")
184 Monetary Supplements
dollars, the Scanlon Plan is usually called a "productivity" 
incentive program. The payroll-to-sales ratio, however, is 
not a true measure of "physical" productivity (or strictly, of 
the reciprocal of labor productivity). Actually, changes in 
the dollar ratio of sales to payroll correspond to changes in 
physical productivity only if the ratio of average hourly earn 
ings to the unit value or price of output remains constant 
over time. 6 While not a true productivity measure, the dollar 
ratio does have bilateral acceptance, and it does focus the at 
tention of the entire workforce on cost items over which 
managers and employees have some control.
The Scanlon Plan provides a formula for distributing 
monthly savings in labor cost the bonus pool between 
employer and employees and also among the employees. 
Labor and management agree on the formula when the Plan 
is first installed. A reserve of one-quarter of the bonus fund 
is first set aside to cover possible deficits during the year or 
to be paid out as a year-end bonus. Of the remaining three- 
quarters, 75 percent is paid to employees and 25 percent to 
the company. Each employee receives a percentage increase 
in pay based on the percentage that the bonus fund com 
prises of the payroll. All employees receive the same percent 
bonus increase.
The monthly bonus payment is the linchpin that holds the 
Scanlon Plan together. Money is the "bottom line" for 
workers who are not yet sufficiently affluent or secure in af 
fluence to give top priority to other rewards of work. In 
other kinds of joint arrangements, the sine qua non of a 
plan's survival is usually the continuance on the job of a key 
supportive manager or union official. 7 A monthly bonus 
check, on the other hand, provides everyone with a visible, 
measurable stake in the plan's continuation. Conversely, the 
failure to produce bonuses regularly, despite employee ef 
forts, weakens credibility and may become the main factor 
for breakdown of the plan.
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The bonus, incidentally, may be sizable. At a Dana plant 
in Wisconsin, monthly bonuses averaged 14 percent of 
payroll in 1974, 22 percent in 1975, and 20 percent in 1976. 
For the average worker, the bonuses amounted to $1,221 in 
1974, $2,176 in 1975, and $2,153 in 1976.
While the bonus formula is intended to harmonize the 
goals of employees with the goals of the organization, the 
Scanlon Plan is not conceived as a substitute for collective 
bargaining. The determination of wage and fringe benefits, 
the definition of worker rights and obligations, and the 
handling of grievances are still subject to adversarial negotia 
tions. The plan is explicitly kept out of the process of collec 
tive bargaining. 8 A union's bargaining strategy, on the other 
hand, may be tempered by a climate of amity and by a 
deeper knowledge of the firm's circumstances and ability to 
pay.
Advantages and obstacles. Case studies made over the past 
30 years or so give high marks to the Scanlon Plan. A review 
of 22 studies made between 1947 and 1972, which covered 
the experience of 44 firms, found that 30 were apparent suc 
cesses and 14 were failures. 9 This favorable rate may be 
somewhat overstated, however, since successful firms are 
more likely to allow their experience to be reported than 
those firms that fail. Consultants, in particular, are naturally 
more eager to talk of positive than negative results.
The tangible benefits of the Scanlon Plan, where effective 
ly applied, appear to be substantial. Studies show rates of 50 
to 80 percent of the workforce contributing suggestions; in 
contrast, a participation rate of about 30 percent is indicated 
for individual suggestion systems. 10 Furthermore, the quality 
of Scanlon suggestions, as measured by acceptance rates, 
seems to be at a higher level. Output per manhour 
presumably increases in response to brisk suggestion activity, 
which management may seek to sustain by feeding problems 
for solution by the productivity committees.
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The intangible benefits are more difficult to document or 
measure, but they are real. Among these are greater coopera 
tion among departments and between supervisors and 
employees, closer identification of employees with their 
firms, and higher job motivation. 11 Also to be expected in 
Scanlon companies are diminished resistance to 
technological change, a vigilant interest on the part of 
employees in better management and planning, and greater 
flexibility in the administration of collective bargaining con 
tracts.
It would be wrong to overlook some disadvantages of the 
Scanlon Plan for individual employees. High performers 
under individual incentive plans may suffer losses in pay in 
shifting to a group bonus system. Highly productive groups 
under the Scanlon Plan, moreover, may resent payment of 
the same bonus percentage to service and other indirect 
workers whose contribution is not directly evident. Finally, 
individual employees who are less interested in cash bonuses 
than their fellow employees may be subjected to intense peer 
pressure to increase their pace of work. Such unavoidable in 
equities in group incentive plans require acknowledgment 
and explanation by union and management lest they become 
sources of serious discontent.
Despite the many publicized advantages of the Scanlon 
Plan, only about 400 firms use it. 12 Most firms cited in 
studies are unionized, with the steelworkers, machinists, 
auto workers, and rubber workers the principal partners. 
Herman Miller, Inc., an internationally known furniture 
company in Michigan which adopted the Scanlon Plan in 
1950, is nonunion; it perceives the plan as "the central 
management process" for integrating the work of all 
employees to meet the company's economic objectives. In 
another nonunion company in Michigan, Donnelly Mirrors, 
the Scanlon Plan is part of a participative management pro 
gram that features interlocking work teams, salaries for all 
employees, and a less hierarchical authority structure. 13
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The Scanlon Plan seems to flourish best in moderate-size 
and small manufacturing plants where communications are 
good and employees can see more readily the connection be 
tween their own job performance and the achievement of the 
firm's goals. The plan is also more workable where credible, 
simple performance measures can be derived; this criterion 
would rule out firms with frequent changes in product lines 
and costs. Furthermore, the company must be willing and 
able to pay substantial consulting, bookkeeping, and clerical 
costs, as well as bear the cost of time spent in committee 
meetings. Finally, and above all, a high degree of trust is 
essential; without such trust on both sides, management 
would be most reluctant to disclose cost data and to discuss 
business prospects with employee representatives.
Talking of trust brings us back to the fundamental re 
quirement of good communications throughout a plant or 
company. A behavioral scientist has described the Scanlon 
Plan as "a complex means for improving intergroup rela 
tions" and has declared its effectiveness to be "directly 
related to the already existing maturity of relations within 
and between labor and management." 14
In closing, we should note that internal conditions do not 
suffice to determine a plan's success. Adverse external 
business conditions can destroy a plan even more readily 
than it destroys a firm. In chapter 7, we referred to havoc 
wrought at Dana by the collapse of American automobile 
production.
Profit Sharing
Throughout the troubled history of American labor- 
management relations, an idyllic dream has frequently recur 
red: the blunting, if not elimination, of "class" antagonisms 
by conversion of the worker into a minor "capitalist." Com 
pany efforts to translate this dream into a workaday reality
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have actually been limited; and, where tried, they have hard 
ly succeeded in bridging the economic and psychological (not 
to say social) chasm that separates employee from employer. 
On the other hand, where tried, they have certainly helped to 
strengthen the sense of mutuality that coexists with a latent, 
manifest, or sublimated disposition toward conflict. 
Perhaps, the reinforcement of mutuality in particular places 
at particular times is as much as ought to be expected from 
the regular administration of necessarily small doses of pro 
fit and equity ownership. After all, societies that have gone 
through major revolutions professing to transform workers 
into "collective owners of the means of production" have 
egregiously failed to instill an intended "confusion of 
genres" in the psyches of their sullen toiling masses.
In chapter 1, it was noted that, during the 1920s, 
employers astutely challenged the growing labor movement 
for the loyalty of workers. Among the devices used were pro 
grams of profit-sharing and stock ownership. Two authors 
of a standard text on labor-management relations look back 
on the experience of the decade as follows:
Profit-sharing plans continued to manifest their 
traditionally high birth rate as well as their equally 
high death rate, and employee stock ownership, in 
troduced on a wider scale than ever before, was ex 
pected to (and frequently did) cement the faith of 
the workers in the existing order, entrench their 
reverence for the institution of private property, in 
culcate the belief that strikes against the firms 
employing them were strikes against themselves, 
and convince them that the economic interests of 
the wage earners were fundamentally harmonious 
with those of the employing and investing class. 15
Many of the programs collapsed during the Great Depres 
sion, which also saw a resurgence of unionism. Unions have 
seldom endorsed profit sharing, and they have also taken a
Monetary Supplements 189
generally negative view of employee stock ownership. In 
contrast, they have included the establishment and ad 
ministration of private pension plans in their bargaining 
agenda.
Nature and Prevalence of Plans
Profit sharing plans are arrangements by employers to set 
aside a fixed percent of the annual net profits, if any, to 
distribute as a supplement, annually or eventually, to each 
employee's wage or salary. The plans usually do not involve 
employee participation in management decisionmaking or in 
shopfloor consultation. Since profits are highly volatile, sub 
ject to market forces and the competence of management as 
well as productive effort of the workforce, annual cash 
distributions have often proved disappointing.
A more popular type of profit sharing is the "deferred" 
plan, which is often adopted in place of, or as a complement 
to, a company pension program. Instead of making annual 
cash payments, the deferred plan accumulates an 
individual's shares of company profits in a fund usually in 
vested in the company's stock and makes payouts upon 
retirement, death, disability, or resignation. Unlike a formal 
pension program, deferred profit sharing may not promise a 
definite set of benefits and need not rest on an actuarially 
sound basis of employer contributions.
The Profit Sharing Foundation has estimated that, as of 
the end of 1980, about 15 million employees were enrolled in 
some 286,000 deferred and combination plans and 
80,000-100,000 cash plans. 16 Profit sharing is practiced in a 
wide variety of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing in 
dustries, in companies both large and small. It is obviously 
not applicable to public services and nonprofit organiza 
tions.
Only about 29 out of 1,550 major contracts studied by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1980 had provisions per-
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taining to profit sharing. Union leaders have generally 
preferred to concentrate on gains "in the pay envelope," and 
few seem to have followed Walter Reuther's suggestion that 
profit sharing might be a particularly useful noninflationary 
arrangement for unions "to get their full equity."
A unique case of profit sharing under collective bargaining 
is provided by the experience of the American Velvet Com 
pany and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers. 17 
The company, the last major velvet producer in New 
England, employs about 500 people and has kept its plan in 
force since 1940. The plan requires 27 percent of net profits 
(before taxes) to be paid into a fund from which an annual 
bonus is distributed to eligible employees on the basis of each 
employee's annual earnings. One-third of the profit sharing 
bonus is paid in cash; another third is invested in a retire 
ment trust fund; the final third is left to the employee's 
choice. The company has not missed a bonus since 1939. In 
addition to its profit sharing plan, American Velvet Com 
pany and the local union engage in a program of union- 
management cooperation that has fostered the communica 
tion of cost-saving ideas, intense loyalty, and sufficient pro 
ductivity improvement to help the company remain com 
petitive.
Appraisal
A seasoned observer of the industrial scene has listed a 
number of virtues of profit sharing. Plans do encourage "a 
more positive attitude by employees toward their work and 
their firm." Furthermore, they provide useful economic 
education: There is no such thing as a free lunch, rewards be 
ing distributable only "when they can be afforded." Finally, 
"profit sharing as a retirement plan can often provide ade 
quate benefits under a more flexible method of financing 
than the usual funded plan with mixed benefits." 18 For a 
long-service employee, the benefits could substantially sup 
plement those obtained through Social Security.
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These remarks do not, of course, imply that the benefits to 
workers are economically exciting enough to inspire serious 
ideological defection. Besides, as already mentioned, a 
worker's effort is only one of many elements that determine 
the availability and size of his profit share; he may fail to ob 
tain the supplement he thinks he has merited, in which case 
the program provides only a negative or doubtful incentive.
Employee Stock Ownership
Two eras or styles, which might be designated classical and 
modern, need to be distinguished in the discussion of 
employee stock ownership programs. The classical era began 
before the turn of the century. The modern era, marked by 
the enlistment of the federal government as a fiscal third par 
ty with a visible hand, began in the 1970s.
The Classical Approach
In 1893, the Illinois Central Railroad offered workers an 
opportunity to purchase company shares below market price 
on the installment plan. Until the end of World War I, 
relatively few other firms followed this lead. One that did 
was United States Steel, which established its huge stock 
ownership program in 1903.
During the 1920s, employers found stock ownership more 
appealing than profit sharing (the roots of which trace to the 
1870s) as a means of linking together the fortunes of com 
panies and their workers. By 1916, fewer than 50 companies 
were reported to have ownership plans in place; by the time 
of the stock market crash in 1929, the number had risen to 
more than 300, with perhaps 1 million employees par 
ticipating as owners of snares estimated to be worth about $1 
billion. Among the well-known corporations with stock pur 
chase plans were Standard Oil of New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
Railroad, American Telephone and Telegraph, General
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Motors, Firestone Rubber, Eastman Kodak, International 
Harvester, and Philadelphia Rapid Transit. 19
The crash of the stock market taught workers that share 
ownership entails the risk of depreciation of asset values as 
well as the happier prospect of appreciation. Profit sharing 
programs, on the other hand, do not require workers to 
share losses. Fortunately, employees had so little equity in 
their new role as capitalists that they could not have lost sight 
of the continuing future importance of wages or salaries in 
their life plans. It is also pertinent to add that New Deal 
legislation (with respect to Social Security, unemployment 
compensation, housing, etc.) and the later G.I. bills for 
World War II and other veterans pointed to far more prob 
able ways for a worker to improve his scale of living or even 
to build a modest estate.
Enter Federal Government 
as Sponsor
A new impetus was given to the formation of programs of 
stock ownership by federal legislation of the 1970s that made 
them financially attractive to employers via tax deductions. 
Among these laws were the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Tax Reduction Act of 
1975, and the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The so-called ESOPs 
(employee stock ownership plans) spurred by these federal 
enactments already exceeded 5,000 by 1981. 20
The new ESOPs do not necessarily require stock purchase 
by workers. 21 The basic model calls for establishment of a 
company trust to which a company makes payment of exter 
nally borrowed funds for the explicit purpose of acquisition 
of newly issued company stock. As the company repays the 
outside lender, the stock is retained in the trust. The com 
pany may elect to augment the trust's assets with additional 
payments of stock or cash. Each year, the trust's accruals are 
allocated to accounts of participating employees (according
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to their wages or salaries) for eventual distribution upon 
retirement or death.
The U.S. Treasury benignly supplies a subsidy in the form 
of "tax expenditures" (i.e., forgone revenues) to encourage 
the setup and operation of ESOPs. It allows two deductions 
from the employer's taxes for interest paid to lenders and 
also for repayments of principal. The employee or his estate 
is not subject to tax until distribution.
A variant on this basic model is treated even more 
generously by the federal government. Under this version of 
ESOP, an employer may claim an additional investment tax 
credit of 1 percent for an additional equivalent setaside of its 
common stock; or an extra credit of one-half percent if 
employees match additional employer contributions. 
Employees are generally prohibited from withdrawing their 
own payments into an ESOP for seven years.
Federal sponsorship of ESOPs will broaden considerably 
as a result of liberal provisions of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981. The net effect of the new changes in law 
will be to encourage more rapid acquisition by employees of 
larger percentages of company stock. One amendment alters 
the basis of employer contributions to ESOPs in 1983 from a 
small percentage of investment (qualified for the investment 
tax credit) to a smaller percentage of payrolls. This shift will 
make ESOPs as attractive to labor-intensive (e.g., white- 
collar) firms as they have been to capital-intensive enter 
prises. Furthermore, employers will be able to carry back for 
3 years and forward for 15 years any unused ESOP credit in 
a current year. Another change allows an employee to use an 
ESOP as an IRA (individual retirement arrangement); thus, 
beginning in 1982, he or she may purchase up to $2,000 of 




The ESOP concept is adaptable to many purposes, such as 
community development, the funding of producer 
cooperatives (which may include the combination of workers 
for the advancement of "workplace democracy"), the con 
tinuity of small family businesses experiencing loss of key 
members through retirement, or the defense of larger enter 
prises against hostile takeovers. 22 In 1981, however, the 
management and employees failed in their effort to keep 
Continental Airlines out of the grasp of another carrier. The 
joint strategy, foiled by lobbying on the state level, envisaged 
issuance of $185 million of new stock to an ESOP trust 
(enough for 51 percent control) to be "bought" through 
voluntary pay cuts and productivity improvements over a 
number of years. A board of directors would have included 
employees associated with three unions and one nonunion 
organization, three management representatives, and eight 
persons elected by all shareholders. If the scheme had suc 
ceeded, Continental Airlines would have become the second 
largest majority employee-owned company.
While unions are generally wary of ESOPs that are 
unilaterally established, stock ownership became a bargain 
ing chip for the United Auto Workers in the deal with 
management to keep Chrysler operating. The Chrysler Loan 
Guarantee Act of 1980 required substantial wage conces 
sions, but it also provided for the acquisition of 15 to 20 per 
cent of the company's total stock by employees.
Cost and Benefits
The immediate cost of ESOPs in lost government revenues 
is impressively high. If such plans lead, say, to higher pro 
ductivity, greater profit, and more stable employment than 
would otherwise obtain, the long term accounting picture 
would become far more favorable. In any case, estimated tax 
expenditures for investment credits claimed by corporations
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for ESOPs have been set by the Office of Management and 
Budget at $695 million for fiscal year 1980, $770 million for 
1981, and $820 million for 1981. 23
The short-run cost to stockholders could also be high. The 
issuance of new stock to an ESOP trust represents a dilution 
of the equity interest of current shareholders. At a 
minimum, this enlargement of the volume of outstanding 
shares means a reduction of dividends in the near term as 
well as a probable decline in market price.
For the employee also, the establishment of an ESOP may 
not constitute an unambiguous gain. Riskier returns of 
dividends and asset appreciation have to be weighed against 
greater wage increases and the probable alternative of a pen 
sion program.
Apart from tax advantages, the employer looks for other 
gains for example, in motivation of workers, reduced 
absenteeism, and smoother labor relations. 24 The incentive 
effect may be small since stock or cash dividends are only a 
small fraction of total compensation. The worker also has no 
right, as a rule, to vote his stock; and doing so would have 
little effect on corporate policy anyway. Provision for 
employee participation in problem solving on the shopfloor 
would appear to have significantly greater motivational 
force. Where unions exist, labor-management relations 
could be adversely affected by suspicions that ESOPs are 
risky, cheap, unilaterally designed alternatives to sound pen 
sion plans; by appraisals that they tend to favor higher-paid 
managerial employees; and by fears that they accentuate the 
differences in concerns of older and younger workers in 
negotiations over wages, and that they may give employers 
another device for countering union attempts at further 
organization or for encouraging decertification petitions.
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Pensions
The pioneer in private industrial pension plans was 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (1884), but it had few 
followers until the first two decades of the present century. 
In 1916, some 117 plans were noted in a government report, 
with 69 of them established between 1910 and 1916. The pace 
quickened after World War I, an exhaustive count showing a 
total of 466 plans in existence in the United States and 
Canada in 1927. A later estimate, for 1933, indicated over 
600 companies in the United States with plans covering 
about 5 million employees. 25
After World War II, the number of plans increased con 
siderably as employers sought, in the presence of a broad 
new system of Social Security, to identify employee interests 
with the fortunes of particular companies. By 1977, the 
estimated number of private plans exceeded 450,000; they 
covered nearly 50 million current or retired workers, and 
their assets had a market value of more than $300 billion. 26
Unions have recognized their members' concern for ade 
quate retirement income and have sought to extend bargain 
ing beyond its "normal" frontiers to include negotiation and 
joint consultation on pensions. The Labor-Management 
Relations Act of 1947 provided that all trust funds of multi- 
employer pension funds be placed under joint employer- 
union management. Joint boards with equal representation 
of the two parties are responsible for day-to-day administra 
tion; they deal with problems of eligibility, contributions, 
and benefits and try to settle conflicts between the parties. 27
Single-employer plans, on the other hand, are usually 
designed and operated with little input from the unions. A 
report of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, issued 
in 1980, recommended that unions "should use the collective 
bargaining process to obtain as much of a voice as possible in 
the management of benefit funds." 28 Jointly administered
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company funds might, for example, be directed more readily 
to investments in residential mortgages in communities 
where workers live, in firms that have large domestic 
workforces or that have good labor relations, and in many 
companies other than the one that has set up the pension 
plan.
The 1981 tax law has important implications for private 
pensions and also for the relation of these to Social Secur 
ity, which faces an uncertain future as a result of 
demographic changes, inflation, and the expansion of 
benefits with inadequate actuarial and tax provisions for 
financing. Under the new law, a company pension plan may 
qualify, just like an ESOP, for annual, voluntary, tax deduc 
tible, employee contributions up to $2,000. On the other 
hand, an IRA may be set up by a worker independently of 
any existing company plan. It is not unlikely that the new law 
signals a future tilt toward security in old age through greater 
reliance on federal tax expenditures and less on tax levies. In 
such a case, not only will state and local governments 
become increasingly involved in complementary programs 
but so will labor and management at the company level.
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Public Sector 
Collaboration
Some Comparisons with Private Sector
Scope for labor-management cooperation in the public sec 
tor (federal, state, and local) appears even greater than in the 
private sector. Although unions and employee associations 
there include a larger proportion (over two-fifths) of the 
total number of workers (about 16 million) than in the 
private sector, they do not perform their negotiating func 
tions as fully, freely, or surely. l Many of the labor organiza 
tions are relatively new and inexperienced. Collective 
bargaining, furthermore, is still unevenly accepted by public 
employers, in some instances having been rejected outright. 
The strike, too, is commonly forbidden in the public sector; 
the summary dismissal of federal air traffic controllers who 
walked off the job in August 1981 is bound to encourage or 
reinforce "hard-line" positions in other jurisdictions. Where 
strikes or other voluntary interruptions of service are legal or 
tolerated, the inconvenience and resentment felt by ordinary 
citizens may nevertheless act as a partial deterrent. Finally, 
machinery for impartial and binding arbitration is still not 
used routinely or as a last resort for the settlement of 
disputes that threaten to erupt into open hostilities. 2
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All these circumstances point to the desirability of labor- 
management forums for peaceful exploration and adjust 
ment of differences and for the realization of mutual 
benefits at low cost to both sides. This chapter illustrates the 
variety of cooperative media already used in the public sector 
for consultation and problem solving. It takes special ac 
count of the Tennessee Valley experience, which has incor 
porated labor-management arrangements in a larger 
framework of regional development.
As in the private sector, the committees formed for joint 
consultation or problem solving in the public sector range 
widely, may overlap, and differ in vigor, efficacy, and 
longevity. Also as in the private sector, a bilateral disposition 
to temper the adversarial impulse is a prerequisite condition 
for constructive collaboration. This condition, though 
necessary, is not sufficient. It cannot be repeated too often 
that leadership, persistence, patience, knowledge, and skill 
are also required.
Many collective bargaining agreements already include 
provisions for labor-management committees. Indeed, such 
committees are far more prevalent than in the private sector, 
where they may be acknowledged in only about 5 percent of 
the major contracts. A study made by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) of 286 bargaining agreements in force 
in 1970 in 39 of the nation's larger cities showed provision 
for joint committees in 19 percent of the cases. 3 Another 
BLS study, for the federal agencies and a similar date, found 
a much larger incidence: 44 percent, or 314 of the 671 ex 
amined agreements. 4 Although many of the committees must 
have been only "paper" constructions, the figures never 
theless reflect an awareness of their potentials and a will 
ingness to experiment.
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Productivity Committees
The expansion of public needs and services, the concomi 
tant increase in payrolls and staff, and the aggravation of 
normal taxpayer resistance by a relentless inflation these 
developments have made productivity a lively issue of public 
debate since the late 1960s. Threats to solvency at all levels of 
government have inspired efforts to devise and apply means 
of economizing, such as the elimination of less essential ser 
vices, reduction of waste, and improvement of personnel 
utilization and performance. 5
At first, in the early 1970s, "productivity bargaining" 
seemed a practical way toward more effective use of 
workers. The idea was to allow management to "buy out" 
certain work rules as part of the wage settlement and 
thereby to reduce unit labor cost and the upward pressure of 
cost on prices. In Nassau County (N. Y.) and elsewhere, pro 
jects were set up to improve performance and to consider the 
proper division of savings. Although clear benefits were 
discernible from work-rule reform, the design of mutually 
acceptable payoff formulas often proved elusive. 6
An alternative approach to productivity advancement has 
entailed the establishment of formal committees through col 
lective bargaining. Some of the committees engage in the 
estimation of savings attributable to productivity gain, but 
others do not have such duties. A few of the federal and local 
initiatives are briefly described below.
Federal Committees
In 1975-1977, joint productivity councils were set up at 
four defense depots. 7 Civilian employees at each of the 
facilities numbered about 6,000. In each case, local officials 
of the American Federation of Government Employees and 
the Laborers' International Union signed a memorandum of
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agreement with military commanders. These memoranda, 
developed with consulting assistance supplied through the 
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working 
Life, outlined common goals, which had to be endorsed by 
high authority in union headquarters and in the Department 
of Defense.
Eight committee members selected by each council met 
weekly on government time to consider impediments to effi 
cient performance. The recommendations of these commit 
tees were forwarded to commanding officers, who then ad 
vised the councils of their decisions. The committee delibera 
tions were conducted with full appreciation that failure to 
achieve cooperative cost control could lead to contracting- 
out of in-house activities and a consequent loss of jobs.
Experience over several years has indicated both tangible 
and intangible benefits from the committee system. Perfor 
mance standards were raised, absenteeism and abuse of sick 
leave were reduced, mutual trust between labor and manage 
ment grew, and team work became more natural. Ground 
work was laid for the later use of quality circles at various 
depots.
One exploratory study, relating to six joint undertakings 
in a large midwestern city in the early 1970s, reported 
favorably on the work of federal productivity councils and 
committees. 8 It particularly stressed the contribution of open 
channels of communication to reduction of labor- 
management disputes; the two-way flow of information pro 
vided a basis for effective problem solving.
Despite such positive features, another survey, made by 
the Office of Personnel Management, has disclosed a high 
mortality rate. 9 By 1980, only 4 out of 25 committees set up 
in the 1970s under collective bargaining agreements were 
reported to be still active. The remainder had either been 
abolished or had deteriorated as a result of labor-
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management conflict or indifference to their recommenda 
tions.
Local Government
Joint productivity committees have sprung up in various 
towns and cities caught between the tide of rising costs and 
the rocks of relatively static and uncertain revenues. The 
committees are typically confined to particular agencies or 
departments of government and may focus on particular 
facilities or activities. 10 Two examples are described briefly 
below for New York City, which attracted considerable na 
tional attention a few years ago as it teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy not alone, but very visibly.
New York Transit Authority. In the 1971 contract negotia 
tions between the New York Transit Authority and the 
Transport Workers Union, the two parties agreed to 
establish a "special joint committee" for dealing with inade 
quate productivity in bus maintenance.'' This activity, which 
engaged about 5,000 workers, had been the subject of long, 
intense contention.
The committee was chartered to review work practices and 
schedules, the adequacy of materials and tools, and so forth. 
It had an impartial chairman empowered to make binding 
decisions in case of disagreement. Initial success in projects 
involving bus maintenance encouraged establishment of 
similar committees in other departments. As productivity 
improvements led to reduction of manpower requirements, 
workers were transferred to other jobs without loss of pay 
and more repair work was done in-house rather than con 
tracted out.
Both sides agreed that good results had been obtained 
under the joint program but felt that fuller rank and file par 
ticipation was essential for maximum benefit. Union fears 
that workers would resist employment savings proved un-
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warranted. The program prepared the Transit Authority for 
participation in the citywide venture described next.
COLA-Productivity Linkage in New York. A broader- 
based program of cooperation was introduced and pursued 
as New York City's financial prostration neared irreversibil- 
ity. Sweeping readjustments were required in pay and in 
union-management relations affecting some 250,000 
employees. Piecemeal approaches to productivity stimula 
tion had proved inadequate. More thorough reform became 
a prerequisite to federal and state assistance and to continu 
ing credit-worthiness in general.
The new citywide program, begun in the latter 1970s under 
the eye of a state monitoring board, has entailed a stay of 
wage increases, lowering of employment ceilings (through at 
trition rather than layoffs), and defrayal of COLA (cost-of- 
living adjustments) through productivity gains and other 
cost savings rather than reduction of services. Top city and 
union officials make up a Joint Labor-Management Produc 
tivity Committee that is chaired by a representative of the 
public and sets broad policy guidelines. Lower tiers of 
similar committees were established for 26 city departments 
to plot the conservation of cash outlays without dilution of 
services. 12
A survey of program participants conducted in 1977 found 
that sufficient money savings were frequently achieved for 
payment of the cost-of-living allowances. 13 It was felt, 
however, that the incentive effect would be of short duration 
and that commitment would flag as a sense of crisis 
diminished. Union officials voiced the expected criticisms 
that the program infringed on collective bargaining, paid in 
sufficient attention to improvement of employee morale as a 
route to productivity gain, and was shaped primarily by 
management.
At each of 16 major public hospitals included in a city ad 
ministration employing a total of about 35,000 workers, a
Public Sector Collaboration 207
labor-management committee proposed revenue-yielding 
projects to meet COLA goals. 14 Among the successful in 
itiatives requiring no increases in personnel were the installa 
tion of more rigorous systems for collection of fees for out 
patient services, major expansion of auxiliary pharmacy 
business, and the more economical use of medical supplies. 
A top level labor-management committee provided informa 
tion and technical assistance to individual hospitals in addi 
tion to setting common policy and acting as coordinator.
The contracts negotiated in 1978 between the city and 
municipal unions cut the link of COLA and productivity, 
but the committee structure was retained. Attention shifted 
to matters like training and absenteeism, which, of course, 
also bear on productivity.
Despite the city's financial straits and the invocation of 
cooperative arrangements, the adversarial spirit has remain 
ed very much alive. A fresh example is provided by the com 
ments made on a cost-of-living award to some 35,000 transit 
workers in October 1981; the award was based on a program 
designed to yield $16.9 million in savings. 15 The mayor opin 
ed that the decision of the three-man productivity panel to 
approve the payment was a "sham." The head of the Transit 
Authority, who was one of the three panel members, also 
had grave misgivings even though he cited savings in car 
cleaning, consolidation of operations in one of the shops, 
and a substitution of trucks for trains in picking up fares col 
lected at train stations. The productivity panel concept, he 
stated, was "flawed." Credits, he felt, were being given 
where no tangible saving occurred and where workers carried 
only the workload expected under approved job 
assignments. The union head, also a panel member, was 
satisfied with the decision, claiming that it justified the con 
tention that the workers had "earned and paid for" the full 
COLA. Savings were cited in the use of energy and in car 
maintenance. The neutral member considered the decision
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"fair" in the light of contract provisions and the facts on 
cost-savings and productivity disclosed in a review lasting 
"several weeks."
Quality Circles
From defense contractors in the aerospace industry, quali 
ty circles quickly spread to the contracting agencies 
themselves. A survey made in 1980 by the Office of Person 
nel Management found them in existence at regional or field 
installations of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Federal 
Aviation Agency. 16 As in industrial practice, the circles com 
prise small voluntary groups of about eight employees, led 
by supervisors, who meet weekly. All group members receive 
formal training in problem solving. Reported ac 
complishments usually feature reductions in rework, error 
rates, fuel consumption, and other specific sources of cost.
At the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, which has 12,000 
employees, 36 circles are expected to be in operation in 1982. 
In the initial year, the program included only nine. Although 
the program was developed entirely by shipyard manage 
ment, union representatives sit on the committee that directs 
it.
Worker Satisfaction and Well-Being
Labor-management arrangements that are directed toward 
worker concerns and needs are at least as necessary in the 
public sector as in the private. First, as already mentioned 
earlier in this book, such arrangements may have favorable 
spillover effects on productivity. The activity of government 
is typically labor-intensive, making heavy use of services to 
create and deliver other services, so worker morale and 
motivation have an important bearing on output quantity 
and quality. Furthermore, the products are usually not sold, 
so feedback from the marketplace is minimal. The products
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also often are intangible, preventive, or contingent, so it is 
easy for a government worker to lose a vivid sense of the 
realities of the competitive external environment of the 
customer. Finally, since pay is regular and the job relatively 
secure, the daily discontents and frictions of the internal 
workplace acquire great psychological moment.
Before such irritations can manifest themselves in indif 
ferent service or disruptive "job actions," they may be 
detected for joint address by means of attitude and opinion 
surveys. One study, for example, completed for the National 
Center for Quality and Working Life in 1978, cited public 
worker doubts about the competence of management and 
discontent with lack of recognition for good perfor 
mance while managers appeared satisfied. 17 Another exam 
ple, a survey made by University of Michigan researchers for 
the U.S. Department of Labor and reported in 1980, found 
Michigan teachers more unhappy than American workers in 
general over various aspects of their jobs. The researchers 
concluded that "school effectiveness may be enhanced if in 
creased resources are used to establish appropriate problem 
solving structures (e.g., strong channels for vertical com 
munication) and those channels are actively used by school 
personnel to solve problems (e.g., instructional methods)." 18
Quality of Working Life
Two experiments conducted in municipalities in the 1970s, 
in which consultants to the Quality of Worklife Program at 
Ohio State University's Center for Human Resource 
Research assisted, illustrate the collaboration of unions and 
management to upgrade work, the workplace, and the 
worker with benefit to performance.
Springfield Project. In 1974, the district director of the 
union (AFSCME) representing municipal employees pro 
posed a project to defuse tense labor-management relations 
in Springfield, a city of 80,000 people. 19 The union saw an
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opportunity to improve the public perception of organized 
government employees, while the city manager saw an op 
portunity to provide better service. A written agreement, 
ratified by 470 union members, established guiding prin 
ciples: twin goals of improving the work environment and 
delivered services; avoidance of issues belonging to the do 
mains of collective bargaining and grievance handling; 
setaside of contract provisions for the duration of the project 
only if both parties agree; and avoidance of layoffs or 
downgrading as a result of the project.
A central committee, half top management and half union 
leaders, moved to involve rank-and-file workers in five 
departmental mini-committees. These mini-committees, in 
turn, coordinated work groups at the worksites. Under the 
supervision of a foreman, each work group met weekly, over 
a month, to identify problems of common concern and to 
make recommendations. Over 300 people took part in this 
self-examination. The work groups fed back their reports to 
the mini-committees, which analyzed the data and presented 
the results with recommendations to employees in their 
departments.
The system permitted more open communication and in 
formation exchange throughout the city government and 
gave workers a chance to advise on the purchase of equip 
ment used in their jobs. It also permitted work restructuring, 
with more responsibility and autonomy for teams and con 
comitant increase in productivity, reduction of overtime, 
and shortening of the actual workday. It allowed enlarge 
ment of the jobs of motor equipment operators to include 
training in welding for in-house repair work instead of con 
tracting out.
Columbus Project. The Springfield venture led the 
regional director of the government workers' union 
(AFSCME) and the Ohio State University consultants to 
propose a similar project to the mayor of the much larger
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neighboring city of Columbus. The mayor readily assented, 
and a two-year agreement was signed (see documentary ap 
pendix). Necessary funds were supplied by the city, the 
union, and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. 20
Both sides pledged to keep adversarial issues outside the 
project. Management guaranteed that no reduction of jobs 
or pay would be sought, that time for meetings would be 
compensated, and that needed training would be provided. 
Furthermore, it agreed to work with the union to develop a 
plan for sharing with employees any productivity gains 
achieved through the project. The union pledged to make 
every effort "to resolve any grievances filed in contract items 
set aside for trial periods outside the formal grievance pro 
cedure."
The same structure was adopted as in Springfield a top 
level committee, mini-committees, and unitary work groups. 
Again, communication was greatly facilitated, and problem 
solving at the group level was encouraged. It was recognized 
that broad participation in decisionmaking conduces to 
broad acceptance of the emerging decisions.
Many different aspects of worklife quality were addressed 
during the first two years of the Columbus program. Among 
these were: improvement of employee lunchrooms, pro 
cedures for equalization of overtime (as required by the col 
lective bargaining contract), design of a system for 
evaluating performance, and experimentation with flexible 
work scheduling for maintenance personnel. More impor 
tant than the concrete results was the demonstration by the 
Columbus and Springfield projects that cooperation could 
create an atmosphere and the instrumentality for in 
vestigating alternative modes of organizing work in public 
services with advantage to both employee satisfaction and 
productivity.
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Skill Improvement
Both parties have long recognized that skill improvement 
through training of employees could be a win-win game. In a 
number of cities with strong unions and sophisticated 
management, innovative training programs have been jointly 
planned and organized. These efforts, however, do not ap 
pear to have been as widely imitated as they presumably 
deserve to be.
An early venture was one sponsored in 1968 by the district 
council of a union of local government employees and New 
York City officials for upgrading workers in municipal 
hospitals. 21 This joint undertaking, which depended heavily 
on federal funds, provided in-service training for low-rank 
employees, enabling some to move into licensed occupations 
without interruption of their employment or jeopardy to 
their seniority and other rights. It dramatized the possibility 
of career development for the disadvantaged in public in 
stitutions.
A more recent example is the joint program set up in Troy, 
Michigan by the Department of Public Works and Parks and 
the AFSCME local. 22 The proposal originated with manage 
ment; it started with a general idea about productivity im 
provement, but, in the discussion that ensued, training in 
health and safety came to the fore as a matter for primary 
emphasis. A survey of employees convinced the joint Job 
Enrichment and Productivity Committee to accord priority 
to training in first aid, the operation of equipment, and 
supervision. Further development of this training initiative 
followed a detailed work analysis of each job by the person 
nel department and a review of employee recommendations 
for improvement. The union withdrew from co-sponsorship 
for lack of direct benefit, but it continued to participate with 
the Department in furtherance of membership training.
Public Sector Collaboration 213
Flexible Work Schedules
By 1980, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a 
fifth of the employees in public administration were eligible 
for some type of flexible work scheduling. Impetus to the 
spread of novel arrangements that allow for worker conve 
nience without impeding organizational operations was 
given by passage of the Federal Employees Flexible and 
Compressed Work Schedules Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-390). This 
law authorized a three-year period of controlled experimen 
tation for federal civilian employees to determine the advan 
tages and disadvantages of various alternatives to traditional 
uniform work schedules. This experimentation was accom 
modated by temporary modification of certain premium 
pay, overtime pay, and scheduling provisions of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.
About 1,500 experiments, involving about 325,000 
workers, were under way in federal agencies throughout the 
country by 1982. The most popular plans allowed maximum 
carryover of hours from one pay period to the next; a shorter 
workweek with longer hours per day (4 days, 10 hours per 
day); and alternation of the standard and shorter 
workweeks.
Although union headquarters have looked askance at flex 
ible work schedules (as potential threats to hard-won stan 
dards respecting premium pay and as arrangements that 
ought to be accommodated within the existing legal 
framework), local unions at federal agencies have been less 
circumspect. They have participated with management in 
selecting plans and sites for experimentation. In the U.S. 
Department of Labor, at least one labor-management task 
group has met regularly to monitor the program's effect on 
productivity and to work out answers to technical questions 
raised by employees.
In 1981, the Office of Personnel Management found 
widespread approval of flexitime among employees and
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supervisors after three years of experience, but continuation 
of the program was not assured. A view strongly held in the 
new federal administration is that flexitime should be limited 
to cases in which clear benefits in productivity or service to 
the public would result.
Health and Safety
Since the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not 
cover public employees, their protection on the job and 
against alcoholic disablement has been an important topic of 
labor-management cooperation. Two urban examples are 
briefly considered below.
In the District of Columbia, joint committees exist in at 
least two departments of the local government under the um 
brella of collective bargaining. 23 A comprehensive and conti 
nuing joint program seeks to eliminate dangerous equip 
ment, to improve safety in the workplace, and to promote 
safety consciousness in the repair shop of the Service Depart 
ment. Significant reductions of accidents and injuries have 
been reported as well as gains in productivity. The union and 
management also cooperate in dealing with tardiness, 
absenteeism, and morale, with the union taking major 
responsibility for helping problem workers. In another D.C. 
department, concerned with water supply, the union and 
management have cooperated in counseling and rehabilita 
tion programs for workers afflicted with alcoholism. This 
condition, described as a major deterrent to productivity, 
has affected about 15 percent of the workforce. In the same 
department, a joint safety committee is said to have been 
noticeably successful in accident prevention.
In the city of Memphis, labor-management committees 
were set up in 1971 to combat health and safety hazards in 
the sanitation, public works, and public service departments, 
employing about 2,600 workers. 24 Since high accident rates 
were ascribed mainly to poor maintenance of equipment, 
joint committees promoted the timely reporting of malfunc-
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dons, stricter inspection of city vehicles, rigorous investiga 
tion of accidents, and installation of safety devices. In the 
opinion of both parties, the committees have had construc 
tive influence.
Employment Security
The fiscal travail of the 1970s exposed the vulnerability of 
"secure" jobs in the state and local "civil service." The 
1980s will apparently underscore the same insecurity in 
federal employment. Bargaining contracts in the public sec 
tor have seldom provided for severance pay; and, in a period 
of government retrenchment, the general public and elected 
politicians are much more inclined to seek the retention of 
customary services than the jobs of the "bureaucrats" per 
forming them. Accordingly, some interest has developed in 
joint programs to anticipate and to alleviate the problems 
faced by public sector personnel when budgets are cut and 
work is extensively reorganized.
New York State Committee
As an example of the kind of cooperation entailed, we 
briefly consider the program established by the State of New 
York and the Civil Service Employees Association in 1976. 25 
A key role in this program was given to a joint committee for 
"continuity of employment." This committee included five 
management representatives, five union representatives, and 
a neutral academic chairman (assisted by a staff of two). Its 
work was regarded as adjunct to, and parallel with, the col 
lective bargaining process. The committee's charter was set 
forth in the bargaining agreement, as in the case of the Ar 
mour automation committee described in chapter 5. Its 
assignment was to:
a) Study worker displacement problems arising from 
economy RIFs, programmatic reductions and cur-
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tailments, closedowns, relocations, consolidations, 
technological changes, and contracting out; and
b) Make recommendations for the solution of these 
problems, including but not limited to the use of nor 
mal and induced attrition (e.g., early retirements), 
sharing of available state job opportunities (e.g., 
transfers) indemnification (e.g., severance pay), and 
transition to work in the labor market beyond state 
employment (e.g., retraining).
In its first three years, the committee studied the status and 
adjustments of 10,000 workers already laid off, proposed 
remedial actions, made policy recommendations on job 
security, and conducted several demonstration projects on 
avoidance of layoff by workforce planning and reassign 
ment.
The committee's efforts to help laid off workers were only 
"minimally effective." Of the 10,000 in the original cohort, 
1,200 remained unemployed or were underutilized. A center 
was accordingly set up, at state expense, to assist through 
counseling, referral retraining, and outplacement in the 
private sector. The target group, however, was not generally 
receptive; it consisted largely of older workers, and only 
about 10 percent clearly benefited.
The committee was more successful in devising an alter 
native to the state's layoff policy. It proposed workforce 
reduction through attrition and the offer of retraining for 
other jobs in the same area at comparable grades. These con 
cepts were subsequently applied to state efforts to de- 
institutionalize mental health care.
In 1979, New York State and the Civil Service Employees 
Association agreed to extend the scope of cooperation 
beyond continuity of employment. A Committee on the 
Work Environment and Productivity was established with 
nine members, representing labor, management, and the 
general public. The enlarged responsibilities included study
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and recommendations concerning performance evaluation, 
productivity, and quality of working life. A major goal set 
for 1979-1982 was "enhancing the lives of employees at the 
workplace and improving productivity through cooperative 
labor-management committees." 26 A sum of $2 million was 
appropriated for demonstration projects, employee surveys, 
etc.
Pensions
Provision for retirement income now exists for public 
employees at all levels of government. The contributory 
federal program for civil servants was enacted in 1920. 
(Federal pension and related benefits for war veterans trace 
back to 1792.) The first city pension plan, set up in New 
York in 1857, was confined to policemen. New York City 
was also the site of the first mutual aid program for teachers, 
established in 1869; employer contributions did not begin 
until 1898. Among the states, Massachusetts led the way in 
setting up a pension program for all its employees (1911). 
With the growth of the merit system, the scope and number 
of public plans has increased steadily during the present cen 
tury. 27
The expansion of public pension plans in the past two 
decades has been enormous, especially at the state and local 
levels. Public employee unions have been active in seeking 
pension gains as part of total compensation. By 1975, 6,698 
public plans were in force, including 68 at the federal level; 
and over 90 percent of public employees were covered (10.4 
million full-time and part-time state and local employees and 
5 million others on federal civilian and military payrolls). 28 
Union officials are included in retirement boards that ad 
minister state and local plans; they participate in investment 
decisions.
Fiscal difficulties at all levels of government have invited 
closer scrutiny of pension benefits, financing, and ad-
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ministration. Unions have negotiated with administrators 
and legislators on proposed changes intended to reduce 
costs. Studies of the management of state and local pension 
funds assets amounting to more than $46 billion in 
1976 have revealed widespread inadequacies tending to 
reduce investment income and accordingly to increase the 
burden on taxpayers. 29
In the mid-1970s, when New York City could no longer 
sell its bonds on the open market or refinance existing debt 
without guarantees from the state and federal governments, 
municipal unions approved the use of employee pension 
fund money for purchase of large amounts of the city's notes 
and bonds. According to a leading industrial relations 
scholar, "this made the unions de facto partners in the 
management of the city." He also noted, however, that 
"there is little evidence that unions in New York City have 
abandoned, or even diluted, in a significant way their ag 
gressiveness and intensity of effort in collective 
bargaining." 30
Tennessee Valley Authority
To developing nations, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) has, for almost half a century, served as a model of 
integrated planning for the economic and social development 
of a "backward" region. In the United States, attitudes 
toward this gem of the New Deal has been ambivalent and 
inconstant except, perhaps with regard to its brilliant 
record of labor-management cooperation over several 
decades. This record commands our attention not only 
because of the durability of the collaboration but also 
because of the size of the organization (more than 40,000 
employees), the number of unions and states involved, and 
the extensive tie-ins with the private sector. Very recently, in 
1981, the historic harmony appeared ready to end in bitter 
discord; and this development, too, is reason for taking 
special notice of the TVA phenomenon.
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Committee System
The design for cooperation at TVA proceeded from a vi 
sionary idealization of economic democracy, but it also took 
account of a worldly precedent: the B&O plan discussed in 
an earlier chapter. A guiding premise was that collective 
bargaining and cooperation are not only compatible but also 
essential to effective operation. 31 Article X of the contract 
negotiated between TVA and the Trades and Labor Council 
of 16 craft unions in 1940 called for a two-tier committee 
structure:
1. TVA and the Council, having recognized that 
cooperation between management and employees is 
indispensable to the accomplishment of the purposes 
for which TVA has been established, maintain and 
support a Central Joint Cooperative Committee and 
local joint cooperative committees as an effective 
means by which to foster such cooperation.
2. These cooperative committees give consideration to 
such matters as the elimination of waste; the conser 
vation of materials, supplies, and energy; the im 
provement of quality of workmanship and services; 
the promotion of education and training; the correc 
tion of conditions making for misunderstandings; the 
encouragement of courtesy in the relations of 
employees with the public; the safeguarding of 
health; the prevention of hazards to life and property; 
and the strengthening of the morale of the service. 
The committees shall, however, not consider and act 
upon subjects or disputes the adjustment of which is 
provided for by Articles VI, VII, and VIII of this 
agreement (jurisdiction, grievances, wages).
Later, similar provision was made in the agreement with 
unions representing white-collar workers (e.g., the TVA 
Engineering Association and the Office and Professional 
Employees International Union). Additional information on
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the committee system is given in the last entry of the 
documentary appendix.
In 1980, the Central Policy Committee oversaw 119 en 
tities 64 "conferences" including white-collar workers, 15 
"committees" including workers in the 16 building trades, 
and 40 "groups" including both blue-collar and white-collar 
workers. Each of these entities has 15-30 members (both 
labor and management), and each member represents 8-15 
employees. Meeting monthly, each committee or conference 
deals with proposed solutions to problems of morale, pro 
ductivity, quality, housekeeping, etc. that cannot be settled 
by the bargaining process.
The committees and conferences solicit suggestions for im 
provement (from managers as well as hourly workers!). 
Many of the suggestions are offered by groups of employees. 
Approved suggestions do not earn cash awards; instead, they 
are given wide publicity. Most of the suggestions relate to 
work methods, quality of service, and waste; others relate to 
safety, health, training, morale, and the work 
environment. 32
Relation to Collective Bargaining
In principle, the committees and conferences are required 
to steer clear of matters subject to formal contract negotia 
tion, like pay, and grievances for which machinery already 
exists. In practice, however, these extra-normal entities have 
naturally engaged in discussions of issues that eventually are 
decided in contract negotiations. In 1975, the contracts were 
amended to allow recommendations on negotiable matters.
Negotiations concerning wages and fringe benefits, while 
conducted separately from committee-conference delibera 
tions, are not intensely adversarial as a rule. TVA employees 
are supposed to be paid according to area prevailing pay 
rates. Surveys of these scales are conducted jointly a pro 
cedure that has normally reduced, even if it does not
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eliminate, the acrimony so common in conventional bargain 
ing.
A Quality of Worklife Venture
In 1974, a joint experiment was begun to expand the scope 
of, and to create more interest in, the cooperative con 
ferences of white-collar employees. 33 The Chattanooga of 
fice of the Division of Transmission and Engineering was 
selected as the site; it employed 300 persons, including 
engineers, draftsmen, supervisors, and office workers. The 
aim of the project was to determine organizational changes 
that would create a more satisfying work environment and 
conduce to higher productivity.
With the assistance of independent consultants, the com 
mittee in charge conducted interviews, made surveys, and 
held meetings and workshops to encourage interest in pro 
jects that could lead to greater employee influence over daily 
work. As might be expected, first-line supervisors at first 
resisted, fearing transfer of decisionmaking authority on 
technical matters to their staffs. Some projects were 
stimulated on work restructuring, flexible scheduling, 
recognition of merit in pay, and performance evaluation. An 
important result of the venture was to enlarge the scope of 
cooperative conferences in all TVA divisions.
In addition to the committee-conference system, there are 
programs for joint address of special topics of mutual in 
terest. Thus, joint training committees develop and ad 
minister courses for operators and apprentices. A joint 
health insurance committee monitors the medical insurance 
plan. A joint committee exchanges ideas on job classifica 
tion.
The New Disharmony
While officials of TVA and the many unions involved 
have consistently and strongly supported the committee-
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conference system, the era of good feeling may have come to 
an end in 1981. In September, the TVA Board and five 
white-collar unions, representing 17,500 employees, sharply 
disagreed over new contract terms affecting pay and promo 
tion. Pro-strike sentiment was tempered by fresh memory of 
the fate of federal air traffic controllers, who were summari 
ly dismissed after their August walkout. 34 A settlement was 
finally reached, but the unions decided to cancel their par 
ticipation in the voluntary program of cooperative con 
ferences begun in 1947. For the time being, the blue-collar 
workers continued to support their cooperative committees.
The unusual bitterness of the dispute reflected a major 
shift in labor-management styles over the past few years-. In 
flation and budgetary constraints have motivated greater 
management stress on productivity and cost-cutting. Unions 
appear to have become less inclined to cooperate in these 
regards and more inclined to concentrate on "maintaining 
gains won during the past through the only effective 
mechanism available collective bargaining." 35
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This brief chapter comments on the near term outlook for 
labor-management cooperation in the light of past 
developments and current signs. Accordingly, it leans heavi 
ly on the content of earlier chapters. On the whole, it sug 
gests a considerable quickening of the tempo, and extension 
of the range, of collaborative activity at the industry, enter 
prise, and community levels.
We should recall first what amounts to a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for the quickening and extension 
just mentioned: the American style of industrial relations has 
already proved hospitable to pragmatic, even creative, prob- 
ings for collaborative opportunity. The preceding chapters 
(and the documentary appendix) amply attest to the trial and 
practice of many varieties of joint activity that have counter 
parts in West Europe and Japan. They also should alert the 
reader to the possibility of underestimating the actual level 
of labor-management cooperation in the United 
States because of the prevalence, open-endedness, and 
adaptability of decentralized collective bargaining.
The American style of industrial relations promises to 
become still more hospitable to collaboration in the near 
future as: (1) its usual adversarial thrust is restrained (not
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abandoned) and (2) the federal government abdicates or at 
tenuates various roles it had assumed in the past few decades 
as a third party representing the perceived "public interest." 
The moderation of the adversarial spirit (which animates the 
"normal" competition and conflict of labor and manage 
ment in the United States) and the federal retreat will leave 
greater scope for the co-existing voluntaristic impulse to 
joint endeavor.
Future reinforcement of the voluntary disposition to 
cooperate is suggested by a number of pervasive cir 
cumstances. Among these are:
1. A proneness to (a) intolerable rates of price inflation 
and (b) wage increases far in excess of productivity gains.
2. Slow, uncertain, and uneven economic growth in a set 
ting of very high interest rates and huge defense demands.
3. Intense foreign competition for markets in the United 
States as well as markets abroad.
4. Aging of the labor force, which will (for this and other 
reasons) become more security-oriented.
5. Attrition of the economic base of once-prosperous 
areas and regions of the country.
6. More determined automatization and robotization of 
production, threatening various conventional skills and ex 
isting jobs.
7. Budgetary stringency at the state and local levels, 
diminishing the bargaining power of public service unions.
Efforts to reduce drastically the federal presence in 
"regulation" and in social welfare arrangements may be ex 
pected to encourage labor and management to (1) minimize 
disturbance to existing equilibria and to (2) expand the cur 
rent range of topics for negotiation and cooperation. 
Presumably, the two parties will wish to limit the new uncer 
tainties surrounding the devolution of federal responsibilities 
to lower jurisdictions and nongovernmental bodies. They
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will also have to fill gaps left by the weakening of federal 
commitment to worker health and safety, pollution control, 
training, and so forth. Incidentally, the shifting of burdens 
from the federal government to local jurisdictions will con 
tribute to the budgetary stringency cited in the preceding 
paragraph.
The seven pervasive circumstances listed above may be ex 
pected to promote collaboration along these lines:
1. The sharing of financial and cost information with 
unions by companies in dire straits (a conditional "opening 
of the books").
2. The placement of labor leaders on more company 
boards of directors. 1
3. Retention, insofar as practicable, of otherwise laid off 
workers for training in problem solving techniques and in oc 
cupations needed for future productive activities. 2
4. Promotion of company, industry, and area products 
and lobbying for import limitations.
5. Borrowing from pension funds to help ailing local 
governments.
6. Company assistance to employees in the acquisition of 
relinquished facilities (e.g., through stock ownership plans) 
and also in the operation of them for short initial periods 
(e.g., through supply or sales contracts).
7. Grudging acquiescence of unions in wage concessions, 
work-rule changes, etc., intended to cut costs and save 
jobs in return for future profit sharing. 3
8. Increased agreeableness of unions, as they become less 
able to win substantial gains in wages and fringe benefits, to 
cater to the interests of younger and better educated workers 
in QWL, participative, and problem solving programs.
9. Greater readiness of unions and employers to enter, 
under appropriate conditions, into joint programs for rais 
ing productivity, improving product quality, and safeguard 
ing health and safety.
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10. Greater willingness of national labor leaders to par 
ticipate in a credible price-wage stabilization program in the 
event of a federal reversal of proclaimed policy.
Despite the anticipated quickening of the tempo of col 
laboration and the anticipated extension of the range, dif 
ficulty will continue to be experienced at the enterprise, in 
dustry, and community levels in starting up, maintaining, or 
expanding specific joint programs. Enthusiasm of the two 
parties for cooperation is far more relevant than the en 
thusiasm of academic observers and media commentators. 4 
It is easier to assert the basic requirement of mutual trust 
than to show the two parties how to revise their attitudes 
fundamentally. Where mutual trust has already led to 
cooperation, a recession can wreck a successful 
program e.g., by forcing the layoff of workers in quality 
circles or other problem solving programs whose jobs were 
supposed to be protected. 5 This cautionary paragraph could 
be extended to point to other problems, such as the uncer 
tainty of getting sustained top-level leadership and commit 
ment. External economic pressures and federal retreat, 
however, will improve the probability of attitudes and 
behavior favorable to meaningful cooperation.
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with Ford and GM that could greatly assist revival of the American automobile industry. 
The agreement negotiated with Ford and approved by union members in February 1982 is 
included in the documentary appendix.
4. Ivar Berg, Marcia Freedman, and Michael Freeman, Management and Work Reform: A 
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For easy reference, the 25 selected documents that follow are 
arranged in five sections: the national scene (I), the industry 
level (II), the community level (III), the company level (IV), 
and the public sector (V). Some items appearing in one sec 
tion, however, could reasonably have been classified in 
another as the next paragraph makes clear.
Two categories of documents are distinguished in the first 
section. One category (illustrated by three items marked with 
the prefix IA) refers to cooperative entities established under 
public or private auspices to deal with broad policy issues of 
national import. The documents in the second category (ten 
designated by the prefix IB) emanate from a national 
body public (e.g., the Congress) or private (e.g., a national 
association or nonprofit foundation) but really focus on 
coopeation at the level of the company or a plant. Accord 
ingly, a reader interested in the documents grouped in IV 
may also wish to consult those in IB.
Contents of Documentary Appendix
I. The National Scene
IA:1 A Presidential Advisory Committee (1981)
IA:2 A Private Policy Group (1981)
IA:3 An Earlier Presidential Committee (1961)
IB:1 National Productivity and Quality of Working Life Act
of 1975 
IB:2 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Amendments of 1978
IB:3 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 
IB:4 A Joint Economic Committee Report
235
236
IB:5 A Policy Statement of the National Commission on
Productivity and Work Quality 
IB:6 Guidance for Company Committees National Center
for Productivity and Quality of Working Life 
IB:7 Sample of Committee Bylaws Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service 
IB:8 Sample of Committee Contract Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service
IB:9 A Policy Recommendation on Alcoholism 
IB: 10 A Policy Statement of a Committee to Fight Inflation
II. Industry Level
11:1 Letter of Cochairmen of Steel Tripartite Advisory
Committee
11:2 Outline of Agreement on Retail Food Committee 
11:3 Memorandum of Understanding on St. Louis
Construction 
11:4 Agreement on a California Nuclear Project
III. Community Level
111:1 Report on Jamestown (N.Y.) Committee
IV. Company Level
IV: 1 GM-UAW Letter of Agreement on Quality of Worklife
Program 
IV:2 United States Steel-United Steelworkers Agreement
on Participation Teams 
IV:3 AT&T-CWA Agreement of 1980 
IV:4 AT&T-CWA Statement of Principles on Worklife
Quality 
IV:5 Mountain Bell-CWA Letter of Understanding
on Flexitime
IV:6 Scanlon-Plan Agreement at Midland-Ross 
IV:7 UAW-Ford Agreement, February 1982
V. Public Sector
V: 1 Bylaws of Committee of New York State and Civil
Service Employees Association 
V:2 Columbus-AFSCME Agreement on Quality of
Worklife Committee 
V:3 TVA-Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council





Establishing the National Productivity 
Advisory Committee (1981)
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the 
United States of America, and in order to establish in accordance with 
the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 
U.S.C. App. I), an advisory committee on strategies for increasing na 
tional productivity in the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Establishment, (a) There is established the National Produc 
tivity Advisory Committee. The Committee shall be composed of 
distinguished citizens appointed by the President, only one of whom may 
be a full-time officer or employee of the Federal Government.
(b) The President shall designate a Chairman from among the 
members of the Committee.
Section 2. Functions, (a) The Committee shall advise the President and 
the Secretary of the Treasury through the Cabinet Council on Economic 
Affairs on the Federal Government's role in achieving higher levels of 
national productivity and economic growth.
(b) The Committee shall advise the President, the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief with 
respect to the potential impact on national productivity of Federal laws 
and regulations.
(c) The Committee shall advise and work closely with the Cabinet 
Council on Economic Affairs (composed of the Secretaries of the 
Treasury, State, Commerce, Labor, and Transportation, the United 
States Trade Representative, the Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget), 
the Assistant to the President for Policy Development, and other govern 
mental offices the President may deem appropriate.
(d) In the performance of its advisory duties, the Committee shall con 
duct a continuing review and assessment of national productivity and 
shall advise the Secretary of the Treasury and the Cabinet Council on 
Economic Affairs.
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Section 3. Administration, (a) The heads of Executive agencies shall, 
to the extent permitted by law, provide the Committee such information 
with respect to productivity as it may require for the purpose of carrying 
out its functions.
(b) Members of the Committee shall serve without compensation for 
their work on the Committee. However, members of the Committee who 
are not full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government shall 
be entitled to travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as 
authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in government ser 
vice (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
(c) Any administrative support or other expenses of the Committee 
shall be paid, to the extent permitted by law, from funds available for the 
expenses of the Department of the Treasury.
(d) The Executive Secretary of the Cabinet Council on Economic Af 
fairs shall serve as the Executive Secretary to the National Productivity 
Advisory Committee.
Section 4. General, (a) Notwithstanding any other Executive Order, 
the responsibilities of the President under the Federal Advisory Commit 
tee Act, as amended, except that of reporting annually to the Congress, 
which are applicable to the advisory committee established by this Order, 
shall be performed by the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with 
guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General 
Services.
(b) The Committee shall terminate on December 31, 1982, unless 
sooner extended.
RONALD REAGAN




New Labor-Management Group Formed (1981)
a) Press Release
WASHINGTON, D.C., March 4 The formation of a newly con 
stituted Labor-Management Group was announced today at a press con 
ference here. The new group represents an attempt by both business and 
labor to maintain a continuing dialog.
John T. Dunlop, Harvard Lamont University professor and former 
Secretary of Labor, is coordinator of the group. Lane Kirkland, presi 
dent of the AFL-CIO, is chairman of the labor group and Clifton C. 
Garvin, Jr., chairman of the Exxon Corporation, is chairman of the 
management group.
Both the labor and management members of the new group have 
agreed upon a Statement of Purpose which will guide the group's ac 
tivities. (Note: Statement attached to this press release.)
In addition to Mr. Kirkland, the labor leaders who have been involved 
are: Thomas R. Donahue, secretary/treasurer, AFL-CIO; John H. 
Lyons, president of the Iron Workers; Lloyd McBride, president of the 
United Steel Workers of America; Martin J. Ward, president of the 
United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & 
Pipe Fitters Industry of the U.S. & Canada, and William H. Wynn, 
president of the United Food and Commercial Workers. Additional 
labor members will be added.
In addition to Mr. Garvin, the business leaders who have been involv 
ed are: James H. Evans, chairman and CEO of the Union Pacific Cor 
poration; Philip M. Hawley, president and CEO of Carter, Hawley, 
Hale Stores, Inc.; Dr. Ruben F. Mettler, chairman of TRW, Inc.; Irving 
S. Shapiro, chairman of the board, E. I. duPont deNemours & Co.; 
George P. Shultz, president of the Bechtel Group, Inc.; Roger B. Smith, 
chairman and CEO, General Motors Corporation; John F. Welch, 
chairman-elect of the General Electric Company, and Walter B. 
Wriston, chairman of CitiCorp.
b) Statement of Purpose
The U.S. faces a period in its history when non-inflationary economic 
growth and full employment are essential to the maintenance of a free 
and healthy society.
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American labor and business see these as necessary mutual goals to pro 
vide our society with new and expanded job opportunities, increased liv 
ing standards, international competitiveness in an interdependent world 
and the capacity to meet social commitments.
With these objectives in mind, the Labor-Management Group will meet 
on a voluntary basis to search for solutions to a wide range of issues.
The principal focus of the Group's discussions will be in the area of 
economic policy in which its collective experience is widely based. In 
framing its discussions, the Group is mindful that it is but one of many 
groups whose opinions may be sought in shaping the nation's policies. 
The Group's recommendations must consider its obligations to the 
aspirations of all Americans, including the just demands for equity by 
minorities, women and those for whom social justice is still a dream.
The national interest requires a new spirit of mutual trust and coopera 
tion, even though management and organized labor are, and will remain, 
adversaries on many issues.
The uniqueness of America lies in the vitality of its free institutions. 
Among these, a free labor movement and a free enterprise economy are 
essential to the achievement of social and political stability and economic 
prosperity for all. It is destructive to society and to business and organiz 
ed labor, if in our legitimate adversarial roles, we question the right of 
our institutions to exist and perform their legitimate functions. In per 
forming these functions, we recognize that both parties must respect 
deeply held views even when they disagree.
One recognition of the legitimacy of our respective institutions is 
demonstrated in the process of free collective bargaining. We believe that 
both the democratic right of employees to determine the issue of 
representation and the process of collective bargaining must not be 
threatened by occasions of excessive behavior by employers or unions.
The Group will use the wider relationships its individual members have in 
the business and labor communities to broaden its knowledge of issues, 
to improve the overall labor-management climate and to communicate 
the results of its deliberations to its respective associates.
The complexity of issues suggests the Group may not find complete con 
sensus on all the issues it explores. When it does, it will communicate its 
views publicly. Otherwise, the participants reserve to themselves the 
privilege to address issues in their individual capacities.
The Group intends to look closely at the issues it knows best and how 
they are affected by public policy. These are the issues that grow out of 
our experiences in industries and localities. Further we intend to explore 
a wide range of issues with particular emphasis on revitalizing the
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nation's economic base, rebuilding the private and public infrastructure 
on which our productive capacity as a nation depends, and stimulating 




Executive Order No. 10918
Establishing The President's Advisory 
Committee on Labor-Management Policy
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United 
States, it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby established the President's Advisory Com 
mittee on Labor-Management Policy (hereinafter referred to as the Com 
mittee). The Committee shall be composed of the Secretary of Labor, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and nineteen other members who shall be 
designated by the President from time to time. Of the nineteen 
designated members, five shall be from the public at large, seven shall be 
from labor, and seven shall be from management. The Secretary of 
Labor and the Secretary of Commerce shall each alternatively serve as 
chairman of the Committee for periods of one year, the Secretary of 
Labor to so serve during the first year following the date of this order.
Section 2. The Committee shall study, and shall advise with and 
make recommendations to the President with respect to, policies that 
may be followed by labor, management, or the public which will pro 
mote free and responsible collective bargaining, industrial peace, sound 
wage and price policies, higher standards of living, and increased pro 
ductivity. The Committee shall include among the matters to be con 
sidered by it in connection with its studies and recommendations 
(1) policies designed to ensure that American products are competitive in 
world markets, and (2) the benefits and problems created by automation 
and other technological advances.
Section 3. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Commit 
tee and to furnish it such information and assistance, not inconsistent 
with law, as it may require in the performance of its duties.
Section 4. Consonant with law, the Department of Labor and the 
Department of Commerce shall, as may be necessary for the effectuation 
of the purposes of this order, furnish assistance to the Committee in ac 
cordance with section 214 of the act of May 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 134 
(31U.S.C. 691). Such assistance may include detailing employees to the 
Committee, one of whom may serve as executive officer of the Commit 
tee, to perform such functions, consistent with the purposes of this 
order, as the Committee may assign to them, and shall include the fur 
nishing of necessary office space and facilities to the Committee by the 
Department of Labor.
JOHN F. KENNEDY
THE WHITE HOUSE 
February 16, 1961
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Section 204 of the National Productivity 
and Quality of Working Life Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-136)
This section stated 15 "functions" of the new National Center for 
Productivity and Quality of Working Life that it established. Two of 
these functions are particularly relevant to this book, viz., to:
(6) encourage, support, and initiate efforts in the public or 
private sector specifically designed to improve cooperation 
between labor and management in the achievement of con 
tinued productivity growth: Provided, however, That no ac 
tivities of the Center involving consideration of issues includ 
ed in a specific labor-management agreement shall be under 
taken without the consent and cooperation of the parties to 
that agreement;
(12) encourage and coordinate the efforts of State and local 




Section 6 of Comprehensive Employment & Training Act 
Amendments of 1978 (CETA)
Assistance to Plant, Area, and Industrywide 
Labor Management Committees
Sec. 6 (a) This section may be cited as the "Labor Management 
Cooperation Act of 1978."
(b) It is the purpose of this section 
(1) to improve communication between representatives of labor 
and management;
(2) to provide workers and employers with opportunities to study 
and explore new and innovative joint approaches to achieving 
organizational effectiveness;
(3) to assist workers and employers in solving problems of mutual 
concern not susceptible to resolution within the collective bargain 
ing process;
(4) to study and explore ways of eliminating potential problems 
which reduce the competitiveness and inhibit the economic 
development of the plant, area or industry;
(5) to enhance the involvement of workers in making decisions that 
affect their working lives;
(6) to expand and improve working relationships between workers 
and managers; and
(7) to encourage free collective bargaining by establishing continu 
ing mechanisms for communication between employers and their 
employees through Federal assistance to the formation and opera 
tion of labor management committees.
(c) (1) Section 203 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(e) The Service is authorized and directed to encourage and 
support the establishment and operation of joint labor manage 
ment activities conducted by plant, area, and industrywide commit 
tees designed to improve labor management relationships, job 
security and organizational effectiveness, in accordance with the 
provisions of section 205A.".
(2) Title II of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, is amended 
by adding after section 205 the following new section:
"Sec. 205A. (a) (1) The Service is authorized and directed to provide 
assistance in the establishment and operation of plant, area and in 
dustrywide labor management committees which 
"(A) have been organized jointly by employers and labor organiza 
tions representing employees in that plant, area, or industry; and
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"(B) are established for the purpose of improving labor manage 
ment relationships, job security, organizational effectiveness, 
enhancing economic development or involving workers in decisions 
affecting their jobs including improving communication with 
respect to subjects of mutual interest and concern.
"(2) The Service is authorized and directed to enter into contracts and 
to make grants, where necessary or appropriate, to fulfill its respon 
sibilities under this section.
"(b) (1) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and 
no other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section 
to a plant labor management committee unless the employees in that 
plant are represented by a labor organization and there is in effect at that 
plant a collective bargaining agreement.
"(2) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and no 
other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section to 
an area or industrywide labor management committee unless its par 
ticipants include any labor organizations certified or recognized as the 
representative of the employees of an employer participating in such 
committee. Nothing in this clause shall prohibit participation in an area 
or industrywide committee by an employer whose employees are not 
represented by a labor organization.
"(3) No grant may be made under the provisions of this section to any 
labor management committee which the Service finds to have as one of 
its purposes the discouragement of the exercise of rights contained in sec 
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157), or the in 
terference with collective bargaining in any plant, or industry.
"(c) The Service shall carry out the provisions of this section through 
an office established for that purpose.
"(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provi 
sions of this section $10,000,000 for the fiscal year 1979, and such sums 
as may be necessary thereafter.".
(d) Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, is 
amended by striking the word "or" after the semicolon at the end of sub- 
paragraph (7) thereof and by inserting the following before the period at 
the end thereof:"; or (9) with respect to money or other things of value 
paid by an employer to a plant, area or industrywide labor management 
committee established for one or more of the purposes set forth in sec 
tion 5(b) of the Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978".
(e) Nothing in this section or the amendments made by this section 
shall affect the terms and conditions of any collective bargaining agree 
ment whether in effect prior to or entered into after the date of enact 
ment of this section.
REPEALER
Sec. 7. Section 104 of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment 
Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-567) is hereby repealed.
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IB:3
Excerpt from Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 
1978* (P.L. 95-523)
a. Section 109 amends Employment Act of 1946 by adding a new Sec 
tion 8, of which 8(c) (4) cites this "structural policy" to "reduce the rate 
of inflation":
(4) encouragement to labor and management to increase produc 
tivity within the national framework of full employment through 
voluntary arrangements in industries and economic sectors.
b. Section 111 adds a new Section 9 to the Employment Act of 1946 
that calls for "advisory boards" to the President, the Council of 
Economic Advisers, and federal agencies:
9(b) Such advisory board or boards shall include appropriate 
representation of labor, small and large businesses and industries, 
agriculture, commerce, State and local officials, and the public at 
large, and shall advise and consult with respect to matters related to 
this Act, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, 
and other appropriate matters related to national economic pro 
grams and policies.
*Also known as Humphrey-Hawkins Act.
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IB:4
Excerpt from The 1981 Midyear Report: Productivity, Report 
of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United 
States, July 23,1981
Recommendation No. 9: Encourage Labor and Management to 
Cooperate in Improving Long-Run Productivity and Competitiveness.
Cooperative activities by labor and management may significantly 
enhance government efforts to smooth adjustment problems and pro 
mote more effective uses of human resources. In hundreds of individual 
plants as well as several dozen industries and local communities, commit 
tees composed of worker and employer representatives have been formed 
to find acceptable solutions to issues of common concern.
At the plant level, for example, labor-management committees have 
arranged for training programs to meet changing skill requirements of 
employers and to alleviate labor bottlenecks. In other cases, labor and 
management have worked together to redesign production processes or 
deal with special workplace problems such as absenteeism. Community- 
wide committees have sought to encourage cooperative activities in local 
plants and create conditions that foster economic development. Labor- 
management committees in the retail food and steel industries have dealt 
with regulatory problems; in the railroad industry, cooperative projects 
have experimented with manpower and other changes to increase the ef 
ficiency of certain routes. While the scale, mix of activities, and success 
has varied from committee to committee, the initiatives have helped to 
improve productivity and strengthen labor-management relations in a 
variety of industrial settings.
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IB:5
Excerpt from A National Policy for Productivity, A Statement 
by the National Commission on Productivity and Work Quali 
ty, October 1975
Labor-Management Relations
The Commission believes that greater cooperation between labor and 
management offers significant and mainly untapped potential for in 
creasing productivity in all sectors of the economy. "Cooperation" in 
this context refers to an open exchange of ideas between labor and 
management, occurring outside the formal collective bargaining process 
and in a nonadversary environment. Improved cooperation requires, on 
management's part, a recognition that labor can contribute important 
know-how, imagination, and ingenuity in such areas as increasing out 
put, reducing waste, improving morale and job satisfaction, and reduc 
ing counterproductive behavior such as absenteeism or alcoholism. Of 
equal importance, a cooperative approach to productivity improvement 
requires an acceptance by labor of its responsibility for sharing in the ef 
fort to improve productivity.
Collective bargaining has proved to be an effective mechanism for 
resolving differences between labor and management; however, the 
Commission believes that opportunities also exist for labor and manage 
ment to identify and pursue common objectives outside the collective 
bargaining process, and that the pursuit of these objectives can serve 
their mutual interests without threatening the viability of collective 
bargaining.
The identification and promotion of areas of cooperation should 
prove equally useful in those sectors of the economy where employees are 
not represented by unions, and where no other formal mechanism exists 
for communication between management and employees on productivity 
issues.
In promoting the potential of expanded labor-management relations 
to achieve productivity improvement, the Commission feels that our na 
tional policy should place particular emphasis on the public sector. The 
public sector (Federal, State, and local government) now accounts for 
approximately one-fifth of the total national employed work force. 
However, many units of government lack administrators with adequate 
skills, training, and experience in labor relations. In addition, collective 
bargaining is often new and quite fragmented and many public service 
unions have less experience than their counterparts in the private sector. 
Therefore, the Commission believes that opportunities to improve labor- 
management procedures including grievance-settling methods and
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communications on productivity improvement issues and to expand the 
skill levels of those responsible for labor relations should be vigorously 
pursued.
In addition, the Commission believes that managers in almost every 
area of the economy can take more initiative and can contribute more to 
the process of productivity improvement. Accordingly, efforts to pro 
mote the value of increased productivity and to disseminate techniques 
for improving productivity should involve every employee. This is 
especially true in the public sector, where the need for administrators to 
take an active role in productivity improvement is not as widely 
understood as it might be.
Quality of Working Life
In its broadest sense, the concept of quality of working life embraces 
many of the areas covered elsewhere in this statement labor- 
management relations, job security, the quality of education and training 
provided to workers, and other factors associated with maintaining the 
capacity and motivation of the American work force. In this broad 
sense, the Commission believes that quality of working life is vital to our 
national productivity.
In addition, increased national attention has been focused recently on 
experiments designed to improve quality of working life in the more 
specific sense of the atmosphere in which work is conducted. The Com 
mission endorses these efforts and believes that they offer promise in 
providing an atmosphere conducive to productivity improvement. In the 
view of the Commission, further experimentation should place more em 
phasis on seeking a better understanding of the relationship between pro 
ductivity and the quality of a worker's environment and on learning 
more about which concepts of "quality of working life" seem most con 
ducive to stimulating productivity improvement.
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IB:6
Excerpt from Starting a Labor-Management Committee in 
Your Organization: Some Pointers for Action, National 
Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, 1978
Ten Summary Points for an Effective Labor-Management Committee
  Both parties share mutual interests in the long-term survival and 
success of the enterprise and the community, even though they may 
have conflicting goals in other matters.
  Both sides want to make the labor-management committee work 
and have realistic expectations of what it can accomplish. Par 
ticipation in regular sessions symbolizes this commitment, which is 
known throughout the organization.
  Labor members of the joint committee are believed and trusted by 
the rank and file; the management members have sufficient status 
and authority.
  Maximum voluntary participation is encouraged; employees, in 
cluding supervisors, are kept informed and involved in matters con 
sidered by the labor-management committee and have oppor 
tunities to express their views on its recommendations.
  The joint committees do not take up matters which infringe on the 
rights of either party as established under the collective bargaining 
agreement or the grievance procedure.
  Job security is recognized as basic to the program's success.
  The parties have a mature, open relationship. Each is willing to 
listen to the other side. Both agree to concentrate on finding 
answers to problems at hand and discovering opportunities for col 
laboration.
  The joint committees are promptly informed about the status of 
their recommendations. If they are not, the committees will lose in 
terest and stop operating.
  Numerous channels of communication are encouraged, and an at 
mosphere of mutual respect prevails. However, communications 
must be accompanied by substantive recommendations.
  New ideas are encouraged, and their value weighed objectively. 
Concrete problems of interest to both management and labor must 




Excerpt from Labor-Management Committee: Planning for 
Progress, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
1977 Sample Format of Committee Bylaws
Joint Labor-Management Committee 
Purpose
To investigate, study, and discuss possible solutions to mutual 
problems affecting labor-management relations.
Representation
Union
Five members: president, business agent, secretary-treasurer, 
and two stewards.
Company
Five members: Top management representatives, department 
head, two industrial relations representatives, and one other 
operating member from the departments working under the 
union contract.
The company's general manager and the international representative 
of the union are ex-officio members.
Substitutes may be chosen by mutual consent, but it is recognized that 
a continuity of membership is required. The operating members from 
management and the two representatives from the union, other than the 
president, business agent, and secretary-treasurer, will be rotated every 
12 months.
Chairmanship
Chairmanship shall alternate monthly between the union and manage 
ment. Each party will determine whether it will have a permanent chair 
man or rotating chairmen.
Reporting
Topics will be recorded as they are discussed. Any procedures or 
recommendations developing from these meetings will be communicated 
to the proper group; i.e., Operating Department, Joint Standing Com 
mittee, Negotiating Committee, etc.
Drafts of the minutes of meetings will be refined by one designated 
representative from each party.
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Date and Time of Meetings
Meetings shall be held once a month, and they shall be limited to two 
hours. An agenda shall be submitted 48 hours prior to the meetings to 
both parties. At the first meeting, a specific day and time shall be selected 
for future meetings. Every attempt shall be made to keep such a 
schedule, realizing that some flexibility is necessary.
Topics not on the agenda shall not be discussed but rather shall be 
placed on the following month's agenda. The agenda shall include a brief 
description of each item to be discussed. Emergency items may be added 
to the agenda by mutual consent.
Discussion of agenda topics will be alternated, with the party occupy 
ing the chair exercising the right to designate the first topic.
General Guides
1. It is recognized that recommendations growing out of these 
meetings are not binding.
2. No grievances shall be discussed and no bargaining shall take 
place.
3. Topics that could lead to grievances may be discussed.
4. Each person wishing to speak shall be recognized by the chair 
man before speaking.
5. The chairman shall recognize a motion from either party to table 
a topic for further study.
6. Either party may initiate a request to the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service for assistance.
7. Each topic shall be discussed fully and action reached before 
proceeding to another topic. Topics requiring further study may 
be tabled. Where mutually satisfactory decisions are not reach 
ed, the topic shall be cancelled, reverting to its proper place in 




Excerpt from Labor-Management Committee: Planning for 
Progress, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
1977 Sample Format of Contract Language
Sec. 2 Joint Study Committee
2.51 The Company and the Union, desiring to foster better day-to 
day communications, and to achieve and maintain a mutually 
beneficial relationship through the use of a continuing com 
munications program to effectively maintain stable labor- 
management relations and avoid controversies, do hereby 
establish these bylaws for a Joint Study Committee.
2.52 The purpose of the Committee is to discuss, explore and study 
problems referred to it by the parties to this Agreement. The 
Committee, by mutual agreement, shall be authorized to make 
recommendations on those problems that have been discussed, 
explored and studied.
2.53 In order to have a frank and open discussion, the Committee 
shall have no authority to change, delete or modify any of the 
terms of the existing Company-Union Agreement, nor to settle 
grievances arising under the Company-Union Agreement. Com 
mittee discussions shall not be publicized except for those 
recommendations that have been mutually agreed upon.
2.54 The Committee shall be composed of ten members, five 
representing the Union and five representing the Company. The 
Union Committee shall include the President of the Local 
Union, the International Representative or Business Agent and 
the three Chief Stewards. The Company Committee shall in 
clude the General Manager, Industrial Relations Manager, 
Manufacturing Manager and two other Management represen 
tatives appointed by the Company.
A representative of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service may be invited to attend and participate in Committee 
meetings.
2.55 The Chairmanship of the Committee shall alternate between a 
representative appointed by Management and a representative 
appointed by the Union. The representative appointed as Chair 
man shall serve a term commencing with the close of the meeting
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at which his appointment is announced and continue under the 
end of the next meeting.
Meetings shall be held on a day designated by the Chairman 
during the first full calendar week of the month. However, in 
terim meetings may be held if mutually agreed to by the Com 
mittee.
Meetings shall be conducted in the plant unless otherwise agreed 
to.
Meetings shall begin at a time agreed upon by the parties.
The Chairman shall cause an agenda to be prepared for the 
meeting and distributed to all members at least two working 
days prior to the meeting.
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IB:9
Model Joint Union-Management Statement of Policy on 
Alcoholism Recommended by the Labor-Management Com 
mittee of the National Council on Alcoholism
Joint Union-Management Statement of Policy
Judging by the combined experience of the most successful programs, 
the following principles should be considered for inclusion:
(1) Alcoholism is recognized as a disease for which there is effective 
treatment and rehabilitation.
(2) Alcoholism is defined as a disease in which a person's consump 
tion of any alcoholic beverage definitely and repeatedly in 
terferes with that individual's health and/or job performance.
(3) Persons who suspect that they may have an alcoholism problem, 
even in its early stages, are encouraged to seek diagnosis and to 
follow through with the treatment that may be prescribed by 
qualified professionals, in order to arrest the disease as early as 
possible.
(4) Any persons having this disease will receive the same careful 
consideration and offer of treatment that is presently extended, 
under existing benefit plans, to all those having any other 
disease.
(5) The same benefits and insurance coverages that are provided for 
all other diseases, under established benefit plans, will be 
available for individuals who accept medically approved treat 
ment for alcoholism.
(6) This policy is not concerned with social drinking, but rather with 
the disease of alcoholism. The concern is limited to those in 
stances of alcoholism which affect the job performance of the 
individual. The policy is designed solely to achieve restoration of 
health and full recovery.
(7) It will be the responsibility of all management and union person 
nel to implement this policy and to follow the procedures which 
have been designed to assure that no person with alcoholism will 
have either job security or promotional opportunities jeopardiz 
ed by a request for diagnosis and treatment.
(8) Neither supervisors nor union representatives have the medical 
qualifications to diagnose alcoholism as a disease. Therefore, 
referral for diagnosis and treatment will be based on job perfor-
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mance, within the terms, conditions and application of the 
union-management agreement.
(9) The decision to request diagnosis and accept treatment for 
alcoholism is the personal responsibility of the individual.
(10) An individual's refusal to accept referral for diagnosis or to 
follow prescribed treatment will be handled in accordance with 
existing contractual agreements and union-management 
understandings with respect to job performance.
(11) The confidential nature of the medical records of individuals 
with alcoholism will be strictly preserved.
(12) Persons participating in this program will be expected to meet 
existing job performance standards and established work rules 
within the framework of existing union-management 
agreements. Any exceptions to this requirement will be by 
mutual agreement between the union and management.
(13) Nothing in this statement of policy is to be interpreted as con 
stituting a waiver of management's responsibility to maintain 
discipline or the right to take disciplinary measures, within the 
framework of the collective bargaining agreement, in the case of 
misconduct that may result from alcoholism.
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IB:10
Excerpt from A Policy Statement Issued by a Bipartisan Com 
mittee to Fight Inflation* through American Enterprise In 
stitute for Public Policy Research, June 23,1980
We urge that other feasible means be adopted to increase the productivi 
ty of our economy. These should include larger private and public 
outlays for research and development; more carefully designed man 
power training programs; productivity councils in individual plants, 
shops, and offices in communities across the country, in which 
employees and employers can pool their ideas for improving the efficien 
cy with which their tasks are discharged; and other means of encouraging 
cooperative efforts of labor and management in furthering their com 
mon interest in greater efficiency.
*The Committee included 5 former Secretaries of the Treasury, 2 former Chairmen of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1 former Undersecretary of the 






Letter of Co-Chairmen Transmitting Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Com 
mittee, September 25,1980
Dear Mr. President:
In our capacity as joint chairmen of the Steel Tripartite Advisory 
Committee we herein summarize the findings and recommendations of 
the Committee and transmit its working papers for your review and con 
sideration.
The Steel Tripartite Advisory Committee was established on July 26, 
1978, in conjunction with the Administration's acceptance of the recom 
mendations of the Solomon Report. The purpose of the Committee is to 
serve as a mechanism to ensure a continuing cooperative approach to the 
problems and prospects of the American steel industry. Its current 
membership includes:
Government
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall 
Secretary of Commerce Philip M. Klutznick 
United States Trade Representative Reubin O'D. Askew 
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Douglas M. Costle 
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Economic Policy Curtis A. 
Hessler
United Steelworkers of America
President Lloyd McBride
Vice President Joseph Odorcich
Director Paul Lewis
Director Edgar L. Ball
Director Buddy W. Davis
Director Frank J. Valenta
Director Howard Strevel
Assistant to the President John Sheehan
Steel Industry
William J. DeLancey, Chairman, Republic Steel Corp.; Chairman, 
American Iron and Steel Institute
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Harry Holiday, Chief Executive Officer, Armco Steel Corp.
Edgar F. Kaiser, Jr., Chairman, Kaiser Steel Corp.
William H. Knoell, President, Cyclops Corp.
Robert B. Peabody, President, American Iron and Steel Institute
David M. Roderick, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corp.
George A. Stinson, Chairman, National Steel Corp.
Donald H. Trautlein, Chairman, Bethlehem Steel Corp.
Shortly after it was established, the Committee concluded that the fun 
damental problems of the industry could best be addressed by focusing 
on five areas: capital formation, trade, environmental and regulatory 
matters, worker and community adjustment, and technology. Working 
groups were established in each area and assigned the task of developing 
findings and recommendations. The results of the working groups were 
then reviewed by the full Committee members. Our report is based upon 
this process.
On behalf of the Committee we have endeavored to summarize the 
condition of the industry, its basic problems, objectives to guide action, 
and the major findings and recommendations Committee members 
believe are necessary to revitalize the steel industry. All represent tripar 
tite views. The summary of the findings and recommendations is 
organized according to the five working groups mentioned above. 
Although there has not been agreement on all matters, we have been im 
pressed by the substantial consensus that has emerged among labor, 
business, and government members of the Committee.
At the outset we wish to emphasize four points that we believe are cen 
tral to understanding how to improve the performance of the domestic 
steel industry.
First, steelmaking constitutes a foundation for a substantial portion of 
our industrial base. Metals continue to be essential to industrial produc 
tion, and steel represents about 90% of all metals consumed.
Second, the problems of th steel industry, although varying from firm 
to firm, are fundamental. At the same time, the inherent strength of the 
industry as a whole provides major opportunities for long-term progress.
Third, the problems of the industry reflect failings on the part of 
government, management, and labor. None has been sufficiently respon 
sive to the changes affecting the industry. All share responsibility for 
contributing to a more vital industry.
And fourth, remedying the problems of steel will require a substantial 
period of time. A coordinated and integrated set of initiatives, maintain 
ed for a 3 to 5 year period, or longer, will be necessary to set the industry 
on a new path.
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We believe that the conclusions of the Steel Tripartite Advisory Com 
mittee provide useful guidance towards developing policies and pro 
grams that will foster modernization of the American steel industry.
Secretary of Labor Secretary of Commerce
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11:2
Description of the Initial Objectives and Proposed Activities 
Agreed upon by Union and Management Leaders at Forma 
tion of the Joint Labor-Management Committee of the Retail 
Food Industry, March 29,1974
(1) The Committee shall serve as a forum for initiating and maintain 
ing wage and benefit data collection programs and for the exchange 
of information to strengthen the ability of the industry (labor and 
management) to reach constructive decisions in collective bargain 
ing. Labor, management, public and government representatives 
recognize that the information presently available on collective 
bargaining settlements, wage rates and wage patterns, fringe 
benefits, noneconomic contract clauses, and bargaining time tables 
is not always as accurate, available or useful to all parties as it 
should be. This can be improved. Programs in this area have 
already been initiated, with the help of the Cost of Living Council, 
and these should be refined, continued and expanded. The Cost of 
Living Council is prepared to defray the costs of assembling the in 
formation and of designing ways, with the assistance of 
managements and the unions to present the data in a useful and 
understandable form.
(2) If the Committee is to make a constructive contribution to the in 
dustry, it will have to be sensitive to interference with normal col 
lective bargaining and respect the autonomy of the individual 
organizations. The Committee cannot and should not be a man 
datory industry settlement organization. However, with reliable 
data that is kept current and utilizing its role in encouraging open 
communication and exchange of information on a national basis, 
the Committee may be able to assist the industry in key contract 
discussions that might otherwise lead to major confrontations. 
Such procedures as encouraging early discussion of difficult prob 
lems, supplying information for such discussions, and bringing to 
bear national experience on local problems should be a part of this 
function. These kinds of procedures have increasingly been used by 
a variety of other industries to encourage constructive and respon 
sible collective bargaining. All of this activity must be closely coor 
dinated with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
(3) The Committee shall be a national forum for discussions of a vari 
ety of longer range industry problems that often surface in local 
negotiations and which may benefit from national attention to
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secure mutually beneficial results. Among these problems, but by 
no means an exhaustive list, are the following:
(a) Relationship between top management and the interna 
tional unions the need for a better understanding of the 
scope and limits of authority and responsibility on both 
sides.
(b) International and local unions' relations with rank and 
file.
(c) Understanding lines of management and union authority 
at the bargaining table.
(d) Technological change.
(e) Government regulation.
(f) Management and union work practices.
(g) Fragmented bargaining.
(h) Contract administration.
(i) New types of dispute settlement mechanisms.
The parties have themselves indicated that most of these items have 
a high priority on their list of concerns.
(4) Overriding all of the above, and implicit in the fundamental work 
of the Committee, would be to use the Committee as an ongoing 
forum to broaden the base of communication between labor and 
management at all levels and on all subjects of mutual concern to 
labor and management. Therefore, in setting priorities the agenda 
must reflect the role that individual members play outside of the 
Committee and the concerns of those that do not participate in its 
regular meetings the local and regional representatives on both 
sides.
(5) The international unions and the major national retail chains have 
expressed their willingness for a period (such as the rest of 1974) to 
cooperate with the above procedures, to serve on the operating 
committee, to meet regularly, and join in a procedural voluntary 
agreement to this effect.
263
11:3
Memorandum of Understanding Signed by Union, Contractor, 
and Other Groups, Construction Industry, St. Louis, 1977
I. Preamble:
The parties signatory to this Understanding recognize the problems 
confronting the construction industry in the Eastern Missouri Area and 
pledge their cooperation and support to the provisions of this Under 
standing and other mutually agreed upon policies and programs which 
will tend to eliminate these problems and promote a healthy growth of 
the construction industry in this area.
II. Customers:
1. Owners shall continue to show increasing personal interest in their 
construction before and after their contracts are let. Wherever 
possible, owners agree to conduct prebid conferences to explain 
what is expected of contractors and prejob conferences to resolve 
possible jurisdictional disputes.
2. Owners shall pursue more thorough job design to insure that jobs 
can be built economically and efficiently with a minimum of 
changes.
3. Owners shall set completion dates as realistically as possible. 
Owners shall enforce the terms of the contract and work with prime 
contractors for best possible results. Owners shall make every ef 
fort to render prompt decisions.
4. Wherever possible, owners shall avoid and discourage scheduled 
overtime or other actions that mitigate against effective and 
economical construction.
III. Designers:
1. Architects and Engineers will provide professional services to 
Owners in the most feasible way within the limitations of the 
Owners needs and established budget.
2. Architects and Engineers will prepare plans and specifications 
which will clearly define the scope and details of the project 
necessary for bidding and construction. For convenience of 
reference and to facilitate letting of subcontracts by the Contrac 
tor, these documents will conform with general building practice 
relating to jurisdictional matters.
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3. Architects and Engineers will consult with the Owner advising him 
of reasonable bidding and construction time schedules in accor 
dance with local construction industry practices.
4. Architects and Engineers will recommend that Owners follow 
recognized industry standards and procedures for bidding projects, 
award of contracts, observation of the work and progress payment 
procedures. Wherever possible changes resulting in extra costs and 
multiple punch lists will be minimized.
IV. Contractors:
1. All Contractors shall make installations in accordance with plans 
and specifications and recognized contract procedures.
2. All Contractors shall exercise their management rights. These 
rights shall include planning, directing, hiring, firing, layoff, 
transferring, appointing foremen and general foremen and other 
wise directing the work force.
3. As part of the planning and execution of management procedures, 
all Contractors shall provide their craftsmen with necessary plans, 
employer furnished tools, equipment and materials in order for the 
craftsman to perform his duties in the most efficient and ex 
peditious manner.
4. Prime contractors shall be responsible for the job progress of their 
subcontractors and they shall coordinate and support the project 
operations of their subcontractors.
5. All Contractors shall follow all recognized and ethical standards 
and procedures in bidding on, soliciting bids and performing all 
work.
V. Unions (Craftsmen):
1. The importance of workmen remaining on a job from start to com 
pletion is recognized by both parties. Contractors must be able to 
give reliable completion dates to contract letting agencies and 
owners. To meet this objective, it is pledged that illegal work stop 
pages and strikes will not occur.
2. Unions further pledge that no picketing or strikes will be used in 
jurisdictional disputes. After obtaining all necessary facts the par 
ties involved will resolve the dispute off the job site as expeditiously 
as possible. If necessary, the Council of Construction Employers 
and the Building Trades Council will render all assistance in these 
discussions. If the dispute cannot be settled in this manner, the ap 
plicable contract provisions for settlement of jurisdictional disputes 
will be followed.
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3. Alleged violations of union contracts or disputes over interpreta 
tions of union contracts will not be the grounds for unions to picket 
or strike until the following occurs: (1) The parties in this dispute 
will meet off the job site to resolve the disputes. (2) The Council of 
Construction Employers and the Building Trades Council will be 
given opportunity to participate in the discussions. Failure to settle 
such disputes in this manner will necessitate the use of the grievance 
procedure and/or arbitration provisions in the applicable labor 
agreement.
4. Increased productivity is the key to putting contractors who employ 
union workmen in a more competitive position. To accomplish this 
objective, the individual workman shall be made to realize the im 
portance of his role in the Construction Industry through both oral 
and written communications from the Employers, Employer 
Associations, the Building Trades Council and the Union. Workers 
will be made aware of their responsibility. The necessity of per 
forming a day's work for a day's pay will be emphasized.
5. Where stewards are appointed by respective unions, the steward 
shall be a qualified workman performing the work of his craft who 
shall exercise no supervisory functions. There shall be no non- 
working stewards.
6. Workmen shall be at their place of work at the regular starting time 
and shall remain at their place of work until quitting time. There 
shall be no limit on production by workmen nor restrictions on the 
use of tools or equipment other than that which may be required by 
safety regulations.
VI. Joint Contractor-Union:
1. Unions and contractors will work in harmony with the objective of 
demonstrating to contract letting agencies and owners, that 
organized labor and their employers will strive to produce the best 
quality installation for the money spent by the consumer.
2. It is recognized that prolonged periods of overtime tend to reduce 
productivity and, therefore, is undesirable and not in the best in 
terest of the industry, the craftsman and the consumer. Therefore, 
except in unusual circumstances, overtime will not be worked. 
Where unusual circumstances demand overtime, such overtime will 
be kept to a minimum.
3. Unnecessary and/or inefficient work practices, where they exist, 
shall be eliminated. Slowdowns, standby crews and work rules 
which cause same and featherbedding practices increase costs and 
place the contractors who employ union labor at a competitive 
disadvantage. Elimination of these inefficient work practices is a 
necessity and will be diligently pursued by both parties.
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VII. Suppliers:
1. Suppliers will, to the best of their ability, seek to deliver materials 
and equipment according to project schedules.
2. Suppliers will counsel with owners, architect-engineers or contrac 
tors so as to advise the appropriate party of necessary procedures 
and requirements leading to order placement, so that project 
schedules may be maintained.
3. Suppliers will work in close harmony with their contractual partner 
on the project so as to provide the most economical price for 
materials necessary to meet project requirements.
4. Suppliers will expedite erection plans, shop details, and installation 
instructions for approval and project distribution to insure project 
schedules.
5. Suppliers will furnish materials of a quality to meet or exceed 
mutually agreeable plans and specifications.
6. Suppliers will attempt to maintain stock items which are used on a 
regular basis, to minimize delays in obtaining such items.
A harmonious working relationship between all parties using this 
Understanding as a guide should result in the healthy growth of the con 
struction industry in the Eastern Missouri Area.
The Memorandum of Understanding will be developed and im 
plemented in accordance with the various existing labor agreements and 
will be fair and equitable to both labor and management, as well as the 
property owners and the public in general.
Signed this 28th day of November, 1977.
Council of Construction Employers
St. Louis Building & Construction Trades Council
Consulting Engineers Council of Missouri
St. Louis Chapter, American Institute of Architects
St. Louis Area Construction Users Council
St. Louis Chapter Producers' Council, Inc.
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11:4
Excerpt from National Constructors Association/
California Building & Construction Trades Council
Joint Voluntary Cal/OSHA Self-Inspection Program
for the 




It has been shown that governmental inspection/enforcement programs 
alone are not effective in reducing job injuries and illness; hence, a 
significant percentage of such occurrences are not inspection preventable 
by routine compliance inspections.
Therefore, The National Constructors Association/The California 
Building & Construction Trades Council have jointly agreed to a pilot 
program which will enable a joint Labor/Management Committee, com 
prised of persons employed on the project, to function in such a manner 
so as to provide a continuing assurance that compliance with the 
Cal/OSHA Construction Safety Orders is maintained.
Voluntary Self-Inspection Program
The purpose of the jobsite committee is to assist the employer, as re 
quired, in the implementation of the Voluntary Self-Inspection Program. 
The committee will function as outlined below. The committee's ac 
tivities will be monitored by the National Constructors Associa 
tion/California Building and Construction Trades Council Joint Com 
mittee on Voluntary Self-Inspection.
Organization of Jobsite Voluntary Program Safety Committee
1. A four-member committee, comprised of two employer represen 
tatives and two employee representatives will be established.
2. All committee members must be current employees on the project.
3. All employee committee members will be appointed by the local 
Building Trades Council having jurisdiction.
4. Employee committee members may not be union stewards.
5. Employer members shall have field supervisory responsibility ex 
cepting the employer Safety Representative who shall be a perma 
nent member of the committee.
6. Committee members will be permitted to perform committee 
business.
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7. Participation on the committee shall not preclude discharge for 
cause or reduction in force for valid reasons. Participation on the 
committee does not guarantee continued employment.
Functions of the Jobsite Committee
1. The committee shall meet on a weekly basis at a time and place 
agreed by the membership.
2. The committee will assist in the implementation of the Voluntary 
Self-Inspection Program at the SONGS 2 & 3 site.
3. As an adjunct to the on-going safety programs, the committee shall 
conduct inspections to assure continuing compliance with the 
Cal/OSHA Construction Safety Orders. General (project-wide) in 
spections shall be conducted on a monthly basis. Other inspections 
will be conducted as required by committee action. The abatement 
measures taken on violations noted during inspections will be 
reviewed by the committee.
4. The committee shall review all Report of Safety Problem forms 
submitted by employees to the contractor's safety department since 
the last meeting. The follow-up action taken by the employer will 
be reviewed by the committee.
5. Other outstanding or unsolved safety matters relating to com 
pliance with the Cal/OSHA Construction Safety Orders will be 
considered.
6. Minutes will be kept of each committee meeting.
Notification of Voluntary Self-Inspection Program to Project Employees
1. Current employees will be advised through a printed notice 
disseminated to each employee at the tool box meeting prior to the 
effective date of the program. The program will be the principal 
topic of this meeting.
2. New hires will be given a printed notice at time of hire. The Volun 
tary Self-Inspection Program will be discussed thoroughly at the 
new hire safety orientation meetings.
3. Copies of the printed notice will be posted in conspicuous loca 
tions.
4. The program will be discussed periodically in all safety meetings.
5. The function of the program will be reviewed with each newly 
assigned foreman and supervisor.
Monitoring of Voluntary Self-Inspection Program
1. The National Constructors Association/California Building and 
Construction Trades Council Joint Committee will monitor the im 
plementation of the Voluntary Self-Inspection Program through 
periodic on-site audits of the jobsite committee's activities.
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2. Cal/OSHA will monitor the program through periodic on-site 
audits by designated personnel.
Documentation of Committee Activities
1. Minutes will be kept of each meeting.
2. Compliance inspection reports, noting violations of Cal/OSHA 
Safety Orders will be forwarded to management for review and ac 
tion as necessary. Corrective actions/abatements will be reviewed 
by the committee.
3. Report of Safety Problem forms submitted to the Safety Depart 
ment will be reviewed.
Notice of Safety Problem Form
This procedure is intended to be utilized after a verbal notification of the 
alleged problem/condition has been made to responsible personnel, or 
when extenuating circumstances exist.
1. Copies of the Notice of Safety Problem will be available in the 
Safety Department, in the change rooms, and from craft stewards.
2. The notice will be logged in upon receipt, reviewed by the Safety 
Department, appropriate action taken, and the results 
documented.
3. Those employees who elect to identify themselves will be advised of 
actions taken.
4. The jobsite committee will review all Notice of Safety Problems 





Excerpt from Commitment at Work, the Five Year Report of 
the Jamestown Area Labor-Management Committee (1977)
Community Programs A Comment
The original basis for the Jamestown Labor-Management Committee 
was as a community level program. It was believed that sufficient pro 
gress could be made in altering the industrial relations climate at the 
community (leadership) level so that a genuine change in the image and 
attractiveness of Jamestown would induce a new generation of private 
industrial development. This belief has proven to be supported by the ar 
rest in the outmigration of plants, the attraction of Cummins Engine 
Company, the refinancing of five local companies which otherwise 
would have disappeared, and many subsequent plant expansions and 
modernizations.
Nevertheless, the community basis as the sole approach for effective 
labor-management cooperation was rejected by the leaders of the com 
mittee in 1973. They made an explicit decision to expand and decentralize 
the participation in the committee, through their support for both the in- 
plant committee structure and the skills development programs. While 
the in-plant work has matured sufficiently into a program in its own 
right, the skills development program remains as the cornerstone of the 
community-based activities. It is this program which pulls together 
organizations in the community, such as Jamestown Community Col 
lege, the County Manpower office, the Manufacturers Association of 
Jamestown, and the County Industrial Development Agency. In a very 
real way, the continuing need to pull these organizations together serves 
as a "reality check" on the efficacy of the entire Jamestown operation. 
Meetings, feedback, and action plans which would otherwise be pursued 
on a unilateral basis are, through the medium of skills development, 
coordinated within this diverse set of organizations. The process appears 
effective and is one of the most compelling features of the Jamestown ex 
perience upon which visitors comment.
New initiatives on the community basis include the following:
  Training of secondary school teachers in a model curriculum of 
labor-management cooperation and quality of working life ap 
proaches to industrial organizations.
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  Planning of a regular series of monthly workshops and seminars on 
topics of current interest.
  Regular exchange, both formal and informal, of approaches 
developed in in-plant committees. This exchange is exemplified by 
visits of union and management leaders to other plants within the 
Jamestown area.
  Community based documentation is planned, using videotaping as 
a method. This was suggested by the union president of Local #27, 
I.B.F.&O., Carborundum, in March, 1977.
  Distribution of a bi-monthly newsletter to members of the 
Jamestown Labor-Management Committee. The first newsletter 
was distributed in December, 1976.
  Broadening of participation in the regular dinner meetings and an 
nual conference. The Fourth Annual Conference took place March 
31-April 2, 1977.
  Technical assistance to director of Y.W.C.A. Child Care Center. 
The Jamestown area desperately needs additional child care 
facilities, especially in light of the findings of the Manpower Over 
view report produced by Larry Carter, Labor-Management Com 
mittee staff consultant, which points out the likelihood of a severe 
manpower and skills shortage in the Chautauqua County area in 
approximately 1981-82. It is expected that this shortage will in 
crease the demand for child care by working mothers who will be 
attracted to the job openings.
  Technical assistance to a unique energy conservation program 
whose initial phase was a thermography based study of existing 
energy losses in Jamestown industry.
  Participation in the planning of a major industrial corridor 
rehabilitation program, being planned by the City of Jamestown, 
and likely to be funded by the Economic Development Administra 
tion. This program will include a process of "self design", in which 
participating manufacturers, located along the Chadakoin River in 
Jamestown, will design changes in the immediate physical environ 
ment of their plants which will help them in their operation. Ex 
amples include changing traffic patterns to facilitate better ship 
ping and changing the slope of city streets to eliminate water run 
off problems.
In summary, the community based programs continue to reflect both 
the credibility and the relevance of the Labor-Management Committee as 




Letter of Agreement between General Motors Corporation 




Mr. Irving Bluestone: 
Vice President and Director 
General Motors Department 
International Union, UAW 
Solidarity House 
8000 East Jefferson Avenue 
Detroit, Michigan 48214
Dear Mr. Bluestone:
During the course of the current negotiations, General Motors and the 
International Union, UAW reaffirmed the matter of the Corporation's 
letter of November 19, 1973, regarding the National Committee to 
Improve the Quality of Work Life. The text of that letter is as 
follows:
"In discussions prior to the opening of the current negotiations for a 
new collective bargaining agreement, General Motors Corporation and 
the UAW gave recognition to the desirability of mutual effort to 
improve the quality of work life for the employes. In consultation 
with Union representatives, certain projects have been undertaken by 
management in the field of organizational development, involving the 
participation of represented employes. These and other projects and 
experiments which may be undertaken in the future are designed to 
improve the quality of work life, thereby advantaging the worker by 
making work a more satisfying experience, advantaging the 
Corporation by leading to a reduction in employe absenteeism and 
turnover, and advantaging the consumer through improvement in the 
quality of the products manufactured.
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"As a result of these earlier discussions and further discussions during 
the course of the current negotiations for a new collective bargaining 
agreement, the parties have decided that a Committee to Improve the 
Quality of Work Life composed of representatives of the International 
Union and General Motors will be established at the national level.
"This Committee will meet periodically and have responsibility for:
1. Reviewing and evaluating programs of the Corporation which 
involve improving the work environment of employes represented 
by the UAW.
2. Developing experiments and projects in that area.
3. Maintaining records of its meetings, deliberations and all 
experiments and evaluations it conducts.
4. Making reports to the Corporation and the Union on the results 
of its activities.
5. Arranging for any outside counselling which it feels is necessary 
or desirable with the expenses thereof to be shared equally by the 
Corporation and the Union.
"The Corporation agrees to request and encourage its plant 
managements to cooperate in the conduct of such experiments and 
projects, and recognizes that cooperation by its plant floor supervision 
is essential to success of this program.
"The Union agrees to request and encourage its members and their 
local union representatives to cooperate in such experiments and 
projects, and recognizes that the benefits which can flow to employes 
as a result of successful experimentation is dependent on the 
cooperation and participation of those employes and the local union 
representatives."
Very truly yours,




Memorandum of Agreement between United States Steel Cor 
poration and the United Steelworkers of America, 
Establishing Labor-Management Participation Teams, August 
1, 1980:
The following understandings have been agreed upon regarding an Ex 
perimental Agreement for Labor-Management Participation Teams.
The strength and effectiveness of an industrial enterprise in a 
democratic society require a cooperative effort between labor and 
management at several levels of interaction. The parties hereto recognize 
that if Steelworkers are to continue among the best compensated 
employees in the industrial world and if steel companies are to meet in 
ternational competition, the parties must pursue their joint objectives 
with renewed dedication, initiative and cooperation.
Collective bargaining has proven to be a successful instrument in 
achieving common goals and objectives in the employment relationship 
between steel labor and steel management. However, there are problems 
of a continuing nature at the level of the work site which significantly im 
pact that relationship. Solutions to these problems are vital if the quality 
of work for employees is to be enhanced and if the proficiency of the 
business enterprise is to be improved.
The parties recognize that a cooperative approach between employees 
and supervision at the work site in a department or similar unit is essen 
tial to the solution of problems affecting them. Many problems at this 
level are not readily subject to resolution under existing contractual pro 
grams and practices, but affect the ongoing relationships between labor 
and management at that level. Joint participation in solving these prob 
lems at the departmental level is an essential ingredient in any effort to 
improve the effectiveness of the company's performance and to provide 
employees with a measure of involvement adding dignity and worth to 
their work life.
In pursuit of these objectives, the parties believe that local union and 
plant management at a plant can best implement this cooperative ap 
proach through the establishment of Participation Teams of employees 
and supervision in departments or similar units at the plant. According 
ly, it is agreed that the following experimental program will be under 
taken with respect to Participation Teams.
1. The Company and the International Union will select a plant, or 
plants, on a pilot basis to be covered by this Experimental Agree 
ment and will determine the date, or dates, during the term of this
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Basic Labor Agreement on which the program shall commence. 
These determinations shall be made in consultation with local plant 
management and the local union and subject to their concurrence.
2. A Participation Committee will be established at the plant level to 
coordinate the activities of the Participation Teams at department 
or unit level. A Participation Team will be made up of a manage 
ment co-chairman, an employees' co-chairman, and employee and 
supervision members of the department or unit. Employee 
members and supervision members need not be equal in number, 
and may be rotated periodically to permit broader employee in 
volvement. The employees of the department or unit will select 
their Participation Team co-chairman and members.
3. Each employee member of a Participation Committee or a Par 
ticipation Team shall be compensated for time spent away from 
work in Committee or Team activities at his average straight-time 
hourly rate of earnings as calculated under Section 11-D-l.
4. Participation Team meetings shall be called by the co-chairmen 
during normal working hours as often as the employee and supervi 
sion members agree. A Participation Team shall be free to discuss, 
consider and decide upon proposed means to improve department 
or unit performance, employee morale and dignity, and conditions 
of the work site. Appropriate subjects, among others, which a 
Team might consider include: use of production facilities; quality 
of products and quality of the work environment; safety and en 
vironmental health; scheduling and reporting arrangements; 
absenteeism and overtime; incentive coverage and yield; job 
alignments; contracting out; and energy conservation and transpor 
tation pools. The Participation Committee and the Participation 
Teams shall have no jurisdiction over the initiation of, or the pro 
cessing of, complaints or grievances. The Participation Committee 
and the Participation Teams shall have no authority to add to, 
detract from, or change the terms of the Basic Labor Agreement.
5. A Participation Team shall be free to consider a full range of 
responses to implemented performance improvement, including, 
but not limited to, such items as bonus payments or changes in in 
centive performance pay. A Participation Team may also consider 
one-time start-up bonuses for employees on new facilities who 
reach target levels in specified periods.
6. To facilitate the establishment of these Participation Committees 
and Participation Teams, and to assist them, a Participation Team 
Review Commission will be established comprised of a head 
quarters representative of the International Union and a head 
quarters representative of the Company.
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IV:3
Excerpt from 1980 Agreement between the Communication 
Workers of America and the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company
Technological Displacement*
If during the term of this agreement, the Company notifies the Union 
in writing that technological change (defined as changes in equipment or 
methods of operation) has or will create a surplus in any job title in a 
work location which will necessitate reassignments to regular employees 
to different job titles involving a reduction in pay or to locations requir 
ing a change in residence, or if a force surplus necessitating any of the 
above actions exists for reasons other than technological change and the 
Company deems it appropriate, any regular employee ~
- who is in the affected job titles and work locations; and
- who is not eligible for a service pension may elect not to accept such 
reassignment to a job title involving a reduction in pay or to a location 
requiring a change in residence and shall be paid termination allowance. 
Any such regular employee who refuses to accept a transfer to a job title 
having the same or greater rate of pay and which does not require a 
change in residence shall not be paid a termination allowance.
*Western Electric Manufacturing lateral transfer and bumping procedures in universes with 
multiple titles at the same grade level already provide multiple protection for employees 
under similar circumstances. Western Electric Manufacturing will follow its regular con 
tractual procedures. However, the reassignments to locations requiring a change residence 
would apply.
Technology Change Committee
The Company and the Union recognize that technological changes in 
equipment, organization, or methods of operation have a tendency to af 
fect job security and the nature of the work to be performed. The parties, 
therefore, will attempt to diminish or abolish the detrimental effects of 
any such technological change by creating a joint committee to be known 
as the Technology Change Committee to oversee problems and recom 
mend solutions of problems in this area as set forth below.
It is agreed that a Technology Change Committee be constituted in 
each Company. Such Committee will consist of not more than three 
representatives of the Company and not more than three representatives 
of the Union. Such Committee may be convened at the option of either 
party at mutually agreeable times.
The purpose of the Committee is to provide for discussion of major 
technological changes (including changes in equipment, organization, or
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methods of operation) which may affect employees represented by the 
Union. The Company will notify the Union at least six (6) months in ad 
vance of planned major technological changes. Meetings of the Commit 
tee will be held as soon thereafter as can be mutually arranged. At such 
meetings, the Company will advise the Union of its plans with respect to 
the introduction of such changes and will familiarize the Union with the 
progress being made.
The impact and effect of such changes on the employees shall be ap 
propriate matters for discussion. The Company will discuss with the 
Union:
(a) What steps might be taken to offer employment to employees af 
fected:
1. In the same locality or other localities in jobs which may be 
available in occupations covered by the collective bargaining 
agreements between the parties;
2. In other occupations in the Company not covered by the collec 
tive bargaining agreement;
3. In other Bell System companies:
(b)The applicability of various Company programs and contract pro 
visions relating to force adjustment plans and procedures, in 
cluding Supplemental Income Protection Plan, Reassignment Pay 
Protection Plan, termination allowances, retirement, transfer pro 
cedures and the like.
(c)The feasibility of the Company providing training for other 
assignments for the employees affected. (Example: sponsorship of 
typing training on Company time)
The Committees shall not formulate policy or arrive at binding deci 
sions or agreements, but rather shall be charged with the responsibility to 
develop facts and recommendations so that the Company can make well- 
informed decisions regarding the matters covered by this provision.
Occupational Job Evaluation Committee
In the changing environment resulting from technological and 
organizational developments, the Company and the Union recognize the 
need to create new jobs, job titles, and classifications, as well as to 
restructure and redefine existing ones as necessary. They further 
recognize that employees performing such new jobs, as well as existing 
jobs, should be fairly compensated based on the work they do.
Accordingly, the Company and the Union agree to form a committee 
to be known as the Occupational Job Evaluation Committee. The 
membership of such committee will consist of six persons, three each to 
be designated by the Union and the Company.
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The purpose of such committee is to research, develop and recommend 
a job evaluation plan using common measurements of work that can be 
uniformly applied so that all job titles and classifications (both existing 
and newly created) in the bargaining units can be properly evaluated. The 
Committee will be charged with the responsibility to develop and make 
recommendations regarding a job evaluation plan and its implementa 
tion to the respective bargaining representatives of the Union and the 
Company who shall constitute an overall policy and advisory group for 
the Committee. The final recommendations and report of the Committee 
shall be delivered not later than June 1, 1981. Such recommendations 
will not be binding on either the Union or the Company, but will be for 
the purpose of allowing such representatives to form well-considered and 
intelligent opinions regarding the adoption and implementation of a job 
evaluation plan.
If the Committee determines it to be advisable, it may contract with 
consultant(s) to assist it in developing a Plan and an implementation pro 
cedure to be recommended. The cost of any such consultant(s) shall be 
borne one-half by the Company and one-half by the Union.
This provision and the responsibilities of the Committee do not en 
compass or apply to job titles or grades or the job evaluation plans in the 
Western Electric Company.
Joint Working Conditions and Service 
Quality Improvement Committee
Recognizing the desirability of mutual efforts to improve the work life 
of employees and enhance the effectiveness of the organization, the 
Company and the Union express their mutual belief that activities and 
experiments initiated and sponsored jointly by management and the 
Union can prove beneficial to all employees and the Company, and that 
by encouraging greater employee participation, work can be made more 
satisfying and organizational performance and service quality can be im 
proved.
The parties agree to continue cooperation in developing a spirit of 
mutual trust and respect and establishing structures to support 
cooperative participation by creating, at the national level, a Joint Work 
ing Conditions and Service Quality Improvement Committee, composed 
of three representatives each of the Union and the Company. The com 
mittee will meet periodically and have responsibility for:
1. Encouraging and assisting local Union officials and Company 
managers to understand and implement the principles on which this 
agreement is based.
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2. Developing and recommending principles and objectives relative to 
working conditions and service quality improvement which will 
guide experiments or projects such as quality circles, problem solv 
ing teams, and the like, in various work situations. These should be 
designed to encourage teamwork, to make work more satisfying, 
and to improve the work operations.
3. Reviewing and evaluating programs and projects which involve im 
proving the quality of the work environment.
4. Maintaining records and making reports to the Union and the 
Company on its activities.
5. Arranging for any outside consultants which it feels are necessary 
or desirable to assist it. The expenses thereof will be shared equally 
by the Company and the Union.
The parties agree that organizational and technological innovations 
are necessary and desirable; that every individual has the ability to con 
tribute to the objectives of the organization; and that work should satisfy 
personal needs for self-respect and fulfillment as well as service and 
financial objectives.
The parties recognize that voluntary involvement by management and 
the Union is essential for the success of mutual efforts. The Company 
and the Union agree to encourage all levels of their respective organiza 
tions to cooperate in the design, development, and implementation of 
participative experiments, projects, and programs, in a spirit of mutuali 
ty and responsible leadership.
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IV:4
Statement of Principles on Quality of Work Life
from the 
CWA/AT&T National Committee
on Joint Working Conditions 
and Service Quality Improvement
The 1980 National Memorandum of Understanding between CWA and 
AT&T states - - - "recognizing the desirability of mutual efforts to im 
prove the work life of employees and enhance the effectiveness of the 
organization, the Company and the Union express their mutual belief 
that activities and experiments initiated and sponsored jointly by 
Management and the Union can prove beneficial to all employees and the 
Company, and that by encouraging greater employee participation, work 
can be made more satisfying and organizational performance and service 
quality can be improved."
The following principles provide the framework for the activities of the 
joint Union/Management National Committee to encourage and sup 
port the spread of the kind of activities referred to above:
(1) The essential component of a Quality of Work Life (QWL) effort is 
a process which increases employee participation in the decisions 
which affect their daily work and the quality of their work life. 
Specific local concerns and local problem-solving should be the 
basis of QWL efforts.
(2) The goals of QWL efforts are:
(a) to employ people in a profitable and efficient enterprise.
(b) to create working conditions which are fulfilling by providing 
opportunities for employees and groups at all levels to in 
fluence their working environment.
The pursuit of these goals is guided by the basic human values of 
security, fairness, participation and individual development.
(3) QWL holds as a basic tenet that employees are responsible, 
trustworthy, and capable of making contributions when equipped 
with the necessary information and training. Management and the 
Union seek to better acknowledge, employ and develop the poten 
tial of all employees and are committed to providing the necessary 
information and training to encourage maximum contribution to 
the success of QWL.
(4) QWL efforts must be viewed as a supplement to the collective 
bargaining process. The integrity of the collective bargaining pro 
cess, the contractual rights of the parties and the workings of the
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grievance procedure must be upheld and maintained. The process 
of implementing an improved quality of life at work shall not in 
fringe upon existing employee, union, or management rights.
(5) Authorized representatives of the Union shall participate in the 
planning, development, implementation, and evaluation of specific 
QWL activities which involve Union-represented employees.
(6) Voluntary involvement by Management, the Union, and employees 
is essential to the success of mutual efforts. Participation in specific 
QWL activities shall be voluntary. Individuals shall have the right 
to participate in or to withdraw from such activities without penal 
ty.
(7) Innovations which result from the QWL process will not result in 
the layoff of any regular employee or negatively affect the pay or 
seniority status of any Union eligible employee, whether he or she is 
a participant in the process or not.
(8) The success of QWL efforts requires a spirit of mutual respect and 
trust among employees, Management and the Union. Each party 
must give serious attention and consideration to the needs and 
values of the other parties. Management, the Union and employees 
must respect one another's legitimate needs and constraints. The 
success and maintenance of Quality of Work Life requires flexibili 
ty and continuing support and leadership from Management, 
Unions and employees at all levels.
(9) Quality of Work Life is not a "program": there is no universal or 
one best approach. It is a process which has great potential, but it 





Letter of Understanding between Mountain Bell and Com 
munications Workers of America, District 8, Establishing 
"Flextime" Program
Mountain Bell
930 Fifteenth Street Room 1060 
Denver, Colorado 80202 




Mr. J. E. Murphy
Assistant to the Vice President





This letter is intended to set out our understanding of the future ap 
plication of the concept known as "flex-time" in work groups made 
up of employees represented by the CWA during the term of the 
August 13, 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Management will decide when and under what circumstances "flex- 
time" will be allowed. The nature of the business is such that "flex- 
time" is inappropriate for certain units and specific employees within 
a unit. For example, twenty-four hour shift operations cannot operate 
efficiently under the "flex-time" concept. In addition, a supervisor 
must be present in the unit or nearby in the office or building. This 
serves to insure that questions can be answered and a safe working en 
vironment maintained. After Management has analyzed the operating 
requirements of the office or work group to determine what hours of 
work are required and what levels of coverage are necessary within a 
given time frame, if "flex-time" is to be allowed, the following will 
apply:
1. The supervisor will determine the earliest and latest time
employees will be permitted to work. Normally, these hours will 
be between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., although service re 
quirements may require other hours.
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2. There is certain "core-time" during the day when all employees 
must be present. The supervisor will determine these hours dur 
ing which all employees must be present. Included within this 
"core-time" will be one fifteen minute break in each half tour of 
the day. These break periods may not be taken consecutively so 
as to provide a half hour break; neither can they be taken con 
secutively with a one half hour lunch period which will be pro 
vided during the "core-time" period.
3. The difference between the time that employees will be permitted 
to work and the "core-time" will be the flexible time allowable. 
The "flex-time" at the start of the shift will be equal to that at 
the end of the shift.
4. Each employee is given freedom and responsibility in deciding 
upon reporting-in and checking-out time. The employees must 
work a full tour of duty during each day and will be considered 
late if they have not reported at the start of the "core-time".
5. No differential will be paid for any tour unless the "core-time" 
begins before 7:00 a.m. or ends after 7:00 p.m. Under no cir 
cumstances will a split shift differential be paid as the result of 
"flex-time" schedule.
6. "Core-time" may be changed by giving 24 hours' notice to 
employees.
If this letter accurately sets out our understanding, please initial in the 
space provided and return one copy for our files.
Yours very truly,
Assistant Vice President 
Labor Relations & Employment
CONCURRED:
Assistant to the Vice President 




Memorandum of Understanding between Midland-Ross Cor 
poration, Electrical Products Division, Athens, Tennessee, 
Plant and Local Union No. 175, International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers (AFL-CIO) Agreement to Establish a 
Scanlon Plan
This agreement is a supplement to the basic labor agreement between 
the company and the union, and can in no way invalidate or conflict with 
any of the provisions therein.
I. Plantwide Incentive Plan
This memorandum of understanding establishes a plantwide incentive 
plan designed to enable all employees of the Athens, Tennessee, plant of 
Midland-Ross Corporation, Electrical Products Division, up to and in 
cluding the plant manager, but excluding over the road truck drivers, to 
benefit from their increased cooperation and efforts as reflected in in 
creased productivity.
In order to assure full participation in the benefits of the increased 
productivity which should result from the employee-management 
cooperation plan, a plantwide monthly productivity bonus shall be ap 
plied, effective July 19, 1974, to remain in full force and effect for a trial 
period of one (1) year, after which time its continuance will be subject to 
the approval of both the management and the union.
II. Basis of the Plan
The Productivity Ratio
Records for the twelve (12) month period ending June 21, 1974, were 
used in the development of a ratio of 29.31 cents in payroll costs to each 
dollar in standard cost production value. Therefore, in each month 29.31 
percent of each dollar of standard cost production value will represent 
the allowed payroll cost. Whenever the adjusted actual monthly payroll 
is less than the allowed payroll, the difference will constitute the bonus 
pool. However, in order to protect the company's interest in any month 
when the adjusted actual payroll exceeds the allowed, causing a deficit, a 
reserve will be accumulated in months when bonuses are earned. For this 
purpose twenty-five (25) percent of the bonus pool will be set aside. If 
this reserve fund should, in twelve (12) months' time, exceed the amount 
required to restore the ratio to the established norm in the deficit 
months, the excess shall then be distributed as a "year-end bonus," to be
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shared in the same manner as the monthly bonus. If the deficits for the 
Scanlon Plan trial period exceed the amount in the reserve fund, this 
deficit shall be terminated at the end of the Scanlon Plan trial period and 
shall not be charged against any bonus earnings of the next year. After 
the reserve has been set aside, the balance of the bonus pool shall be 
divided, with seventy-five (75) percent going to the participants and 
twenty-five (25) percent being retained by the company.
In calculating the distribution of the participating employees' portion, 
their aggregate share will appear as a certain percentage of their total 
earnings for the month. This percentage will indicate the bonus earnings 
of each participant. As required by Fair Labor Standards legislation, 
total earnings for the month will include all straight time hourly earnings 
and any shift bonuses and/or overtime premium paid. Vacation pay, 
holiday pay, funeral leave, and jury duty pay will be considered as earn 
ings for bonus distribution. For purposes of bonus distribution, 
however, total earnings will not include the following: (1) earnings of 
new employees who have not yet been in the employ of the company for 
sixty (60) days; and (2) lost-time earnings of employees whose pay goes 
on while they are sick or absent for personal reasons.
The productivity bonus ratio is derived from the record of perfor 
mance for the twelve (12) month period ending June 21, 1974. Substan 
tial changes in the conditions which prevailed (with respect to such 
variables as wages, standard cost of production, product mix, 
technology, etc.) in establishing the ratio may necessitate changing this 
ratio in order to protect the equity of either party. Accounting practices 
and procedures may ascertain the adjustment to be made.
The plan is designed to compensate all employees for their ideas and 
efforts. Technological change requiring capital expenditures may alter 
the ratio by reducing labor costs without any increase in productive effi 
ciency on the part of the participants. It is understood that in the event 
the employee representatives suggest mechanical changes which eliminate 
a job or jobs, the employees and the company will meet and make an 
earnest effort to place the employees affected on other jobs.
Substantial fluctuations in the product mix, with its various labor con 
tent proportions, may create inequities requiring a ratio revision. 
However, not every change in the variables affecting the ratio should re 
quire a ratio adjustment, since the development of the ratio itself reflects 
certain fluctuations which prevailed in the base period with respect to 
wage structure, labor turnover, product mix, standard costs, etc.
When the bonus amounts to less than 2 percent, payment will be defer 
red and added to subsequent bonuses and paid when the accumulation 
equals or exceeds 2 percent. However, at the end of the Scanlon year any 
bonus, even if less than 2 percent, will be paid out.
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III. The Committee Structure
The heart of this plantwide incentive plan is participation implemented 
by the creation of joint committees of management and employees to 
promote increased productive efficiency. The committee structure in 
cludes production committees and a screening committee.
Production Committees
There shall be a production committee established for each of the 








8. Tool and Die, Machine Development
9. Office Department
Composition: Production committees shall each be composed of one 
management and two or more union or employee representatives. Union 
or employee representatives chosen in the first election shall serve for the 
trial period of the plan. It is desirable to have experienced committeemen 
serving on the production committees at all times, consequently, after 
the trial period of the plan, a method to alternately elect representatives 
to the production committees will be instituted.
Functions: Production committees shall meet in their divisions at least 
once each month, or more often if deemed necessary, for the specific 
purpose of discussing ways and means of reducing waste and increasing 
productive efficiency. Every effort will be made to schedule in advance 
of such meeting a specific production problem which will be placed on 
the agenda for discussion. Committee members may call upon those 
employees in their division who are most familiar with the specific prob 
lem outlined to participate in the scheduled meetings. In no event, 
however, may a committeeman call in more than two members. It shall 
be the responsibility of the production committeemen to record and ex 
plain all suggestions intended to increase productive efficiency or reduce 
waste which are made to them by the employees in their division.
The production committees shall keep accurate minutes of their 
meetings showing all suggestions designed to increase productive effi 
ciency or reduce waste together with their disposition of the same. An ap 
proved copy of the minutes shall be transmitted immediately to the 
screening committee.
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The functions of the production committees shall in no way conflict 
with the responsibilities and duties of the duly-elected grievance commit 
tees. The grievance committeeman may, if he deems it advisable, attend 
all meetings of the production committee conducted in his department or 
the unit to which he belongs.
The Screening Committee
Composition: The screening committee shall consist of seven manage 
ment and nine union or employee representatives. The chief steward, by 
virtue of his office, shall be a member of this committee. The remaining 
eight members of the screening committee shall come from the produc 
tion committees. Each production committee shall elect one of the 
elected representatives on the production committee to serve as a screen 
ing committee representative.
Functions: This committee shall screen out through joint discussion all 
suggestions that are designed to increase productive efficiency or reduce 
waste. Those that have been placed in effect at the production committee 
level shall be placed in the record, and decisions shall be reached con 
cerning those suggestions which have not been disposed of at the produc 
tion committee level.
It will also be the function of this committee to go over the facts and 
figures used in the calculation of the bonus for the previous month 
before it is announced, in order to establish the greatest degree of faith 
and confidence in the calculated results. The productive efficiency bonus 
will be announced on or before the 15th day of each month and will 
represent the bonus for the previous month.
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Method of Bonus Calculation and Distribution
1. Assume that in the 12-month base period the payroll 
cost of making each dollar's worth of production 
value was 29.31 cents. This establishes a productivity 
norm or ratio against which to measure your perfor 
mance each month:
For example
2. Assume that in this month the value of
production comes to............................ $1,053,444
3. If performance had been no better this month 
than the average for the base period, the payroll 
would have come to ............................ $ 308,764
-This is your allowed payroll ($1,053,444 x 29.31%)
4. Say the adjusted actual payroll for this month,
however, figured out to .........................___250,946
5. This would mean an improvement over the norm of . 57,818
-This is your bonus pool
6. Now set aside 25 percent of this as a reserve ........ ____14,455
7. Which leaves for immediate distribution the sum of . 43,363
8. Deduct the company's share (25 percent) ..........____10,841
9. And the employees' share (75 percent) is ........... 32,522
10. Eligible payroll for the period .................... 250,500
11. This share for the employee is .................... 12.98%
of the eligible payroll.
-This is your bonus percentage paid 
($32,522-$250,500)
12. Suppose your own pay record for the month looked 
like this:
Total Including
Hours Overtime Hourly Total
Name Worked Hours Rate Pay






Joint UAW-Ford Summary of Terms
of Tentative National Agreement,
February 1982
The tentative new UAW-Ford national agreement includes the follow 
ing features:
—A 24-month moratorium on outsourcing-related plant closings
—Outsourcing commitments aimed at maintaining job opportunities 
equivalent to those now encompassed by the total UAW national 
bargaining unit
—A pledge by Ford to manage non-volume related plant closings by 
the principle of attrition
—Pilot employment guarantee projects at selected facilities based on 
the "lifetime employment" concept
—A guaranteed income program for high seniority Ford workers 
which is a disincentive for the company to layoff workers
—A profit sharing plan
—A strengthened supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) program 
with prompt resumption of payments to eligible laid off workers
—Equality of sacrifice provisions
—An economic reopener in the event of an unexpected major upturn 
in Ford sales
—New training programs
—An expanded UAW participation and voice in decision-making
—Improved seniority and early retirement provisions
—No paid personal holidays or bonus Sunday payment
—Vacation entitlements were preserved unchanged from 1979 agree 
ment
—Personal absence allowance days were maintained unchanged
—COLA deferred in first three quarters will be restored later in agree 
ment. There will be no annual improvement factor increases
—Life insurance increases
—Health, surgical, medical, drug, dental, vision, hearing and other 
benefit programs were maintained
—Duration to September 14, 1984
—Changes in wage rates and benefits for new hires
Plant Closings: There will be a moratorium for 24 months on plant 
closings that would have occurred as a result of outsourcing the product 
manufactured in the facility. The moratorium involves a commitment by 
the company not to close, beyond those for which announcements 
already have been made, any plant, parts distribution center or depot,
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tractor supply depot or other facilities constituting a UAW bargaining 
unit under the agreement. Closings would be permitted for volume- 
related reasons attributable to market conditions or internal company 
consolidations of operations within the units represented by the UAW. If 
such a volume-related permanent closing were contemplated, the com 
pany when possible, will provide the union with at least six months ad 
vance notice of the closing.
Outsourcing: The union won a commitment from the company that 
Ford will use every effort to maintain employment opportunities 
equivalent to those now encompassed by the total national bargaining 
unit. Ford agreed to a commitment to employ its best efforts to replace 
jobs which may be lost by outsourcing action.
The company also pledged to strive to manage indefinite workforce 
contractions, other than those related to volume considerations, by the 
principle of attrition rather than layoff. In addition, the company and 
the union have agreed to experiment at two locations with a pilot 
"employment guarantee" project, which will incorporate a "lifetime job 
security" concept which will apply to 80% of the workforce at each 
facility.
Ford also agreed to review major outsourcing decisions implemented 
during the 1979 agreement and to provide timely information to the 
union on any future major sourcing decisions.
The union also won a commitment that Ford will join with the UAW 
in supporting the principle that manufacturers who participate in the 
U.S. market should provide jobs, pay taxes and support the economy of 
the market in which they sell. Ford committed to support government ac 
ceptance of that principle, so that foreign producers will be encouraged 
to make their fair contribution to actions that will restore jobs to 
American autoworkers.
Preferential Placement Opportunities: New preferential placement op 
portunities will be provided to workers affected by plant closings, but 
who are not covered by other transfer agreements or who cannot move to 
any other unit through seniority rights. Under the new program, a 
seniority worker will have the right to apply within 30 days of layoff for 
preferential placement on available work, or to "bump" probationary 
workers if there is no work available. The work must be in jobs for which 
they are qualified or for which they could qualify in a reasonable period 
of time. The job must be either in another plant covered by the Agree 
ment in the same labor market, or a plant covered by the Agreement in a 
different labor market as might be agreed to by the company and the 
union.
If a worker takes preferential placement, he or she will have the right 
for 30 days to return to layoff status. If a worker does this, however, or
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if a worker refuses an initial offer of work, his or her eligibility under the 
program will be sharply curtailed.
Duration: The new agreement, if ratified, would remain in effect until 
September 14, 1984.
Reopener: To protect UAW/Ford workers in the event of an unex 
pected upsurge in Ford's sales, the union negotiated a reopener clause. 
The UAW will be able to reopen the new contract and bargain on all 
economic matters any time on or after Jan. 1, 1983, if retail deliveries in 
the U.S. of new cars and trucks produced or imported by Ford in any 
consecutive six months exceed 1,925,000 units (roughly comparable to 
the average six-month rate during 1977-78). If the two sides cannot reach 
agreement on economics, then the provisions prohibiting or limiting the 
right to strike no longer will be in effect.
Paid Personal Holidays: There will be no paid personal holidays (PPH) 
during the agreement, except for the run-out of the current period 
(3/82).
Vacation: No changes. The existing vacation plan continues as it was in 
the old agreement.
Paid Absence Allowance: No changes. The five PAA days each year 
were maintained.
Bonus Sundays: In the past agreement workers received one day of ex 
tra holiday pay in December that will not be made under the new agree 
ment.
Health Benefits: All health, surgical, medical, drug, dental, vision, 
hearing and other benefit programs in the past agreement are maintained 
for current workers. There are modifications phasing in benefits for new 
hires.
Health/Group Insurance: In the event of future layoffs, health and 
group insurance continues for those with 10 or more years of service for 
up to 24 months (currently coverage continues for up to 12 months).
Life Insurance: Life insurance will increase in November 1982. The in 
crease is likely to be $6,000, but will be determined by inflation.
Equality of Sacrifice: The company has agreed that all economic ad 
justments made by hourly workers will be applied comparably to salaried 
personnel. In addition, the company will automatically restore to UAW- 
represented workers any specific wage and benefit items which may be 
restored to the salaried workforce during the term of the tentative agree 
ment.
The company also noted that at times in some locations, the union has 
been concerned about supervisor/worker ratios which have often seemed 
out of line—workers get laid off, but supervisors stay on. As a result, the
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company agreed that the union may provide local management with data 
on excessive numbers of supervisors. The local management will then 
meet with the union to discuss the information provided. If the local 
union does not feel that local management has addressed the concerns 
adequately, and the claims are not settled, the matter may be referred to 
the National UAW-Ford Department which will take the matter up with 
the company's labor relations staff. If the matter remains unresolved, it 
may be referred to the Vice President and Director of the UAW-Ford 
Department and the Vice President of labor relations for resolution.
Ramification and Implementation: None of these changes will take ef 
fect until the tentative agreement is ratified by a majority of the UAW- 
Ford membership, and only then on the appropriate effective dates 
specified.
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB): SUB payments will 
resume promptly for workers who are currently laid off, but who are not 
receiving SUB due to assets having fallen below minimum levels recently.
Workers with 10 or more years of seniority will be eligibile to earn 
credit units for up to 104 weeks of SUB pay, up from the previous 
52-week maximum.
The overall strength of the SUB plan will be bolstered by increasing the 
company contribution to the fund by 3 C for every hour of compensation.
The resumption of payments will be financed by an advance credit of 
up to $70 million from the company to keep the fund in payment status 
and to pay benefits due. When a level of 70% of maximum funding is 
reached, the company will recover this credit advance at a rate of 5 C per 
hour of compensation.
Pensions: Current pension benefit levels have been maintained, and an 
increase due on August 1, 1982 will be paid as provided for under the 
previous agreement. The company, in its initial proposal, had wanted to 
eliminate pension increases due on February 1, 1982 and August 1, 1982.
There will be an improved special early retirement provision which will 
be helpful in plant closings and in facilitating reductions in the workforce 
through attrition. Workers will now be able to receive a special early 
retirement benefit of $15 per year of credited service for up to 30 years of 
service, rather than the previous maximum of 25 years. This is added to 
their regular retirement benefits for all years of credited service.
Laid off UAW members who are eligible for early retirement will now 
have five years from the date of layoff—instead of the current two 
years—to decide if they want to retire early and receive the early retire 
ment supplement. Workers who choose early retirement with the supple 
ment will lose all seniority. Workers who don't take early retirement 
within the time specified will lose their opportunity to receive the supple-
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ment, worth several hundreds of dollars monthly. This three-year exten 
sion gives a laid off UAW-Ford worker a great deal more flexibility in his 
or her retirement decisions.
Medicare Part B: The benefit pay to help people pay Medicare Part B 
premiums will be increased to $12.20 as of August 1982, $13.00 as of 
Aug. 1983 and $13.50 as of Aug. 1984. The payment will not be more 
than the actual Medicare premium.
Worker Counseling and Outplacement Assistance Programs: The com 
pany will provide counseling and outplacement assistance to workers 
who are affected by plant closings. The primary intent of the programs is 
that the company work aggressively in an effort to find suitable alter 
native for workers who will be displaced by plant closings. The union will 
have appropriate input into the development and execution of these pro 
grams.
Local Agreements: The union and the company agreed that local 
bargaining committees should be given the option of conducting local 
negotiations. Consequently, should either side wish to engage in bargain 
ing, it must make its intentions known within five (5) days following the 
effective date of the new National Agreement. If approval is granted by 
the UAW National Ford Department and/or the Ford Vice President for 
labor relations, bargaining must commence within ten (10) days, and 
must be completed within sixty (60) days after approval is granted. 
However, if an agreement is not reached, the present agreement will re 
main in effect for the duration of the new National Agreement.
Profit Sharing
The new UAW-Ford agreement provides for the first time in UAW- 
Ford history, a profit-sharing program for eligible UAW members.
Eligibility
U.S. hourly workers with one-year seniority at the end of any plan 
year will be eligible to participate, except for those who quit or are 
discharged during the plan year.
Effective Date
The first profit-sharing plan year will begin Jan. 1, 1983, and eligible 
UAW members employed at Ford will share in the profits for that calen 
dar year.
Formula
Those participating in the program will share in profits whenever 
before-taxes profits exceed 2.3% of total sales by U.S. Ford operations 
(excluding Ford Aerospace and Ford Motor Land Development Corp.).
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The amount shared will be a percentage of the profits over that 2.3%, 
and the percentage to be shared will increase as profits measured against 
sales increase.
Distribution
The amount of money in the profit-sharing pool will be divided be 
tween hourly workers covered by the plan and salaried workers who do 
not receive bonuses. (In general, since hourly workers comprise about 
10% of the total workforce, they will share in about 70% of the profit- 
sharing pool.)
Each eligible worker will receive a profit-sharing check at the end of 
the first quarter following the plan year. The amount distributed to each 
will be pro-rated on the proportion of each worker's yearly earnings 
compared to the total annual hourly payroll.
Wages—No UAW/Ford worker's paycheck will be reduced. Wages 
will increase substantially over the course of the agreement. If inflation 
averages 7.5 percent, for example, a Ford assembler now earning an 
hourly wage of $11.67 would receive $13.66 by June, 1983. A toolmaker 
(skilled trades) now earning $13.84 would receive $15.83 by June, 1983. 
Of course, a different inflation rate would result in different wage in 
creases.
Base rates would remain unchanged during the agreement. There will 
be no annual improvement factor increases. Both the COLA principle 
and current 0.26 COLA formula are maintained.
COLA adjustments due in March, June and September, 1982, are 
deferred and restored in September, 1983, December, 1983, and March, 
1984, respectively. Regular COLA adjustments will be made each 
quarter beginning in December, 1982. In the three quarters in which 
deferred COLA is recovered, there will be an increase that includes the 
regular COLA PLUS the deferred COLA. There is a two-cent diversion 
from each of the first three COLA adjustments which are deferred. The 
diversion means that the amount of the COLA increase generated, for 
example, in March, 1982, is reduced by two cents when it is restored in 
September, 1983. The first two diversions would have been required 
under the old agreement.
To protect UAW/Ford workers in the event of an unlikely massive 
surge in inflation, the total amount of the deferred COLA during the 
first three quarters will not exceed 60 cents. Thus, if high inflation 
generated 68 cents over that period (after the three 2C diversions), 8 cents 
would be added to the hourly rate in September, 1982.
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New Hires: A new hire will receive 85% of the hourly rate for his or 
her job and will receive 5% increases every six months until reaching the 
going rate. Rehires are not affected. Certain benefit programs will also 
be phased in for new hires.
Guaranteed Income Stream
Eligible UAW members employed at Ford Motor Co. will be eligible 
for a guaranteed income in the event of layoff, until they reach age 62 or 
until they retire—whichever is earlier. In addition to the income protec 
tion, the program provides a disincentive for the company to lay off 
workers and an incentive to help workers who are laid off to find 
employment.
Eligibility
To be eligible, an employee must
1. Have 15 or more years of seniority at the time of layoff.
2. Be working on or after the effective date of the agreement.
3. Be able and available for work, unless disabled, maintain registra 
tion with the state employment service, and accept employment arranged 
by the company or state agency.
Payments
The minimum Guaranteed Income Stream payment, for workers with 
15 years of seniority, will be 50% of the employee's hourly rate as of the 
last day worked.
For each year of seniority over 15, the rate increases by one percentage 
point; i.e., a worker with 25 years of seniority would receive 50% + 10% 
for a total of 60%.
The maximum benefit will be either 75% of the employee's weekly 
wage, or 95% of the employee's weekly after-tax base pay, minus $12.50, 
whichever is less.
Health insurance and life insurance benefits will be provided for 
employees in the Guaranteed Income Stream program.
Upon retirement, an employee in the Guaranteed Income Stream will 
receive pension and other retirement benefits as if the employee had 
maintained employment until the date of retirement.
Other Provisions
Guaranteed Income Stream benefits will be reduced by other contrac 
tual or government benefit payments received, income replacement 
benefits, and/or 80% of earnings from other employment.
Falsification of information can be grounds for termination or suspen 
sion from the Guaranteed Income Stream program.
Disability benefits will be provided under the program.
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Training and Retraining Program
The new UAW-Ford agreement addresses the problem of retraining 
both displaced and present workers by providing for the establishment of 
an Employee Development and Training Program.
Scope
This Program will be empowered to:
—Arrange for or provide "training, retraining, and development 
assistance for employees displaced by new technologies, new production 
techniques, and shifts in customer-produce preference." It also could 
undertake similar efforts for "employees displaced as a result of facility 
closings or discontinuances of operations."
—Provide present employees with a program so that training/educa 
tional courses can be made available to upgrade/sharpen present job 
skills, provide updating on the state-of-the-art technology for skilled and 
semi-skilled employees based on present and anticipated job re 
quirements, and improve the job satisfaction and performance of all 
employees."
Governance
The Program will be under the jurisdiction of a new UAW-Ford Na 
tional Development and Training Center that will
—Be governed by an equal number of representatives of the union and 
the company, and
—Initially employ an Executive Director and full-time staff of at least 
six persons.
Programs
The Center could "make available a wide range of educational, train 
ing, and retraining services" and, for example, could provide local on- 
site classroom training and outside consulting services, etc., when needs 
can't be met through existing internal and external resources.
Mutual Growth Forums
UAW members employed at the Ford Motor Co. will get new input in 
to the management decision-making process through a framework of 
joint union-management bodies called Mutual Growth Forums, which 
will operate at both the local and national levels.
Scope
The Mutual Growth Forums will be empowered to undertake "ad 
vance discussion of certain business developments that are of material in 
terest and significance to the union, the employees, and the company."
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National Level
An equal number of union and company representatives will comprise 
the national Forum which will be empowered, among other things, to 
discuss the company's general operations and certain business 
developments, examine government relations matters, and take other ac 
tions. The Director of the UAW National Ford Dept. may address the 
company's board of directors twice yearly.
Local Level
At the plant level, it is suggested that the Forums meet at least quarter 
ly to discuss such things as "the plant's general operation and certain 
business developments." The local Forums will get periodic financial 




Provisions of 1979-82 Agreement between State of New York 
and Civil Service Employees Association Establishing Con 
tinuity, Evaluation, Productivity and Quality of Working Life 
Committee
VI. Bylaws of the Continuity, Evaluation, Productivity and Quality of 
Working Life Committee
Article I. The Committee
Section One. The Committee shall be comprised of twenty-one (21) 
voting members to be appointed as follows:
A) Three (3) impartial members shall be jointly appointed by and 
serve at the joint pleasure of the Director of the Office of 
Employee Relations (hereinafter "O.E.R.") and the President 
of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (hereinafter 
"C.S.E.A."), and
B) Nine (9) members shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure 
of the Director of O.E.R., and
C) Nine (9) members shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure 
of the President of C.S.E.A.
Section Two. The Committee shall study and make recommendations to 
the Executive Committee concerning prospective mechanisms for the im 
provement of the work environment of State employees pursuant to its 
enabling provisions in the 1979-82 State of New York/CSEA collective 
bargaining agreements.
Section Three. The Committee shall meet at least annually for the pur 
pose of integrating and evaluating the policy proposals of the sub 
committees, preparing an agenda of topics to be analyzed by the sub 
committees in the ensuing year, and making recommendations to the Ex 
ecutive Committee concerning policy and programs. Special meetings of 
the Committee may be called by the Chairperson upon ten working days 
notice to the members at a time, date and location mutually convenient 
to the members of the Committee.
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Article II. The Chairperson and the Executive Committee
Section One. The Chairperson of the Committee shall be jointly ap 
pointed by and serve at the joint pleasure of the Director of O.E.R. and 
the President of C.S.E.A. from among the impartial members appointed 
pursuant to Article I, SI (A) of these Bylaws.
Section Two. There shall be an Executive Committee comprised of the 
President of C.S.E.A., the Director of O.E.R., and the Chairperson of 
the Committee.
Section Three. The Executive Committee shall approve or reject, upon 
recommendations from the Committee or sub-committees thereof or, 
upon its own initiative, any expenditures of monies appropriated to the 
"statewide major issues study fund" established pursuant to the 1979-82 
State of New York/CSEA collective bargaining agreements.
Section Four. Upon authorization from the Executive Committee pur 
suant to Section Three, the Chairperson or his designees may authorize 
disbursements, hire employees and execute contracts to assist in the per 
formance of Committee or sub-committee functions (as set forth in Ar 
ticles I and III hereof, respectively). All employees of the Committee 
shall report directly to the Chairperson or his designees for purposes of 
attendance and leave.
Article III. Sub-committees
Section One. The Committee shall have three (3) standing sub 
committees, as follows:
A) Continuity of Employment,
B) Performance Evaluation, and
C) Quality of Working Life and Productivity.
Section Two. The members of each standing sub-committee shall be ap 
pointed as follows:
A) The chairperson of the sub-committee shall be appointed jointly 
by the Director of O.E.R. and the President of C.S.E.A. from 
among those impartial Committee members appointed pursuant 
to Article I, S1(A) of these Bylaws,
B) Three (3) members of the sub-committee shall be appointed by 
the Director of O.E.R. from among those Committee members 
appointed pursuant to Article I, S1(B) of these Bylaws, and
C) Three (3) members of the sub-committee shall be appointed by 
the President of C.S.E.A. from among those Committee 
members appointed pursuant to Article I, S1(C) of these Bylaws.
D) No Committee members shall be appointed to more than one 
sub-committee.
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Section Three. Each sub-committee shall be empowered to make recom 
mendations concerning programs and the funding thereof directly to the 
Executive Committee.
Section Four. Each sub-committee shall submit, at least, an annual 
report to the Committee on or about March 1 concerning the results of 
studies undertaken by the sub-committee.
Section Five. All actions and recommendations to the Executive Commit 
tee, by the sub-committee, including any reports and recommendations 
concerning programs shall require a majority vote of the sub-committee 
taken at a meeting of the sub-committee. The chairperson of the sub 
committee may vote only in the event of a tie among the other members.
Section Six. Each sub-committee shall meet at least quarterly and any 
meeting may be called by the respective chairperson upon ten working 
days notice to the members of the sub-committee at a time, date and 
location mutually convenient to the members. No meeting may be con 
vened and no business transacted unless a majority of the entire member 
ship of the sub-committee and an equal number of members appointed 
pursuant to Article I, S1(B) and members appointed pursuant to Article 
I, S1(C) of these Bylaws are present.
Article IV. Procedures
Section One. Except as otherwise expressly provided by these Bylaws, the 
meetings and business of the Committee and standing sub-committees 





Quality of Working Life Agreement
July 26,1976
Agreement among the city of Columbus, Ohio, Local #1632 of the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and 
The Ohio State University Quality of Working Life Program of the 
Center for Human Resource Research to undertake a quality of working 
life demonstration effort in Columbus.
I. Background
Discussions with city administrators, city councilmen, and employee 
representatives in the city of Columbus, Ohio, have indicated an interest 
in efforts to improve both the quality of the work environment of 
municipal employees and the services provided by the city government. 
This mutual interest suggests the basis for a successful quality of work 
demonstration project in the city. This agreement outlines the steps 
which are involved in undertaking a quality of work effort and defines 
the nature of the participation of The Ohio State University Quality of 
Working Life Program (QWLP).
II. Funding
The QWLP, immediately upon the signing and ratification of this 
agreement, will forward a request to the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to release funds allocated to the Columbus ef 
fort for the period of October 1, 1976, to September 30, 1977, and for 
the period of October 1, 1977, to September 30, 1978. The city of Colum 
bus will contribute $25,000 a year for a 2-year period beginning October 
1, 1976. Payments will be made quarterly beginning on January 1, 1977. 
Local #1632 will make $1,000 payments on October 1,1977, and October 
1, 1978. These funds will be used to cover QWLP questionnaires, sup 
plies, seminars, educational services, etc. Should the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare not release the funds specified, this 
agreement is invalid.
III. Duration and Approvals
The agreed upon duration of this project is 24 months beginning on 
October 1, 1976, or, if agreement has not been reached by October 1 on 
the new labor contract, on the day following ratification of the new con 
tract. Only 24 months of funding is being requested at this time. By the 
end of the project's 15th month, the city Quality of Working Life Com 
mittee will decide whether to continue the project for an additional
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18-month or 2-year period. If so, the OSU QWLP will request additional 
funding and will continue to provide technical assistance for the addi 
tional period. Before the project can begin, ratification by the member 
ship of Local #1632' and approval by the city council is required. 2
1. The proposal will be put before the membership of Local #1632 at the next membership 
meeting, which will be held in September.
2. This proposal will be taken before city council for approval after it has been ratified by 
the membership of Local #1632.
IV. Scope
A. Experimenting Groups. This project will start with the establish 
ment of one division level Quality of Working Life Committee in a divi 
sion to be selected by the Public Service Quality of Working Life Com 
mittee and one working level committee in part of this division to be 
selected by the Division Quality of Working Life Committee. From 
there, the goal is to create additional experimenting groups (working 
level Quality of Working Life Committees) as rapidly as is feasible. The 
rate of spread will be determined by staff resources and the judgment of 
the City and Public Service Quality of Working Life Committees. The 
method will be the provision of technical assistance to city, department, 
division, and working level committees in structuring worker participa 
tion to improve the quality of the working environment and the quality 
of services provided to the public. The first experimenting groups will be 
selected and formed on the basis of existing knowledge of the operation 
and of the receptivity of workers, middle management, and first line 
supervision. Subsequent experimenting groups will be selected on the 
basis of questionnaire and productivity measurement results and other 
relevant factors.
B. Questionnaire. A questionnaire will be administered to all of the 
approximately 2,000 hourly and salaried employees in the Public Service 
Department including supervision and middle and top management. 
Some form of feedback, either written or oral, will be provided to all 
employees taking the questionnaire by Quality of Working Life Program 
staff. The results of the questionnaire will serve as a basis for selecting 
additional experimenting groups. Productivity information will also be 
gathered for all employees of the department.
V. Structure
A. City Quality of Working Life Committee. A City Quality of Work 
ing Life Committee will be formed consisting of the mayor and two or 
three management representatives appointed by him (including the direc 
tor of the Public Service Department) and the president of Local #1632, 
the director of District 53, the president of the council, and one or two 
other union officials appointed by them. This committee will meet at
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least once each month to sanction and keep apprised of all quality of 
work life activities in the city. The mayor and the top officials of 
AFSCME District 53 and Local #1632 agree to give top priority to their 
personal attendance at these meetings. The city and AFSCME will each 
provide a part-time executive secretary to the committee who will be 
jointly responsible for preparing the agenda, developing staff proposals 
for the consideration of the committee, and doing the necessary staff 
work to assure that all committee decisions are implemented. They will 
report to the chairperson of the committee and will be assisted by such 
interns and clerical personnel as are considered necessary by the commit 
tee and assigned by the city.
B. Public Service Quality of Working Life Committee. A labor- 
management Public Services Quality of Working Life Committee will be 
formed and will meet at least once each month. Its composition, nature, 
and functions are as follows:
1. Composition. The director of the Public Service Department 
and the chief union official of that department will each sit on 
this committee. Its chairmanship will rotate every 6 months be 
tween management and labor. Management and the president of 
Local #1632 will each appoint four or five other management 
and union members.
2. Nature. This is a cooperative committee formed to create a 
cooperative relationship in addition to the adversary one. It can 
deal with matters on which there is mutual agreement but does 
not deal with grievances, collective bargaining, or other matters 
of a controversial nature. It is not intended to settle disputes. It 
is intended to remove the root causes for these disputes by im 
proving the quality of the work environment for employees of 
the Public Service Department. Both the city and the union ac 
cept on faith that improved productivity and worker well-being 
will follow.
3. Functions. Its functions will be to plan a quality of working life 
program for the Public Service Department, to provide an um 
brella to protect and preserve the program and assure the 
cooperation of all parties, to make such waivers of contractual 
and policy provisions as are necessary during the experimental 
period, to form such division-level and working-level commit 
tees as are indicated, and to monitor the progress of the commit 
tees in reorganizing work and in improving the working environ 
ment in the Public Service Department.
C. Working-Level Quality of Working Life Committees. These com 
mittees will be the heart of the Columbus Quality of Working Life pro 
ject and will generally service groups of 30-50 employees. Shop stewards 
in the employee groups will automatically sit on these committees. Other
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employee representatives will be elected by a vote of the work group 
members and will serve staggered terms to assure continuity. The super 
visor or head of the employee group will sit on the committee and will ap 
point the other management members. An internal election will be held 
by each committee each 6 months to assure that the chairmanship and 
secretaryship rotate between labor and management.
D. Additional Department Quality of Working Life Committees. The 
City Quality of Working Life Committee will, as circumstances indicate, 
establish additional departmental quality of working life committees.
VI. Technical Assistance
A. An Ohio State University QWLP staff member will sit with the Ci 
ty Quality of Working Life Committee, Public Service Quality of Work 
ing Life Committee, Divisional Quality of Working Life Committee, and 
working-level committees at their meeting and offer any possible 
assistance.
B. Educational and informational services will be available at the re 
quest of the committees. Such services include:
1. in house seminars led by nationally recognized experts in the 
field of work restructuring.
2. visits by committee members and others to organizations where 
successful experiments have taken place.
3. provision to the committee of reading material and research ser 
vices by the Ohio State University Quality of Working Life Pro 
gram.
4. training conferences for working-level committee members and 
others in communications, supervisory practices, and changing 
roles in quality of working life situations.
VII. Procedures
Phase I - Six Months.
The following steps will be taken under the guidance of the City and 
Public Service Quality of Working Life Committees.
A. Questionnaire. On a voluntary basis, all Public Service Depart 
ment employees will fill out the questionnaire which appears as Appen 
dix A to "The Quality of Work and Its Outcomes" (Ohio: The Academy 
for Contemporary Problems, 1975). Questionnaires will be completed 
during working hours in groups of approximately 20-25 employees. Data 
will be used in aggregate form broken down by organizational unit. In 
dividual responses will be held strictly confidential.
B. Formation of First Working-Level Committee. As soon as the 
questionnaire has been administered, the Public Service Quality of
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Working Life Committee will decide on the first unit to have a working- 
level committee and will take the necessary steps to establish this ex 
perimenting committee and any intervening committees which are 
necessary to assure an umbrella for the experiment. By the time the ques 
tionnaire report is made to the Public Service Quality of Working Life 
Committee, it will have some experience with one working-level commit 
tee and will be able to select the next units to have working-level commit 
tees and schedule their formation.
C. Feedback. Summaries of questionnaire results will be presented to 
employees in writing with a statement from the Public Service Quality of 
Working Life Committee informing them of the working-level commit 
tees that have already been formed and the Public Service Committee's 
plans for expanding and including more employees in the experiment. 
The results will be discussed orally with all employees who are in ex 
perimenting units covered by working-level committees as these commit 
tees are formed.
D. Productivity Data. Working with the various committees, the OSU 
QWLP staff will develop criteria for measuring productivity and/or the 
quality of services and make baseline measurements according to the 
criteria agreed to by the City Quality of Working Life Committee.
E. Report to City Quality of Working Life Committee. The OSU 
QWLP will furnish a report to the City Quality of Working Life Com 
mittee summarizing and commenting on the questionnaire results. 
Preparation of this report is estimated at 8 weeks from the time all ques 
tionnaires are complete.
Phase II • Two Months.
Quality of Work Plan. Upon receipt of the questionnaire report, the 
next steps will be in the hands of the City and Public Service Quality of 
Working Life Committees. Based on the information provided and on 
the educational seminars conducted during the first phase of the project, 
the Committee will develop, agree to, and implement whatever kind of 
quality of working life plan it deems appropriate.
Phase III -16 Months.
While a number of work restructuring activities may already have 
begun during Phase I and II, Phase III will be the "implementation" 
phase. Educational activities and assistance will continue as requested by 
the Public Service Quality of Working Life Committee.
Phase IV - Remeasurement.
A remeasurement will occur 18 months from the date the question 
naires are initially administered. This will begin a regular program of 
keeping aware of employee attitudes toward working conditions. The
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remeasurement will also include some form of feedback mechanism. If it 
is mutually decided to continue the program beyond the 2 years which 
are now tentatively funded, remeasurements will continue at 18-month 
intervals.
VIII. Additional Provisions
A. All parties understand and believe tht a project of this type offers 
potentially significant benefits to all concerned. These benefits arise, in 
part, from the creation of a forum for the discussion of situations and 
solutions, which is free from the tensions inherent in the traditional 
labor-management relationship. Therefore, this forum will not be utiliz 
ed for discussing or dealing with issues and questions which are properly 
in the province of existing, formal, collective bargaining institutions. All 
parties also agree to accept the working assumption that improvements 
in the working environment will benefit both services to the public and 
worker well-being and so do not have to be justified on an individual 
quid-pro-quo basis.
B. The following procedures are agreed to with regard to project train 
ing expenses:
1. Any lost time for activities of employees (management and non- 
management) in connection with the project (on or off of the 
job) will be borne by the city.
2. Travel, expenses, and fees of city employees (management and 
nonmanagement) representatives for offsite activities will be 
borne by the city.
3. Travel, expenses, fees, and lost time for AFSCME staff not 
from the local union will be borne by AFSCME.
4. The city will budget $22,000 per year cash for travel, expenses, 
and fees in connection with this training and $24,400 per year 
for lost time. The $22,000 will be included in the $25,000 
payments mentioned in section II of this agreement.
IX. Dissemination of Experience and Results
A. Experience Sharing. Management and AFSCME people from the 
city of Columbus agree to participate in conferences and seminars as re 
quested to share their experiences (when feasible within workload and 
time constraints) with other cities, states, etc.
B. Publication. Management and the union agree that, after each 
measurement process, the OSU QWLP can use the data gathered in 
published accounts of the experiment in order to assist other cities in 
their efforts to improve worker satisfaction and productivity.
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X. Commitments
A. Management guarantees that:
1. No employee will be laid off or have his compensation reduced 
as a result of the QWLP.
2. It will "free up" city employees for the time necessary for com 
mittee meetings, training (both on and off the job), team 
building and communications. It accepts the possibility of an in 
itial loss in productivity due to this lost time in hopes of an even 
tual increase due to these activities.
3. Management agrees to work with the union and employees in ex 
ploring and developing a means of sharing any productivity 
gains achieved through this project with the employees involved.
4. Management accepts the policy of utilizing productivity in 
creases by expanding services to the public rather than reducing 
employment.
B. The union will make every effort to resolve any grievances filed on 
contract items set aside for trial periods to facilitate work activity outside 
the formal grievance procedure.
C. Management and union commit themselves to:
1. Keep adversary issues out of the quality of work project and 
continue the project and the cooperative relationship in the face 
of such issues—difficult though this may be.
2. A willingness to try new things—with the understanding that ef 
forts which do not work to the satisfaction of both parties can be 
terminated without prejudicing the whole program.
The signatures on this agreement indicate a commitment to cooperate 
on a program, the purpose being to seek new approaches and, where in 
dicated, implement these approaches in order that the employees of the 
city of Columbus can experience increased satisfaction and productivity. 
They also indicate a joint commitment to improving conditions of securi 
ty, equity, individuation, and participation for municipal employees.
Signed by the following:
Tom Moody Phil Chevallard 
Mayor, City of Columbus President, District 53
Warren Jennings Don Ronchi 
Director, District 53 The Ohio State University 
Robert C. Parkinson Qualitv of Working Life Program 





Excerpt from Agreement between TVA and the Tennessee 
Valley Trades and Labor Council (revised through March 15, 
1981) on Organization of Central and Local Cooperative Com 
mittees
Cooperative Committees
TVA and the Council agree to the following statement of organization of 
the central and local joint cooperative committees in accordance with, 
and for the purposes stated in Article X of this agreement.
A. Central Joint Cooperative Committee
1. The Central Joint Cooperative Committee is made up of the Ex 
ecutive Board of the Council and the following TVA represen 
tatives: Manager of Engineering Design and Construction, 
Manager of Power, Manager of Agricultural and Chemical 
Development, Manager of Construction, Manager of Power 
Operations, and Directors of Chemical Operations, Nuclear 
Power, Fossil and Hydro Power, Power System Operations, Power 
Construction, Property and Services, and the Director of Person 
nel.
2. A management representative on the central committee designated 
by the Manager of Management Services and the President of the 
Council serve as cochairmen on the central committee. A member 
of the Division of Personnel serves as secretary of the central com 
mittee.
3. The central committee develops the basic guidelines for an organiz 
ed program of employee-management cooperation. It promotes the 
formation of local committees, determines the form or organiza 
tion, and furnishes guidance for the conduct of the committees. It 
reviews the progress of the local committees, as reported by the 
secretary, and acts on any suggestions of TVA-wide significance 
which local committees refer to it. In addition, the central commit 
tee takes up such matters as are brought to it by its members, 
discusses major TVA programs and the general policies related to 
union-management cooperation, and sponsors suitable programs 
to provide information of general interest to employees concerning 
TVA activities.
4. The central committee meets at least once a year. This annual 
meeting shall be held in conjunction with an annual Valley-wide 
conference of the officers of local joint cooperative committees.
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Other meetings of the central committee may be held upon call of 
the cochairmen.
5. All actions of the central committee are by unanimous concur 
rence.
B. Local Joint Cooperative Committees
1. Local joint cooperative committees are established by agreement 
between representatives of labor and management, and with the ap 
proval of the central committee, on a plant-, project-, or division- 
wide basis. Each local committee defines its scope as to plant, pro 
ject, or division, providing for the inclusion of all employee groups 
represented by the Council.
2. Management and employees each designate members to serve on 
the local committee; the numbers need not be equal. All members 
shall be TVA employees. The employee representatives are 
designated by the labor organizations participating in the local 
committee and must be approved by the Council. The management 
members are designated by the top supervisor of the administrative 
unit served by the committee. The top supervisor serves as a 
member.
3. The local committee elects a chairman and a cochairman, one each 
from management and labor. The committee also elects a secretary.
4. The cochairmen and the secretary act as a steering committee which 
provides the leadership for planning and carrying on committee 
business and which handles matters between meetings.
5. The local committee schedules regular meetings. Special meetings 
are called by the steering committee. Committee members attend 
meetings without loss of time.
6. The committee receives suggestions made by either employees or 
supervisors. The committee evaluates each suggestion. Action is 
taken by unanimous concurrence. Suggestions relating to activities 
which extend in scope beyond the unit in which the committee 




Awards by the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service under the
Labor-Management Cooperation Act of 1978,
Fiscal Year 1981
A. Joint Industry Committees
1. City of San Francisco/Service Employees International Union (and 
others). The present LMC working in the city's Housing Authority 
would expand to include at least four new city departments and rele 
vant unions for the purpose of improving public service and employee 
relations. ($54,494)
2. Houston Belt and Terminal Railway/United Tranportation Union 
and Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks. The Houston-based 
and FRA-financed labor-management committee would develop a 
training program so that railroad companies belonging to labor- 
management committees in Houston and Buffalo can implement the 
LMC concept in their own companies. ($88,142)
3. Indiana University/Fraternal Order of Police and the Professional 
Fire Fighters Union. This existing statewide LMC consisting of 
representatives of the Indiana Association of Cities and Towns and 
police and firefighters would be strengthened. ($57,247)
B. Regional and Community-Wide Joint Committees
1. Chautauqua County Labor-Management Committee. This newly 
created area LMC would create eight in-plant committees and attempt 
to reduce man-days lost to strikes by 50 percent. ($44,000)
2. Chemung County Labor-Management Committee. This upstate New 




3. Clinton County, Pennsylvania. This existing LMC would be 
strengthened and enabled to create at least three new in-plant commit 
tees while reducing local workdays lost to labor disputes. ($79,753)
4. Jamestown Labor-Management Committee. The City of Jamestown 
would expand present LMC efforts and create at least four new in- 
plant committees. ($73,753)
5. Michigan Quality of Work Life Council. The Council would be en 
abled to establish up to six new area LMCs throughout the state of 
Michigan over an 18-month period and promote the LMC concept 
through training sessions and conferences. ($150,000)
6. Northeast Labor-Management Center. This Boston-based LMC 
would establish five in-plant committees in five different major in 
dustries in the state of Massachusetts as pilot demonstration projects 
for those industries. ($98,275)
7. Philadelphia Area Labor-Management Committee. This newly 
established LMC would hire permanent staff and develop what may 
become the nation's largest local area LMC whose goals include the 
creation of both in-plant and industry committees within the 
Philadelphia area. ($150,000)
8. Siouxland Labor-Management Committee. This Sioux City, Iowa 
area LMC would expand its operations and create at least three new 
in-plant committees. ($76,000)
C. In-Plant Labor-Management Committees
1. Diamond International Corporation/United Paperworkers Interna 
tional Union (Palmer, Massachusetts). Labor-management commit 
tees would be set up in three sites (Natchez, Mississippi, Red Bluff, 
California, and Plattsburgh, New York) to oversee a new and in 
novative employee incentive program. ($37,494)
2. Rath Packing Company/United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union (Waterloo, Iowa). This worker-owned plant would expand the 
efforts of its labor-management committee in establishing Action 
Research Teams to improve productivity and reduce grievances. 
($24,400)
3. Rome Cable Company/International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (Rome, New York). An in-plant labor- 
management committee designed to increase plant productivity and 
improve the quality of work life would be established. ($26,010)
Appendix C




Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
Kenneth Moffett, Director (202) 655-4000 
2100 K St., N.W. 
Washington, DC 20427
Labor-Management Services Administration 
Office of Labor-Management Relations Services 
John Stepp, Director (202) 523-6487 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Washington, DC 20210
Occupational Health and Safety Administration
Office of Policy Analysis
Frank Frodyma, Director (202) 523-8021
U.S. Department of Labor
Washington, DC 20210
National Organizations
American Productivity Center 
Pete Moffett, President (713) 961-7740 
123 North Post Oak Lane 
Houston, TX 77024
American Quality of Work Life Center 
Ted Mills, Chairman (202) 338-2933 
3301 New Mexico Ave., N.W. 
Washington, DC 20016
Association for Workplace Democracy 
John Simmons, Coordinator (202) 265-7727 




Center for Productive Public Management 
Marc Holzer, Director (212) 489-5030 
City University of New York 
445 West 59th St. 
New York, NY 10019
Center for Quality of Working Life
Louis E. Davis, Chairman (213) 825-1095
University of California
405 Hilgard Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90024
Harvard Project on Technology, Work, and Character 
Michael Maccoby, President (202) 462-3003 
1710 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 
Washington, DC 20009
Management and Behavioral Science Center 
Charles Dwyer, Director (215) 243-5736 
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104
National Association of Area Labor-Management Committees
John J. Popular, President (703) 777-8700
Box 118
Fairfax, VA 22030
National Center for Employee Ownership 
Corey Rosen, President (703) 931-2757 
4836 South 28th St. 
Arlington, VA 22206
National Council for Alternative Work Patterns, Inc. 
Gail Rosenberg, President (202) 466-4467 
1925 K St., N.W. 
Washington, DC 20006
National Council on Alcoholism, Inc. 
Labor-Management Services Dept. 
William Dunkin, Director (212) 986-4433 
733 Third Ave., Suite 1405 
New York, NY 10017
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New Systems of Work and Participation Program 
William H. Whyte, Director (607) 256-4530 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, NY 14850
Profit Sharing Research Foundation 
Bert L. Metzger, President (312) 869-8787 
1718 Sherman Ave. 
Evanston, IL 60201
Quality of Work Program
Stanley E. Seashore, Director (313) 763-4064
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48106
Work in America Institute, Inc.
Jerome M. Rosow, President (914) 472-9600
700 White Plains Road
Scarsdale, NY 10583
Regional and State Organizations
Maryland Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life 
Tom Tuttle, Director (301) 454-5451 
University of Maryland 
College Park, MD 20742
Michigan Quality of Work Life Council 
Basil Whiting, Director (313) 362-1611 
755 West Big Beaver 
Troy, MI 48084
Northeast Labor-Management Center
Michael J. Brower, Executive Director (617) 489-4002
30 Church St., Suite 301
Boston, MA 02108
Ohio Quality of Working Life Program 
Don Ronchi, Director (614) 422-3390 
Center for Human Resources Research 




Thomas P. Fullmer, Director (602) 965-7626
College of Business Administration
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ 85281
Quality of Working Life Program 
Milton Derber, Professor (217) 333-0981 
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations 
University of Illinois 
Champaign, IL 61820
Texas Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life 
Barry Macy, Director (806) 742-2011 
College of Business Administration 
Texas Tech University 
Lubbock, TX 79401
Utah Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life 
Gary Hanson, Director (801) 752-4100 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84321
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